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This thesis explores the protection of ownership of corporeal moveables in Scots law 
with particular reference to the position of a good faith acquirer from a non-owner. It 
exposes three fundamental tenets of Scots property law to critical scrutiny: the sharp 
theoretical distinction between possession and ownership, the requirement that the 
owner consent to derivative transfer and the right of the owner to recover his or her 
property from any third party in possession. In many other civil law jurisdictions, 
greater protection is afforded to the bona fide purchaser. The thesis explores the 
historical and doctrinal reasons for the strong protection of the original owner in 
Scots doctrine, including an important Romanist tradition but also a significant moral 
and theological emphasis on the duty to restore, particularly in Viscount Stair’s 
influential Institutions.  Utilising a historical and comparative approach, the first part 
of the thesis outlines the development of early Scots law and the foundation of the 
modern Romanist structure of the law governing transfer of moveables. It is argued 
that the modern patchwork of exceptions to the nemo plus rule lacks any unifying 
justificatory principle and produce often uncertain results. The thesis also examines 
the various justifications advanced for protecting good faith acquirers. The most 
frequently cited explanation is that of promotion of commerce, but significant 
difficulties are identified with this argument. It is further concluded that the publicity 
afforded by possession is not sufficient for it to justify protection of acquirers. In 
terms of security and certainty of rights, good faith acquisition is not a panacea for 
the problems associated with highly mobile property such as vehicles. However, in 
light of the deficiencies of the current Scots law rules, a clear doctrine explicitly 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A. THE BONA FIDE PURCHASE PROBLEM 
  
Among the fundamental tenets of Scots property law are three doctrinal 
characteristics derived from Roman law: a sharp theoretical distinction between 
possession and ownership, a requirement that the owner consent to derivative 
transfer and a right of the owner to recover his or her property from any third party in 
possession.
1
 The thesis seeks to investigate these dogmas through consideration of 
one particular problem: the transfer of corporeal moveable property by a non-owner 
and the position of a good faith acquirer from a non-entitled party. 
 
In many civil law jurisdictions, greater protection is afforded to the bona fide 
purchaser.
2
 The thesis explores the historical and doctrinal reasons for the strong 
protection of the original owner in Scots doctrine, including an important Romanist 
tradition but also a significant moral and theological emphasis on the duty to restore, 




Corporeal moveables present particular difficulties related to goods’ physical 
mobility, the need for facility of transfer and the fact that transactions are not 
routinely registered. As immoveable property raises different issues connected to the 
need to ensure proper functioning of the land registration system,
4
 discussion is 
confined to corporeal moveable property,
5
 but the extent to which the principles 
                                                          
1
 See K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) paras 114; 669; 158 respectively. Of 
course, there are some instances of involuntary transfer but the “cardinal principle” is that no one 
should be deprived of property without his or her consent. See Reid, Property paras 663-668. 
2
 For a comparative survey, see B Lurger and W Faber (eds), Principles of European Law on 
Acquisition and Loss of Ownership of Goods (2010) 890. The variety in solutions adopted within 
Europe has been strikingly illustrated in a diagram produced by Arthur Salomons, see A F Salomons, 
“How to Draft New Rules on the Bona Fide Acquisition of Movables for Europe? Some Remarks on 
Method and Content”, in W Faber and B Lurger (eds), Rules for the Transfer of Movables: A 
Candidate for European Harmonisation or National Reform (2008) 141 at 142. 
 
3
 J Dalrymple (Viscount Stair), Institutions of the Law of Scotland (1681; 2nd edn 1693). 
4
 See for example Scottish Law Commission, Land Registration: Void and Voidable Titles (Scot Law 
Com DP No 125, 2004) at paras 4.33-4.35. 
5
 Where appropriate, it is recognised that the category of corporeal moveable property is not a 
homogeneous one. For example, Reid points out that, in relation to remedies protecting possession, 
ships, aircraft, caravans, oil platforms and other substantial moveable structures may be closer to 
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identified form part of a unitary property law would be a fruitful area for future 
research. 
Although interesting questions are undoubtedly raised by forms of transfer 
other than sale (for example donation or exchange), transfer for value provides the 
clearest example of the general dilemma: following an unauthorised transfer of 
moveables, should orginal owner or transferee be recognised as owner? Discussion 
focuses on three core cases, and the extent to which they can and should be 
distinguished in Scots doctrine. The first is where an owner, Anne, transfers property 
to Beth but there is a defect in the transfer giving Anne the right to avoid it, for 
example the transfer was induced by Beth’s fraud. What is Anne’s position if, before 
she can challenge the transfer, Beth sells the thing to Cara? Currently, the answer 
depends on the distinction between a transfer which is void and one which is merely 
voidable.
6
 In the case of a voidable transfer, the defect giving ground for challenge is 
personal, i.e. only relevant in a question with Beth. Subsequent transferees will not 
be affected. Usually if Anne can be said to have given her consent to transfer, 
ownership will pass to Beth subject to Anne’s personal right to avoid the transfer. 
Until Anne acts to challenge the transfer, Beth will be thus able to pass ownership to 
Cara.
7
 Assuming Cara to have no knowledge of the defect, Anne will have no claim 
against her. 
 
This may be compared with the second core case: Beth’s acquisition of 
physical possession of Anne’s property entirely without her consent. This might be 
because the thing has been stolen from Anne, or because she has lost it. Under the 
current law, Beth does not acquire any right in the property through possession and 
thus cannot give any right to Cara: Nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam 
ipse haberet (“the nemo plus principle”).
8
 Anne’s complete lack of consent to 
transfer is a defect which prevents acquisition indefinitely. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
heritable property as the pursuer may be more interested in the defender relinquishing his or her 
unlawful possession than in securing redelivery: Reid, Property para 159. 
6
 See Reid, Property paras 601 and  607. 
7
 Of course, if Anne acts timeously to avoid the transfer, she can regain ownership of the property and 
Beth will no longer able to validly convey it to Cara.  
8
 D 50.17.54 (Ulpian, On the Edict Book XLVI): “No one can transfer greater rights to someone else 
than he has himself”. T Mommsen, P Krueger and A Watson (eds), The Digest of Justinian (1995) 




While Scots law does not at the moment recognise it as a separate category, it 
is also relevant to distinguish a third core case of “entrusted” property, that which 
Anne has consented to Beth’s physical possession of without consenting to transfer 
of ownership. Under the present law it does not matter whether Beth has borrowed or 
stolen the property, in neither case will she be able to pass ownership to Cara. The 
thesis considers the statutory exceptions to this rule, principally contained in the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979; it is ultimately contended that, despite inconsistencies in the 
current law, a transferor’s physical possession does not, in itself, justify protection of 
any transferee. 
 
B. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
A historical and doctrinal approach is adopted, beginning with the Roman law and 
considering Scots law from the earliest mediaeval sources to the current time. Due to 
the relative inaccessibility (linguistic and otherwise) of manuscript sources, the 
primary sources used are, for the mediaeval period, principally edited versions of 
sources already available in print. As a doctrinal thesis, the research focuses on 
previously recognised sources, with secondary material used to help to place these in 
context. 
 
By examining the historical roots of current doctrinal confusion it is hoped to 
bring increased clarity to questions such as the nature of the owner’s right to recover, 
providing new insight into a fundamental yet under-examined aspect of property 
doctrine.
9
 Although recent scholarship has explored the implications of moral 
theology for understandings of unjustified enrichment,
10
 the impact of theological 
                                                                                                                                                                    
possessed. As the verb “habere” can, in this context, be sensibly translated as “to have” (or also “to 
hold”), the debate over possession of rights will here be avoided. 
9
 Stewart describes the relationship between property and restitution as “probably one of the areas of 
greatest uncertainty in Scots private law”: The Law of Restitution in Scotland (1995). Compare Reid, 
Property paras 158 and 531 (Gordon). See also K G C Reid, “Unjustified Enrichment and Property 
Law” 1994 Juridical Review 167. 
10
 See e.g. G Dolezalek, “The Moral Theologians’ Doctrine of Restitution and its Juridification in the 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries” 1992 Acta Juridica 104; J Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust 
Enrichment in Late Scholasticism (1996); D Reid, “Thomas Aquinas and Viscount Stair: the Influence 
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principles on property law is a particularly fruitful area for further investigation. The 
wide temporal scope of the research limits the depth of focus that can be achieved in 
any specific period. It is hoped, however, that tracking the development of property 
doctrine will contribute to broader scholarly debate regarding legal development in 
Scotland and the interplay of different factors in forming the modern law.
11
 There is 
currently very little academic commentary on the mediaeval law regarding transfer of 
moveables in Scotland; in examining the problem of bona fide purchase the thesis is 
able to trace the more general evolution of ideas of possession and ownership. 
 
The thesis is also comparative in two senses. Particularly during the period of 
the ius commune, works originating in other jurisdictions were often as directly 
applicable in Scottish legal debate as those produced by indigenous authors, for 
example as late as the eighteenth century Dutch jurist Johannes Voet’s account of the 
rei vindicatio was regularly cited in courts.
12
 Scots doctrine is therefore approached 
as part of a wider civilian tradition. 
 
Sources from France, Germany and England are also referred to insofar as 
they provide an opportunity to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the Scots 
position. These legal systems have been chosen for different reasons, France because 
the rule “possession vaut titre”
13
 may have influenced, through its predecessor the 
Sale of Goods Act 1893, the drafting of the modern statute regulating sale of 
moveables in Scotland, the Sale of Goods Act 1979.
14
 The German rules regulating 
acquisition from a non-owner
15
 are also interesting because they explicitly allow 
acquisition from a non-owner in possession,
16
 except where the property has been 
stolen or is lost or otherwise missing.
17
 Given what is argued to be fragmentary 
current provision, it is submitted that a general rule such that contained in § 932 
                                                                                                                                                                    
of Scholastic Moral Theology on Stair’s Account of Restitution and Recompense” (2008) 29 Journal 
of Legal History 189. 
11
 For an initial introduction and overview of Scottish legal history, see J W Cairns, “Historical 
Introduction” in K G C Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland Volume 
1: Introduction and Property (2000) 14. 
12
 See ch 3 B(3)(b)(i). 
13
 Code Civil Art 2276 (formerly 2279). 
14
 See ch 4 D(3)(a). 
15
 §§ 932-936 BGB. 
16
 See § 932. 
17
 “[G]estohlen worden, verloren gegangen oder sonst abhanden gekommen war”: § 935(1) BGB. 
17 
 
BGB would provide a more coherent and clear-cut approach. Finally, in the context 
of the close relations (particularly after the enactment of the Sale of Goods Act 1893) 
between English and Scots law in this area, the thesis investigates why the English 
law doctrine of “market overt”, which safeguarded purchasers at particular markets 
from any claim based on previous theft or unauthorised transfer, was not received in 
Scotland. 
 
The direct relevance of broader philosophical understandings of ownership 
and property to Scots law doctrine is assumed throughout the thesis. By relating 
doctrinal development to ideas about the role of law in society and the justifications 
for recognition of property rights, it is hoped to deepen understandings (at least in the 
Scottish context) of what ownership means, why it is protected and why, in some 
circumstances, it is desirable to abrogate the owner’s right. 
 
C. OUTLINE OF CONTENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Chapter 2 begins by outlining the Roman law and the origins of the idea of 
ownership as a right to recover the thing wherever it was found. It is argued that 
early Scots law did not afford a remedy clearly based upon ownership, instead 
locating the owner’s claim for recovery in the existence of a wrong such as theft. By 
the sixteenth century there is evidence of the reception of Roman principles, with 
reference in case law to the rei vindicatio as well as to the nemo plus maxim. Robert 
Feenstra has criticised a tendency amongst historians to view development in this 
area as oscillation between the Roman approach and a “Germanic” one.
18
 Early Scots 
law certainly does not fit such a model, with a diverse range of influences including 
customary rules shared with other Germanic and Norse cultures, Canon law precepts 
and Humanist learning. Although requirements that sellers act as warrantor to buyers, 
often also offering a cautioner or “borgh” to guarantee that this obligation would be 
satisfied, provided some protection to acquirers there is no evidence of any general 
rule allowing acquisition from a non-owner. 
 
                                                          
18
 R Feenstra, “The Development of European Private Law: A Romanist Watershed?”, in D L Carey 
Miller and R Zimmermann (eds), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law (1997) 103 at 107. 
18 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on development during the “Institutional period”. This was 
characterised by a Romanist approach to the transfer of corporeal moveables typical 
of the ius commune but also by new understandings of law influenced by the natural 
law thought of Grotius and the historical jurisprudence promoted by Lord Kames. It 
is argued that one of the most important works, Stair’s Institutions, further draws on 
Scholastic moral theology to exclude the possibility of acquisition from a non-owner. 
Stair’s account of restitution, while philosophically and theologically interesting, 
does not fit especially well with a Romanist property law structure. A clearer 
understanding of the owner’s right to recover, and its place in the structure of private 
law is desirable.  Both the Romanist influence and a moral and philosophical 
emphasis on protection of ownership prevented adoption of any formal rule 
protecting purchasers; as the system of warranty fell into disuse, the explicit 
recognition of a presumption of ownership from possession helped to mitigate the 
difficulties in ascertaining ownership of moveables.    
 
Chapter 4 analyses the current application of the nemo plus principle. The 
introduction of statutory protections for purchasers in both England and Scotland can 
be linked to the expansion of credit and business practices, such as the management 
of goods by factors (commercial agents), which separated physical possession and 
ownership. However, as well as the practical needs of trade, jurisprudential ideology 
and ideas about the relationship between private law and a society based on 
commerce played an important role in justifying the enactment of the Sale of Goods 
and Factors Acts. Despite these statutes, and differences in the underlying systems of 
property law, English and Scots law remain united in their broad hostility to the 
possibility of acquisition from a non-owner. It is suggested that the modern 
patchwork of exceptions to the nemo plus rule lack any unifying justificatory 
principle and produce often uncertain results; particularly in relation to the 
interpretation of “possession” and “delivery” under the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 seek to identify a coherent basis for future development of 
the law in this area. Chapter 5 draws on broader theoretical accounts of property 
rights to enrich the doctrinal narrative of ownership in modern Scots law and 
19 
 
examine the political and philosophical assumptions which underlie it. There are a 
number of internal values currently reflected in Scots property law regarding transfer 
of moveables which should be the foundation for any future reform, including 
coherence and certainty of rights. The problem of transfer by a non-owner arguably 
involves questions of both corrective and distributive justice, emphasising that 
property law serves both public and private ends. As bona fide purchase rules are 
often justified by reference to furtherance of the ease and rapidity of transactions, a 
central concern is the market impact of legal policy. To this end, the contribution of 
non-formalist perspectives such as the Realist and the Law and Economics 
approaches is considered, but it is concluded that due to insufficient empirical data 
and inherent methodological limitations, these do not provide a clear solution.  
 
Chapter 6 concludes that there is no single overwhelming argument justifying 
protection for good faith purchasers but, in the context of moves towards greater 
harmonisation at the European level, a broad general rule protecting those who 
follow market norms appears to be the most coherent option. Although possession 
cannot be treated as a reliable indicator of right, it is argued that good faith acquirers 
who do not take possession do not form a connection with the thing which would 
justify protection over the original owner. As the most frequently cited justification 
for good faith purchase protection remains promotion of commerce, it is logical that 
any future reform should be based around some notion of acting in accordance with 
market norms. This would add a strong objective element to existing concepts of 
good faith and provide a clear yet flexible general basis for protection of purchasers. 
There are strong arguments for different standards of care to be applicable in some 
limited contexts, for example where objects are of cultural and artistic significance, 
but in general there should be a consistent approach to protection of purchasers 






CHAPTER 2: PROTECTION OF OWNERSHIP IN ROMAN AND EARLY 
SCOTS LAW 
 
A. ROMAN ORIGINS OF THE MODERN LAW 
 
(1) The Relevance of Roman Law 
 
Why does investigation of the modern Scots understanding of ownership require 
resort to the Roman law? The relation between Scots law and its Roman heritage is a 
complex one.
19
 The development of an indigenous legal tradition in the Institutional 
period means that many Roman rules are of limited doctrinal relevance; Roman 
sources are only rarely referred to directly in Scots courts.
20
 In relation to moveable 
property, however, the current law is accepted to be “laid on the foundations of the 
Roman law”.
21
 Particularly in relation to the contemporary concept of ownership as 
dominium
22
 and the application of the Digest-derived nemo plus maxim, the Roman 
roots of these ideas appear of some relevance. 
 
The protection afforded to ownership in classical Roman law is moreover the 
ostensible source of the influential Pandectist concept of ownership as an absolute 
and unitary right.
23
 The position of the Roman owner has been characterised as 
“sacrosanct”,
24
 the application of the nemo plus rule “embod[ying] the principle of 
inviolability.”
25
 Such comments are themselves the product of a particular historical 
period and legal culture; they raise important questions about the relationship 
between legal history and modern problems, specifically the use of Roman law to 
                                                          
19
 For discussion and further references, see generally J W Cairns, “The Civil Law Tradition in 
Scottish Legal Thought”, in D L Carey Miller and R Zimmermann (eds), The Civilian Tradition and 
Scots Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays (1997) 191. On the reception of Roman law in Scotland, 
see P G Stein, Roman Law in Scotland (1968). 
20
 There is, however, some influence. For an assertion of Roman law’s continuing importance, see J 
Cairns and P J du Plessis, “Ten Years of Roman Law in Scottish Courts” 2008 SLT (News) 191. 
21
 Reid, Property para 2.  
22
 See Reid, Property para 5. 
23
 See B Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 9
th
 edn (1906) § 167 and G F Puchta, 
Vorlesungen über das heutige Römische Recht, 6th edn (1873, repr 1999) vol 1 § 144. For discussion, 
see A J van der Walt, “Ownership and Personal Freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid's 
Theory of Ownership” (1993) 56 THRHR 569.  
24
 F Schulz, Classical Roman Law (1951) 335. 
25
 B Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman law (1969) 129. 
22 
 
perpetuate essentially neoteric legal ideals.
26
Analysis of the historical background is 
therefore undertaken with a view to understanding the debates surrounding the 





Although classical Roman law recognised rights which seem to be between 
“full” (quiritary) ownership and non-ownership,
28
 this is only indirectly relevant to 
the current discussion. What follows is concerned with the effect of transfer by a 
non-owner, and the extent to which persons could transfer a greater right in property 
than they themselves had. In accordance with this, the position of the bonitary owner 
(who typically acquired his or her right when the transferor failed to observe the 
correct procedure for transfer by mancipatio)
29
 will not be considered in detail. 
Neither a transfer to nor a transfer by a bonitary owner implies a “true” transfer by a 
non-owner: a right in bonis could not be acquired from a person who did not own,
30
 
nor could a bonitary owner transfer more rights than he or she had. His or her 
defence against the rei vindicatio of the quiritary owner, the exception rei venditae et 
traditae, was available to his or her successors and subsequent purchasers from him 
or her,
31
 suggesting that it was only the transferor’s right in bonis which passed to 
successors and not quiritary ownership. 
 
(2) The Owner’s Claim for Recovery 
 
(a) The ancient law 
                                                          
26
 See K Tuori, Ancient Roman Lawyers and Modern Legal Ideals: Studies on the Impact of 
Contemporary Concerns in the Interpretation of Ancient Roman Legal History, 2nd edn (2007) 181-
193 and also Van der Walt, “Ownership”. 
27
 See D L Carey Miller and D Irvine, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, 2nd edn (2005) para 1.12. 
28
 See M Kaser, Roman Private Law, trans. R Dannenbring 2
nd
 edn (1968) 94-95. 
29
 See generally H Ankum and E Pool, “Rem in bonis meis esse and rem in bonis meam esse: Traces 
of the Development of Roman Double Ownership”, in P Birks (ed), New Perspectives in the Roman 
Law of Property: Essays for Barry Nicholas (1989) 5, especially at 38. The authors suggest that 
acquisition of mancipable things by delivery (traditio) was not necessarily the first example of 
bonitary ownership. 
30
 Ankum and Pool, “Rem in bonis” 38-39. 
31
 D 21.3.3. 
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Although the idea of ownership in ancient Roman law is not knowable,
32
 it is clear 
that even the early law recognized and protected some special relationship between 
person and thing, a distinction between “mine” and “thine”.
33
 The main indication of 
this protection is the existence of an action apparently designed to settle disputes 
over rights
34
 in things; the procedure applicable to moveable property at the time of 
the XII tables (c. 450 BC)
35
 was known as the legis actio sacramento in rem.
36
 The 
form of this action recorded by Gaius includes not only an assertion by the pursuer 
that the thing in question is his by Quiritary right (ex jure Quiritam meum esse) on 
the basis of some causa or title (secundum sua causam),
37
 but a similar assertion by 
the defender; the pursuer then asks the defender to state the grounds for the claim.
38
 
This structure has led Kaser to argue that ownership in this period was actually 
relative, and that the judge was merely required to decide who had the better right;
39
 
it is difficult, however, to draw any conclusive inferences about the nature of 





In ancient law, as today, establishing ownership of moveables presented 
difficulties of evidence.
41
 An obscure guarantee given by a transferor in mancipatio
42
 
                                                          
32
 This is due both to the limited nature of the sources and the fact that there may not have existed an 
“institutionalised” legal concept of ownership at this point. See M Kaser, “The Concept of Roman 
Ownership” (1964) 27 THRHR 5 at 6-7. 
33
 The meaning of “meum esse” is probably not, however, identical to the meanings given to 
ownership as dominium in later law, see G Diósdi, Ownership in Ancient and Preclassical Roman 
Law (1970) ch 4.  
34
 Although the term “right” is adopted here, it is not intended to suggest that the existence the 
modern concept of subjective rights existed in Roman law. 
35
 See A C Johnson et al. (eds), Ancient Roman Statutes (1961) 9. 
36
 See F de Zulueta (trans and ed), The Institutes of Gaius: Part1 (1946) IV 16 and for commentary M 
Kaser, Das Römische Zivilprozessrecht, 2nd edn (1996) § 14; Diósdi, Ownership 96-105. For 
speculation regarding the origins of the actio in rem, see Kaser, Zivilprozessrecht 90-93. 
37
 See F de Zulueta, The Institutes of Gaius: Part 2 (1953) 233. For an overview of the varying 
interpretations of “causam”, see Diósdi, Ownership 99-100. 
38
 Institutes of Gaius IV 16. On defences see Kaser, Private Law 113. 
39
 Kaser, “Roman Ownership” at 8-9. For a fuller account, see M Kaser, Eigentum und Besitz im 
Älteren Römischen Recht (1956) 7-16. Kaser’s view has been criticised, see the references given by 
Diósdi, Ownership 96 fns 14-16 and Kaser’s response in “Zur “legis actio sacramento in rem”” 
(1987) 104 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 53. 
40
 Convincing arguments to this effect are made by Diósdi, Ownership 105-106 and H F Jolowicz and 
B Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 3
rd
 edn (1972) 142. 
41
 Although, due to the public nature of the transfer by mancipatio, perhaps fewer than today. On the 
witnessing of the transaction, see Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction 145-146. 
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known as auctoritas seems to have required the defender’s auctor (transferor) to 
provide evidence supporting his or her ownership of the thing on pain of liability for 
twice the purchase price.
43
 Although there is some debate
44
 over whether the auctor 
played a similar role to the Germanic “Gewährsmann” or warrantor,
45
  resort to the 
defender’s author in disputes over ownership is also seen in other early legal 
systems.
46
  On completion of the hearing, the praetor declared one of the parties to be 
interim possessor, and ordered him or her to offer sureties to the other party for the 
thing and its profits.
47
 Presumably this ensured that the final ruling as to which 
party’s oath was preferred was complied with.
48
 Although the losing party was not 
personally liable for delivery of the property, this system is assumed to have been 




(b) Classical law and the development of the vindicatio 
With the development of the formulary procedure,
50
 the legis actio sacramento in 
rem was replaced in the classical period by the rei vindicatio.
51
 This action lay 
against the possessor,
52
 and aimed at the recovery or restitution of the thing: “ubi 
enim probaui rem meum esse, necesse habebit possessor restituere.”
53
 In contrast to 
systems which require some wrong before the owner can assert his or her right, the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
42
 For an overview of the mancipatio see Kaser, Private Law 36-38 and Jolowicz and Nicholas, 
Historical Introduction 143-149. The extensive literature on its early history is covered by Diósdi, 
Ownership 64-72. 
43
 See Kaser, Zivilprozessrecht 98-99. Full references are given by Diósdi, Ownership 75-81 
44
 On whether the auctor entered the process as defender, compare Kaser, Eigentum 63-65 and 
Diósdi, Ownership 79-81. 
45
 On which see B(2) below. 
46
 See for example the early Babylonian codes discussed by S Levmore, “Variety and Uniformity in 
the Treatment of the Good Faith Purchaser” (1987) 16 Journal of Legal Studies 43 at 49-53. 
Generally a purchaser was required to be able to identify his or her seller, particularly in case of an 
accusation of theft. 
47
 Institutes of Gaius IV 16. 
48
 The sources do not give much information about the conclusion of the action, but for a plausible 
discussion of the possible outcomes see R Monier, Manuel Élémentaire de Droit Romain, vol 1 6
th
 
edn (1947) 143. As to whether it was possible for both claims to be rejected, contrast Diósdi, 
Ownership 105. 
49
 P F Girard, Manuel Elémentaire de Droit Romain, 8
th
 edn (1929) 361-362 characterises the system 
as providing an efficient means of execution; indeed, a similar device was used in the later procedure 
per sponsionem. 
50
 On which see Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction 191-201; 218-223. 
51
 On the emergence of the formula of the vindicatio, see A Watson, Roman Private Law Around 200 
B.C. (1971) 71. 
52
 Originally the possessor in law (rather than the party with physical detention of the object.) 
However by the time of Justinian the vindicatio could be used against any holder. See D 6.1.9. 
53
 D 6.1.9: “For once I have proved that the thing is mine, the possessor will have to deliver it to me.”  
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vindicatio was available against any possessor, whether in good or bad faith.
54
 The 
possessor, however, was not personally liable for the return of the thing and could 
not be forced to defend the action.
55
 This, in theory, meant that the rei vindicatio 
could not be tried. For this reason, in respect of moveable property the praetor 
granted the actio ad exhibendum,
56
 by means of which the pursuer could demand the 
production of the thing.
57
 If the defender failed to produce the thing, he or she was 
condemned to pay the value of the thing as assessed by the pursuer.
58
 Even where the 
thing was produced, the difficulties of proving ownership meant that it was often 
preferable to use possessory interdicts to gain possession, placing the burden of proof 




The distinction between actions in rem (against the thing itself) and those in 
personam (against a specified person)
60
 emerges from the structure of the vindicatio. 
Whether an action is in rem or in personam is immediately clear: when a person is 
claiming in rem, the defender’s name does not (apart from in exceptional cases) 
appear in the intentio at all,
61
 in a claim in personam it necessarily does.
62
 This is an 
extremely significant development; it provides the foundations of the modern 
Civilian understanding of ownership as a right in a thing, enforceable against all third 
parties.
63
 In the classical period, two procedures were available for the trial of the 
vindicatio, the per sponsionem and the per formulam petitoriam.
64
 In the procedure 
per sponsionem, the defender promised to pay a nominal sum of money if the thing 
                                                          
54
 This is the logical implication of, for example, D 6.1.9. See Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical 
Introduction 140. 
55
 D 6.1.80. See L Wenger, Institutes of the Roman Law of Civil Procedure, trans O Harrison Fisk 
(rev ed 1986) 109. 
56
 D 10.4.3.1 states the action to be “perquam necessaria” (extremely necessary) and introduced for 
the sake of the vindicatio. 
57
 D 10.4.2; D 10.4.3.3. See Wenger, Institutes 109-110. 
58
 D 10.4.3.2. 
59
 D 6.1.24. 
60
 See Institutes of Gaius IV 1-IV 5. 
61
 See for example Institutes of Gaius IV 41: “si paret hominem ex iure Quiritium Auli Agerii esse”. 
62
 Institutes of Gaius IV 41. See further Schulz, Roman Law 32-34. 
63
 See Kaser, Private Law 28-29. Kaser posits the distinction as based on a contrast between absolute 
and relative rights; the extent to which the Roman sources can be said to support a notion of 
subjective rights is controversial (see M Villey, “L’idée du droit subjectif et les systèmes juridiques 
romains” (1946) 24 Revue historique de droit français et étranger 201) but it is certainly the case that 
the Roman law provided an important reference point for later development.  
64
 See generally Institutes of Gaius IV 91-IV 99. On the historical relation between the two 
procedures, see Girard, Manuel Elémentaire 364. 
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belonged to the pursuer. Action would then be brought on the promise, and as a 
result judgment given on the question of ownership. In order to ensure that the thing 
was actually returned to the pursuer if he or she won, the defender made a further 
promise (stipulatio) for the value of the thing and the litigation.
65
 The other option 
was the per formulam petioriam; in this case the intentio claimed that the thing 
belonged to the pursuer, if the defender lost he or she was again condemned to pay a 
sum of money, the value of which was fixed according to the pursuer’s oath.
66
 A 
passage from Ulpian which appears to provide for forcible dispossession of the 




(c) Post-classical decline 
Levy argues that although the term “vindicare” continued to be used in the post-
classical period, it no longer had any necessary connection with judicial proceedings. 
In some cases, it was applied to extra-judicial seizure and used essentially to mean 
occupation.
68
 Justinianic law returned to some extent to the system of actiones;
69
 the 
scope of the vindicatio was extended to those who had ceased to possess through 




(3) Transfer by a Non-Owner and the Nemo Plus Rule 
 
(a) Early development 
Although the application of the nemo plus rule in ancient law is uncertain, reference 





 (Corporeal moveable property could probably otherwise be 
acquired by this means after one year’s possession.)
73
 Furtum was broadly defined 
and could seemingly include unauthorised use by a depositee or even accepting a 
                                                          
65
 Institutes of Gaius IV 94. 
66
 See Institutes of Gaius IV 48. 
67
 See Wenger, Institutes 152-153; Girard, Manuel Elémentaire 371. 
68
 E Levy, West Roman Vulgar Law: The Law of Property (1951) 210-219. 
69
 Levy, Vulgar Law 202-210.  
70
 See e.g. D 6.1.36; D 6.1.25; D 6.1.27.3. For commentary on this important development, see 
Girard, Manuel Elémentaire 365 fn 3. 
71
 This obscure term was probably an antecedent of usucapio. See Diósdi, Ownership 85-93 where it 
is concluded that it is simply impossible to define “auctoritas” in a satisfactory manner. 
72
 Table 1 22, collected in Johnson et al., Roman Statutes 619-620. See Institutes of Gaius II 45; II 49.  
73
 Table VI 3. See Johnson et al., Roman Statutes 658-660. 
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pledge that was known not to belong to the pledgor.
74
 The Lex Atinia, passed in the 
second century BC,
75
 is thought to have stated“Quod subruptum erit, eius rei aeterna 
auctoritas esto,”
76
 implying that the thing was permanently recoverable by the 
owner.
77
 There is some scholarly debate about the relationship between the Lex 
Atinia and the XII Tables,
78
 but it seems plausible that, as suggested by Daube, the 
XII tables prohibited acqusition only by the thief him or herself. It was with the 
introduction of the Lex Atinia, which focused on the right of the owner to recover 
stolen objects that the prohibition on acquisition was extended to third party 
acquirers.
79
 It is agreed that by around 150 BC neither the original thief nor third 
parties could acquire stolen property by usus auctoritas. According to Paul, the Lex 
Atinia required stolen property to be returned to the control of the owner, rather than 





For current purposes, this is a key development, reflecting a new emphasis on 
the relationship between owner and res rather than redress for personal wrong. Given 
the important role played by corporeal moveable property, in particular res mancipi, 
in the acquisition of wealth,
81
 it seems likely that these provisions represented a more 
general onus on protection of such property and an unfavourable attitude towards 
those purchasing stolen goods, whether in good faith or otherwise. Indeed, Diósdi 
suggests that the needs of the rural economy at this early stage favoured the 
development of ownership as an absolute and exclusive power over the means of 
                                                          
74
 See Watson, Private Law 146. 
75
 See R Yaron, “Reflections on Usucapio” (1967) 35 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 216. 
76
 “Whatever shall have been stolen, the auctoritas in respect of that object is to be everlasting.” This 
text is taken from Johnson et al., Roman Statutes 745-746. For a full discussion and bibliography, see 
P G Stein, “Lex Atinia” (1984) Athenaeum 596. 
77
 M Kaser, “Altrömisches Eigentum und “usucapio”” (1988) 105 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für 
Rechtsgeschichte 122 at 140. 
78
 See D Daube, “Furtum Proprium and Furtum Improprium,” (1936-38) 6 Cambridge Law Journal 
217 at 217-234, A Watson, The Law of Property in the Later Roman Republic (1968) 24-28 and 
Yaron, “Usucapio”. For a summary, see Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction 153. 
79
 Daube, “Furtum Proprium” 231-234; Kaser, Private Law 106. For contrasting views, see however, 
Watson, Property ibid. and Yaron, “Usucapio”. 
80
 D 41.3.4.6. 
81
 It is generally accepted that the category of res mancipi (mancipable things), which included slaves 
and beasts of burden such as horses, oxen and mules, represented the most important means of 
production in a peasant economy. See Kaser, Private Law 81; Diósdi, Ownership 57. For definition 
of res mancipi, see Institutes of Gaius II 14(a). 
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production, despite the lack of precise legal definition.
82
 The role of the paterfamilias 
as owner and protector of the whole family’s assets meant that legal rules were 
required to protect these assets from dissipation.
83
 It may thus be conjectured that, 
even if the nemo plus rule was not articulated as such, the impetus for the de facto 
application of such a principle can be traced to this early point. 
 
(b) Classical law 
(i) Owner’s consent generally necessary for derivative acquisition 
For current purposes, the most important forms of derivative transfer
84
 of corporeal 
moveables in classical Roman law were mancipation (applicable to res mancipi)
85
 or, 
in the case of non-mancipable things, delivery (traditio).
86
 In order for ownership to 
pass, the modern consensus is that a valid causa such as sale or donation was 
required, typically necessitating the intention of the owner.
87
 Both methods usually 
involved an important element of publicity, helping to reduce the risk of 
unauthorised transfers.
88
 What was the position, however, when a thing was 
transferred without the consent of the owner? Could a good faith purchaser acquire 
ownership of such property? 
 
It is at this point that the application of the nemo plus maxim becomes 
significant. Several Books of the Digest contain statements by leading jurists which 
articulate what was probably already an important rule. The version of the rule 
received into modern Scots law, “nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam 
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 Diósdi, Ownership 124. 
83
 B Kozolchyk, “Transfer of Personal Property by a Nonowner: Its Future in Light of Its Past” 
(1987) 61 Tulane Law Review 1453 at 1465. 
84
 The use of the term “derivative transfer” is not intended to imply that Roman law had a theory of 
derivative acquisition of rights comparable to that in modern Civilian systems. See Kaser, Private 
Law 101; Monier, Manuel Élémentaire vol 1 396 and references given there. 
85
 See Institutes of Gaius II 18-II 23. For definition of res mancipi, see II 14(a). 
86
 See Watson, Property 62. 
87
 See R Evans-Jones and G D MacCormack, “Iusta causa traditionis”, in P Birks (ed), New 
Perspectives in the Roman Law of Property: Essays for Barry Nicholas (1989) 98 at 101. This is, 
however, subject to debate, as is the meaning of causa in this context.  See D 41.1.31; D 41.1.36; D 
12.1.18.  For discussion, see W W Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 
(1990) 228-230; Evans-Jones and MacCormack, “Iusta causa”, W M Gordon, “The importance of 
the iusta causa of traditio”, in P Birks (ed), New Perspectives in the Roman Law of Property: Essays 
for Barry Nicholas (1989)123; J L Barton, “Solutio and Traditio”, in J W Cairns and O F  Robinson 
(eds), Critical Studies in Ancient Law, Comparative Law and Legal History (2001) 15. 
88
 In classical law traditio generally involved the physical transfer of possession. See W M Gordon, 





 is included in the final title of the Digest (50.17), which is entitled 
“Various Rules of Early Law”. This title contains fundamental legal principles which 
often aid in the interpretation and construction of legal rules;
90
 Stein suggests that it 
may have been used heavily by practitioners.
91
 The fact that the rule was included at 
this point suggests that, certainly by the time of the Digest’s compilation, it was seen 
as a maxim of broad application. 
 
Stein has further argued that the criterion for inclusion in Title 50.17 was 
expression in a particular form.
92
 There was a preference for the general, and 
“dogmatic statements introduced by omnis or nemo”
93
 The fact that the rule was 
included in 50.17 does not necessarily mean that it existed as an independent maxim 
in classical law: often such rules had been abstracted from a specific context, and in 
some cases altered to give the text a more general meaning.
94
 In the case of the nemo 
plus maxim, the text itself is taken from Ulpian, On the Edict Book 46. This contains 
several provisions relating to succession, specifically the system allowing the Praetor 





Later the suggestion that the rule was only intended to apply in the context of 
succession is considered, but at this point it is sufficient to note that broadly similar 
principles are reflected in other succession-related maxims, for example “nemo plus 
commode heredi suo relinquit, quam ipse habuit.”
96
 Given that succession is a basic 
instance of property transfer, it is not unreasonable to suppose that it provided the 
genesis for the development of a nemo plus- type rule. 
 
                                                          
89
 D 50.17.54, see fn 8. 
90
 For example D 50.17.9: “In matters which are obscure, we always follow the one which is the least 
ambiguous.” 
91
 P G Stein, Regulae Iuris: From Juristic Rules to Legal Maxims (1966) 123. 
92
 Stein, Regulae Iuris 115. 
93
 Stein, Regulae Iuris 120. 
94
 Stein, Regulae Iuris 118-120. Indeed, some believe that abstracted from its proper context the 
maxim is meaningless, see for example E Albertario, Introduzione Storica allo studio del Diritto 
Romano Giustinianeo (1935) 158, discussed further in (ii) below. 
95
 On bonurum possessio see Kaser, Private Law 282. 
96
 D 50.17.120: “No one leaves a greater benefit to his heir than he himself had”. 
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In assessing the significance of the maxim in classical law, it is important to 
emphasise the general importance placed in Roman law upon the express and public 
transfer of ownership.
97
 Kozolchyk argues that this reflects the policy, common to 
ancient legal systems, of protecting valuable family assets by requiring the express or 
presumed consent of a historical owner.
98
 Other maxims included in Title 50.17, for 
example “Id, quod nostrum est, sine facto nostro ad alium transferri non potest”
99
 
affirm the importance of protection of property, and the need for the owner’s consent 
to transfer. 
 
As articulated in Title 50.17, the maxim itself does not indicate to which 
situations it is intended to apply. The Digest contains other statements to similar 
effect which specifically relate to the transfer of ownership. The most pertinent is 
that of Ulpian: 
 
Traditio nihil amplius transferre debet uel potest ad eum qui accipit, quam 
est apud eum qui tradit. si igitur quis dominium in fundo habuit, id tradendo 




Followed to its logical conclusion, this would appear to suggest that good faith 
acquisition of ownership from a non-owner was never possible, no matter how many 
transfers of the property took place. Although the term vitium reale (real vice) does 
not appear in the Roman sources,
101
 in the context of usucaption Pomponius 
distinguishes between defects (vitia) “ex re” (such as where the property had been 
stolen or obtained through violence) and “ex persona” (emanating from the person of 
the possessor).
102
 There is some authority to the effect that, outside of usucaption, 
lapse of time was not allowed to cure void titles: “Quod initio vitiosum est, non 
                                                          
97
 See Kozolchyk, “Transfer” 1467. 
98
 Kozolchyk,“Transfer” 1468. 
99
 D 50.17.11: “Something which is ours cannot be transferred to another without any action on our 
part”. See also D 50.17.119. 
100
 D 41.1.20: “Delivery should not and cannot transfer to the transferee any greater title than resides 
in the transferor. Hence, if someone conveys land of which he is owner, he transfers his title; if he 
does not have ownership, he conveys nothing to the recipient.” 
101
 In its modern sense, it seems to have been developed by Bartolus of Sassoferrato, Commentaria in 
primam Digesti Novi partem doctis (1547) vol 2 90 (Title “de acquirenda et retinenda possessione”). 
102
 D 41.3.24.1. 
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potest tractu temporis conualescere.”
103
 Gaius’ comment that delivery transfers 
ownership, providing that the transferor is owner of the property, further supports 
this view.
104
 Gaius specifically mentions several examples of highly fungible 
property (gold, silver and garments), implying that no special exceptions were 




Although the present thesis is concerned only with corporeal moveable 
property, it is possible to identify intersections between the nemo plus maxim and 
other, more general, legal principles. The maxim “non debeo melioris condicionis 
esse, quam auctor meus, a quo ius in me transit”,
106
 again collected in Title 50.17, 
applies a broadly similar logic to a potentially wide scope of situations, perhaps 
including the transfer of incorporeals such as debts. The statement that “Qui in ius 
dominiumue alterius succedit, iure eius uti debet”
107
 also indicates congruence 
between transfer of the right to corporeal things and transfer of incorporeals. It 
appears that the corporeal and incorporeal parts of the inheritance may have been 
treated in a unitary manner, raising the possibility that nemo plus applied equally to 
transfer of incorporeals. 
 
Given the apparent strictness of the law in relation to the transfer of property, 
it has been argued that usucapio must have been of considerable importance in the 
establishment of ownership.
108
 However, the development of requirements of iustus 
titulus
109
 and bona fides
110
 meant that the availability of usucaption to parties 
deriving title from a non-owner also continued to be severely restricted. As mala 
fides was usually present where the acquirer knew of the non-ownership of the 
transferor, this meant that one could generally only usucapt someone else’s property 
                                                          
103
 D 50.17.29: “Something which is defective at the outset cannot be validated with passage of 
time.”  
104




 D 50.17.175.1: “I must not be in a better position than my author from whom the right passes to 
me”.  
107
 D 17.54.177: “Someone who succeeds into the legal position or right or property of another must 
accept his rights.” 
108
 See Gordon, “iusta causa” 130-131. 
109
 On the meaning of iustus titulus, see Schulz, Roman Law 356. The precise details of the 
development of these rules are controversial: Watson, Property 31. 
110





 Some important exceptions are discussed below; a bonitary owner, 
although he or she knew that he or she held property incorrectly transferred, was not 
in mala fides.
112
 (This was presumably because the failed transfer had taken place 
with the consent of the original owner.) 
 
(ii) Instances of transfer by a non-owner 
In a society in which public marketplaces such as auctions were common,
113
 it is 
perhaps surprising that there were no further moves to allow innocent third parties to 
acquire ownership. Good faith in itself usually could not give more rights to a 
possessor than the bare fact of possession.
114
 There were, however, some situations 
in which a good faith possessor could acquire property by usucaption. These are 
characterized by Gaius as instances where no theft has been committed, due to lack 
of intent or otherwise.
115
 He mentions the sale of property loaned or hired by or 
deposited with a deceased person which the heir believed to belong to the estate and 
the sale by a usufructury of a female slave’s child which he believed belonged to 
him.
116
 Indeed, any transfer of property which had not been acquired by theft or 
violence allowed a good faith transferee to acquire the property by usucaption.
117
 
This extended to, for example, the property of a deceased person where the heir had 
not taken possession of the estate, and property transferred to a creditor by 
mancipation where possession was subsequently regained.
118
 This is potentially a 
wide exception to the nemo plus principle, particularly where there is no transfer to 
an innocent third party (such as in the case of the debtor reacquiring ownership of 




In addition to acquisition by usucaption, there were some circumstances in 
which agents and curators could transfer ownership of property which they did not 
                                                          
111




 J A Crook, Law and Life of Rome: Aspects of Greek and Roman Life (1967) 219. 
114
 See D 50.17.136; D 43.3.24. 
115
 Institutes of Gaius II 50. 
116
 Institutes of Gaius II 50. 
117
 Institutes of Gaius II.50. See also Julius Paulus, Opinions V.II.5, allowing a purchaser to acquire 
property the ownership of which was in dispute by usucaption after 20 years 
118
 Institutes of Gaius III 201. On usucapio pro herede and usureceptio, as these were respectively 
known, see Watson, Property 32-58; Kaser, Private Law 127-128. 
119
 On possible explanations for this odd exception, see Watson, Property 42-48. 
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themselves own. Indeed, according to Ulpian “non est novum, ut qui dominium non 
habeat, alii dominium praebeat: nam et creditor pignus vendendo causam dominii 
praestat, quam ipse non habuit.”
120
 Gaius compares the position of (authorised) 
agents
121
 and curators of persons without capacity to that of a creditor in receipt of a 
pledge: the principal or the incapax has (expressly or otherwise) consented to the 
agent or curator selling their property in the same way as a debtor consents to the 




Finally, special rules applied in the case of money. Given the particular 
nature of ownership of coins, and the need for free transferability of money, a good 
faith acquirer of coins was protected from vindication by the owner.
123
 Moreover, if 
coins belonging to different persons were mixed so that neither could identify their 
own the possessor acquired ownership.
124
 Both from a practical perspective and one 
of policy such exceptions seem sensible, but they do not affect the broader scheme of 
property transfer. 
 
According to Schulz, however, the presence of such exceptions renders the 







 How can the statement of Ulpian quoted above and the existence of 
these cases in which a non-owner could transfer ownership logically co-exist with 
such a rule?
128
 Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that the current text of the Digest 
is based on an error by the compilers both in omitting to change haberet to habet
129
 
                                                          
120
 D 41.1.46: “There is nothing extraordinary in the fact that anyone can transfer to another the 
ownership of property which he does not have; for a creditor, by selling a pledge, transfers to the 
purchaser a title which he himself did not have.” 
 
121
 An express mandate was usually required but an exception was made for fruits, or other things 
which might be easily spoiled: D.3.3.63. 
122
 Institutes of Gaius II 64. See also D 41.1.9.4. 
123
 D 12.1.11.2 and 12.1.13. 
124
 D 46.3.78. 
125






 The same point is made by Albertario, Introduzione 158. 
129
 Presumably the imperfect subjunctive haberet (roughly translated into English as “might have” or 
“would have”) is consonant with restriction to the context of transfer of future succession rights, 
whereas the present indicative habet (has) is required to make sense of the maxim as a general rule. 
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and in portraying the rule as a general one.
130
 His argument is similar to that made 
earlier by Albertario, who suggests that in separating the maxim from the discussion 
which originally surrounded it, and thus generalising it, the compilers have made an 
error.
131
 Albertario proposes that the statement was made in the context of the 
procedure in iure cessio hereditatis, by which an agnate
132
 could cede his right to 
accept an inheritance which was offered to him before he had acquired the 
inheritance by aditio hereditatas.
133
 (In contrast to transfer of an inheritance already 
acquired, this included incorporeal parts of the inheritance such as debts.) This, in 
itself, is not an implausible suggestion, and indeed, is mentioned by Lenel in his 
Palingenesia.
134
 The contention that nemo plus was never a generally applicable 
principle is, however, more serious. 
 
The possibility of textual error aside, it is submitted that these assertions are 
unfounded. Overall, the scheme of transfer of property in classical Roman law is 
consistent with adherence to the nemo plus rule, for example in the restriction on 
usucaption of stolen goods. Although the exceptions discussed above were certainly 
important, and others based in legal practice may well have existed, their existence as 
exceptions confirms the significance of the general principle. Indeed, why else would 
the situations described be worthy of any particular attention? In his discussion of 
Albertario’s thesis, Buckland comes to a similar conclusion, pointing out that the 
rejection of the general rule renders the exceptional nature of the situations 
mentioned here unintelligible.
135
 If Ulpian is indeed talking of in iure cessio 
hereditatis, it is speculated that he may be commenting on the exceptional nature of 
the institution. 
 
(c) Continuing application of the nemo plus rule in post-classical law 
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 Schulz, Roman Law 352 
131
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132
 Adgnati were all free persons who were members of the same house community or who would 
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Law 61. 
133
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Kaser, Private Law 309. 
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According to Levy, law as developed in the Western Roman Empire continued to 
reflect the principles of the classical law outlined above. Although there were some 
relaxations in the formalities of property transfer,
136
 there was no corresponding 
change in policy in respect of transfer by non-owners. The nemo plus doctrine “stood 
unchallenged in the Roman field through the centuries.”
137
 Indeed, it is contended 
that it had become part of a commune ius, which formed the basis for legislation in 
the West during what he terms the “vulgar” period.
138
 Although Levy’s general thesis 
of the vulgarization of Roman law is debated,
139
 the sources in this area appear to 
support this view. 
 
Levy argues that the Codex Theodosianus reflected this rule in allowing 
children to recover property unlawfully alienated by their father from any acquirer 
and prohibiting usucaption of such property.
140
 In addition, a law of Valentinian 1 
allowed for the restoration of property unlawfully alienated by public officials, even 
against third parties.
141
 Recent scholarship has suggested that the Codex 
Theodosianus should be read in the context of the general principles of private law 
developed during the classical period.
142
 This approach would support Levy’s thesis. 
Some of the more general statements contained in the code also suggest the survival 
of the classical rule, for example “Vitia autem a maioribus contracta perdurant, et 




There are also, however, some clear exceptions to the nemo plus rule. The 
most important relates to the power of the fisc to transfer good title to property 
improperly acquired.
144
 Those who had been wrongfully dispossessed by the fisc 
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thus could not bring an action for the recovery of the property, but were instead 
given a claim for compensation.
145
 Purchasers at auctions of property adjudged by 
the fisc also obtained a wholly valid title, even in cased where the property had been 
unlawfully seized.
 146
 This presumably reflects the absolute power vested in the 
emperor.
147
 However, even this relatively limited exception seems to have been 
debated
148




It is not clear to what extent law in the Eastern provinces followed a similar 
pattern to that in the West. What is known of the classical law is largely based on 
statements compiled in the Digest at the time of Justinian.  The inclusion of the nemo 
plus principle in title 50.17 demonstrates the extent to which it had become 
axiomatic. The treatment of ownership in the Institutes also emphasises the need for 
willing participation of the owner in property transfers.
150
 In the light of the other 
maxims compiled in the Digest, it seems clear that the Institutes take the existence of 
the principle for granted. Reference is made to an exception provided for in a 
constitution of Zeno in respect of property obtained from the Treasury.
151
  The Codex 
Justinianus further records a number of provisions to the effect that a mistake in 
ownership cannot prejudice the rights of the owner.
152
 Nemo plus thus gains the 
status of a fundamental legal rule and indeed, through the Digest, has been received 




From a present-day perspective, excluding the possibility of good faith acquisition of 
corporeal moveable property may often seem impractical or even unfair to innocent 
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acquirers. In considering the reasons for the development of the Roman approach, it 
is important that, in ancient society, property in moveables was often of great 
economic importance; it is argued by Diósdi that moveables, specifically animal 
breeding, were the first form of private property.
153
 It is for this reason that the acts 
used to transfer ownership and the ancient proprietary remedy were based on 
moveables.
154
 In a context in which prosperity is derived largely from ownership of 
moveables, protection of ownership of moveables will be necessary to secure the 
accumulations of the better off. Prohibition of usucaption on stolen goods can thus be 




It is against this background that classical Roman law developed, and it is 
evident that it retained much of the antipathy towards theft which characterised the 
ancient law. Moreover, the ancient legal rituals were slow to adapt to commercial 
expansion. Although trade played an important role in Roman life, Roman legal 
institutions originated in a legal culture in which the access of non-citizens to the ius 
civile was severely restricted and the transfer of property cumbersome and 
complex.
156
 (Indeed, Yaron argues that if foreign trade had played a significant role 
in early Roman society, it would have been stifled by the ancient law’s “radical 
defence of ownership.”
157
) The strictness of the rules governing transfer of property 
created tensions following the influx of strangers to Rome after the first Punic war,
158
 
and the consequent explosion of commerce.
159
 In an era before the widespread 
availability of mass produced goods,
160
 it is perhaps also more likely that particular 
objects could reasonably be traced to their former owner. To this extent, the 
application of the nemo plus principle is not surprising, but rather consistent with the 
social and cultural conditions of the time. 
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Although a number of (sometimes surprisingly wide) exceptions to the rule 
existed, it is submitted that these do not render the principle incoherent. Against 
Schulz, it can be argued that the existence of such a maxim is a logical corollary to 
the requirement that the owner consent to transfer. The structure of the vindicatio 
also reinforces the distinction between mere possession and ownership, and the 
strength of the owner’s right. Conversely, it is also clear that legal logic cannot, in 
itself, justify the law’s preference for the original owner over the honest acquirer. 
“Neither ownership, agency, sales, nor any of the different types of possessory rights 
could, by themselves, claim the inherent symmetry of circles, triangles, or 
rectangles”.
161
 Social conditions and power relations at the time of development also 
play a significant part. 
 
What are the implications of this for the current law? Undoubtedly the social 
and economic conditions of modern life place very different demands upon the law 
of property. It is interesting, though, that some of the exceptions provided in Roman 
law involving situations where it was reasonable for an acquirer to assume that the 
transferor had right to the property reflect the type of practical reasoning also vital to 
the modern law. Particularly in the case of corporeal moveable property, ownership 
of which it is still difficult to evidence, the role of possession is frequently an 
important one. If there is no reasonable means of discovering that the possessor is not 
actually owner, it would be a harsh rule that excludes acquisition in perpetuity. Both 
modern legal systems and classical Roman law seem, in general, to reflect this. 
 




The period 1350-1650 has been described as the “dark age” of Scottish legal 
history.
162
 Although there exist some records of the activities of local courts
163
 and 
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what has been described as an instruction manual for the feudal courts,
164
 there are 
few systematic treatises. As in ancient Roman law, the main source of information 
about the ownership of moveable property is the law of actions, and the forms of 
words used to make particular claims. What, then, was the procedure by which an 
owner could recover possession of moveables? By way of social and economic 
context, in terms of trade and commerce Scotland “shared in the great urban revival 
of the eleventh and twelfth centuries in Europe”,
165
 with the development of towns as 
trading centres.
166
 A significant feature of this period was the grant by the twelfth-
century monarchs of burghal status to the most important village markets, 
establishing spatial monopolies on trade which persisted longer in Scotland than 
elsewhere in Britain.
167
 The Royal Burghs enjoyed extensive trading privileges, 
usually set out in the charter establishing the Burgh.
168
 Burghal markets were strictly 
regulated, with numerous laws restricting the times and places at which trading could 
occur.
169
 Customs and procedures developed in order to facilitate the trading 
activities of the burghs,
170
 and it is thus here that the earliest developments in laws 




Turning to legal provision, there are unfortunately few Scottish sources detailing this 
early period; those which exist do not devote much attention to the classification of 
actions. In general, the procedure for recovering moveable property appears similar 
to that found in many other Germanic legal cultures. Concern with publicity of 
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transfer, with requirements for witnessing of sales
171
 and, in the case of a challenge, 
reliance on the seller as warrantor
172
 were common features of early Germanic laws. 
Roman terminology does not seem to be commonly used; several of the Scots 
sources adopt the distinctively British term “haimhald” (as a verb in Latinised form, 
“haimhaldare”).
173
 This could refer to various things: a pledge exacted that an animal 
sold is one’s lawful possession, and not stolen or simply anything domestic or 
belonging to one’s household.
174
 Of most interest in the current context is the use of 
the term to mean “To claim (an animal) as one’s own property.” 
 
The Dictionary of the Scots Language gives the origin of the term as the Old 
Norse “heimold”, meaning “title or right of possession.” Early Icelandic law (dating 
from the Icelandic Commonwealth, which ran from the tenth to the thirteenth 
century) used the verb “hemila” for “to warrant someone’s title to something”; 
“heimild” was “warrant, warranty or warrantable title.”
175
 A law of William the 
Conqueror refers to the “heimelborh”
176
 or “hemoldborh”, a cautioner provided by a 
seller to guarantee performance of his or her obligations of warranty; this is 
acknowledged by Thorpe to derive from the Norse, presumably reflecting a rare 
remnant of the Norse language in Norman French.
177
 Johannes Steenstrup has argued 
that the British “haimhald” relates to the Nordic “Heimildartak”, a kind of pledge 
typically offered by a seller of used goods; he suggests the Nordic institution was 
received through the “lively trading relations”
178
 between Britain and the Nordic 
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there is evidence that similar terminology and procedures were used in Northern 




 This may indicate a shared 
source, or perhaps shared customary development. Although similar to the Anglo-
Saxon getyman (warrantor),
182
 the “hemold borgh” thus had a distinctly Nordic 
character. 
 
(a) The “March laws” 
The earliest surviving collection of laws is that contained in the Berne Manuscript,
183
 
which has been dated to the late thirteenth century.
184
 The origins of the “March 
laws”
185
 a collection of provisions contained within the manuscript which are 
believed to have regulated the Anglo-Scottish border territory in the twelfth to 
thirteenth centuries are uncertain.
186
 They featured a form of the recovery of stolen 
property by oath.
187
 The claimant must obtain the support of “six lele men.”
188
 If the 
defender alleges that the thing in question is his “awin propir,” the matter is to be 
resolved by duel.
189
 Neilson suggests that this type of procedure may be traced to the 
Lex Salica;
190
 it is certainly true that, as noted above, similar provisions were 
included in many early Germanic legal codes. The resolution of property disputes by 
duel does not leave much scope for discussion of questions of good faith acquisition; 
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(b) Leges Scocie 
The Berne Manuscript also records several provisions relating to challenge of stolen 
(furato) cattle and the calling of warrantors which probably date from the reign of 
William I (1165-1214);
192
 these specify the locations at which and the times within 
warrantors must appear.
193
 The practical enforceability of this law, known as 
“Claremathan”, was doubted by Lord Cooper
194
 but later scholars have affirmed its 




It is further provided that sellers of property should make available a 
cautioner (borgh), who will compensate the buyer if his ownership is challenged.
196
 
Similar provisions are found in earlier Anglo-Saxon laws.
197
 It is difficult to say how 
far such injunctions were enforced, but there is evidence that formalities of this type 
were used in the transfer of important objects. For example, an inscription at the end 
of the Bute manuscript records its sale in 1424, and names, in addition to the buyer 
and the seller, the “borgh off hamehalde” and two witnesses.
198
 The need for this 
kind of formality suggests that physical detention in itself was not enough to 
establish a presumption of lawful acquisition; rather it was production of the 
warrantor, or his or her borgh, which was necessary to evidence the possessor’s right. 
 
(c) Regiam Majestatem 
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198
 This is mentioned in APS 1 Notice on the manuscripts vii fn 3. 
43 
 
There are some difficulties in accurately establishing the date at which Regiam was 
compiled, and indeed, its status as representative of Scots law.
199
 The provisions 
collected distinguish civil from criminal causes, with civil causes involving a stake 
measurable in pecuniary terms and criminal causes penalties of “blood” (mutilation 
or death.)
200
 There existed, however, no clear separation of jurisdiction, and most 






 where a thing is claimed from a buyer as stolen the 
buyer may call a warrantor from whom he acquired the property to vouch for his 
lawful acquisition.
203
 It is stated that this will discharge the buyer from liability “ita 
quod propter hoc nihil de recto perdere poterit.”
204
 (Presumably this does not mean 
that he or she always will be able to keep the thing in question, only that any loss 
may be made good through a claim against his or her warrantor.
205
) Production of the 
warrantor will assoilzie the defender from any further part in the process, which will 
begin anew between the pursuer and the warrantor.
206
 The process of warranty may 
continue up to the fourth warrantor.
207
 Evidence of lawful purchase will be enough to 
remove the suspicion of theft from a warrantor, but will not protect against the loss 
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of the thing to the rightful owner.
208
 If a warrantor fails, there may be a duel between 
the buyer and the warrantor.
209
 Regiam also contains the sources from the Berne 
manuscript. Stolen money may not be immediately recovered; the claimant must first 




(d) Quoniam Attachiamenta 
The procedure for claiming moveables is also described in the Quoniam 
Attachiamenta, which uses the verb “haymaldare” for “to claim as one’s own”, or in 
civilian terminology, “to vindicate.”
211
 Further evidence of the usage of this term is 
found in the Exchequer Rolls of 1337, which make reference to use of the plegio de 
haymald in a dispute over cattle.
212
 It was alleged that the cattle had been stolen from 
a Justiciar but returned by friends of the thief under “oath of haymald”, presumably 




In the Quoniam text, only three warrantors may be called
214
 but the process 
seems essentially to be the same as that described in the Regiam. The procedure 
begins with an allegation that a thing has been taken (elongatem) from the pursuer. 
Production of his warrantor will relieve the defender from any claim against him or 
her, but if the warrantor fails to show lawful grounds for retention of the disputed 
thing (“si non iustam causam rem illam retinendi habeat,”)
215
 the pursuer may 
recover it. If the thing in question is an animal, the pursuer must place the Bible on 
its horns and swear that he neither sold nor gave away the thing in question,
216
 a 
process which can be understood as reflecting both the importance of the oath and 
also the juridical significance attached to certain material acts necessary to claim the 
thing.
217
 The formulation indicates the influence of earlier Saxon laws;
218
 similar 
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provisions are also found in the customary codes of Northern France and Spain.
219
 It 
is not possible to be certain, but it is submitted that the reference to the pursuer not 
having sold the thing in any way (venditum aliquo modo) does not encompass 
transfer under a contract for temporary possession such as loan or hire. This would 
contrast with the then-prevailing general reluctance to permit recovery by an owner 
who had entrusted his or her property,
220
 but is more consistent with later 
development in Scots law. 
 
What is the nature of these actions? Are they aimed at enforcing the 
ownership of the pursuer, or redress of a wrong (i.e. the theft of the property)?
221
 The 
way the procedures are structured suggests they are designed to redress the wrong of 
unauthorised transfer; in the sources mentioned, the process usually begins with an 
allegation of theft (or wrongful taking). Although the question of ownership would 
be implicitly addressed in the course of the competing claims of the parties, it seems 
reasonable to say that the right of ownership itself was not the subject of the action. 
Rather, the action is based on a wrong having been committed. Indeed, the Quoniam 
text refers to an animal having been taken from the pursuer, which may indicate that 
the action was not only open to an owner, but anyone in lawful possession of the 
animal (e.g. a hirer or depositary). There is little evidence as to the concepts of 
ownership of moveables during this period, but these sources suggest that, in some 
parts of Scotland at least, they were probably similar to that of the Anglo-Saxons and 
other Germanic legal cultures. 
 
Does this imply that, as in the Anglo-Saxon law, an owner who had 
voluntarily parted with possession of his property had no action for recovery based 
solely in ownership? The Germanic action for recovery of moveables has been 
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characterised as depending on an involuntary loss of possession.
222
 For example, the 
Lombard laws required that where property had been deposited with another 
freeman, this person should be held responsible for compensating the owner if it was 
stolen from that person’s home. The depositee could pursue the thief. This was to 
prevent the thief being pursued twice.
223
 It is, however, consistent with the Scots 
sources to suggest that if a borrower of moveable property had purported to sell it to 
a third party, the owner would be able to recover it. The question of good faith 
acquisition is not discussed, but the purser’s action implicitly depends on 
establishing ownership through the oath of “haymald”. 
 
(e) Leges Burgorum 
Further evidence of the strictly regulated nature of commercial transactions in this 
period is found in a provision collected in the Ancient Laws and Customs of the 
Burghs of Scotland requiring that all transactions apart from those concerning “smale 
merchandise” require the seller’s “lawful borgh” (provision of caution).
224
 In case the 
thing be “chalangit and recouerit”, it is the borgh which will “sauf him lif and 
mebris.” This again implies that, without a reliable warrantor, a good faith purchaser 
is vulnerable not only to loss of the property, but to an accusation of theft. A burgess 
whose goods are challenged by an “uplandis” (rural) man who has no borgh will lose 
the thing in question, and must clear his name with the oath of twelve of his 
neighbours.
225
 For the purposes of publicity, sales of particularly valuable goods, 
such as horses, might be proclaimed at the market cross, “before the hale 
multitude.”
226
 Special rules existed for the resolution of disputes over ownership of 
things challenged at fairs.
227
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An example of a successful recovery by the owner and recourse by the buyer 
to the seller’s “borgh” is found in a case of 1398 recorded in the Council Register of 
the Burgh of Aberdeen concerning a claim by one Johannes against Patricium Crane, 
who had given “plegio de haymhald” in respect of Henrico de Lothiane. Henrico had 
sold Johannes a horse, which had subsequently been taken from Johannes by process 
of law. Johannes now claimed from Patricium the price of the horse, damages for 
loss caused and in respect of his expenses incurred. Partricium admitted his pledge, 
and after finding caution, was granted forty days in which to ascertain the amount 
owed and satisfy the pursuer.
228
 In another case, the claimant proved his ownership 
of the carcass of a cow to the satisfaction of the judges, and the defender was again 
left to proceed against his warrantor.
229
 The process of calling warrantors could be 




In a case recorded in the Acta Dominorum Concilii in 1499, a herdsman was 
ordained to deliver up various animals in his custody which were alleged to belong to 
the pursuer. The defender had been given a specified time to produce his warrantor 





(3) Roman and Canon law influence 
 
(a) Spuilzie 
Particularly during the fifteenth century, but probably also prior to that, the 
development of a civil remedy protecting against wrongeous dispossession of 
property, spuilzie, is also relevant. This was apparently derived from the exceptio 
spolii of the Canon law
232
 which “crossed over into Scots law to provide a category 
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in which to deal with wrongs.”
233
 The Robbery Act 1438,
234
 which gave spuilzie 
statutory blessing, is cited by Walker as the first example of the emergence of a legal 
process to secure the restoration of moveables,
235
 but it seems likely that an 
equivalent existed in the earlier common law.
236
 MacQueen has identified references 
to spoliation in several fourteenth-century cases.
237
 However, the height of its 
popularity seems to have been during the fifteenth century: John Cairns has 





As spuilzied moveables could apparently also be recovered from the 
“resettouris” (resetters) of such,
239
 the remedy was afforded a remarkably wide 
scope. For present purposes, its significance is that it represented the beginnings of a 
conceptual separation between possession and ownership, and between possessory 




(b) Nemo plus 
Although there is little evidence as to the principles governing transfer of moveables, 
the nemo plus rule was received into Scots law at a relatively early stage. Stein has 
pointed out that, as the maxim was already in axiomatic form, this may have 
facilitated its adoption by later legal systems, and indeed its reception into Scots 
law.
241
 A Justiciar court in 1347 held that the king could not grant lands more freely 
than he held them himself.
242
 There is also evidence in legal documents contained in 
the Chartulary of the Abbey of Lindores that the principle was quoted in legal debate 
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in the fourteenth century in order to argue that an heir could not exact more feudal 
duties than his author.
243
 It is surmised by the editor of the Chartulary that the rule 
was received directly from the Digest,
244
 but, whatever the actual source, the maxim 
was clearly familiar to the practitioners of the period.  
 
One possible reason for this is the great influence of the learned ecclesiastical 
lawyers on early legal development. Particularly in the thirteenth century, the 
ecclesiastical courts provided an attractive forum for the resolution of disputes 
compared to the secular courts.
245
 At least until the founding of the first Scottish 
universities in the fifteenth century, Scottish students went to study Civil and Canon 
law in continental universities, during the fourteenth century often to Paris and 
Orleans.
246
 Canon law thus provides an obvious route for reception of the maxim. 
 
To what extent, then, is reference made to the nemo plus principle in the 
Canon law sources? Versions of the maxim made their way into the Corpus Juris 
Canonici; the rescript to a Scottish petition of 1203, later collected in the Decretals 
of Gregory IX, refers to a version of the principle, stating “quum regulariter nullus 
plus iuris in alium transferre possit, quam eum constet habere…”
247
 The rule drawn 
from this in the Decretals is “Usufructuarius, donans sine consensus domini rem 
ipsam uxori propter nuptias, non transfert in eam plus iuris quam ipse habebat.”
248
 
In the Sextus Liber Decretalium of Boniface is found “nemo potest plus iuris 
transferre in alium, quam sibi ipsi competere dignoscatur.”
249
 Along with the civil 
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law sources, these would very probably have been known to a learned Scots lawyer 




An abbreviated, but essentially equivalent, form of the maxim, “nemo dat 
quod non habet”, was known in fourteenth-century France
251
and appears in the 




Stein has argued that, in turning to the Civil and Canon law, Scots lawyers 
were looking primarily for “a set of universal principles.”
253
 Texts which were 
originally only of limited application were treated as containing broad general rules. 
As mentioned above in relation to its inclusion in Title 50.17 of the Digest, nemo 
plus is an ideal maxim for such a purpose. Its inherent flexibility means that it would 
have been easy to apply in situations far removed from those envisaged by the 
Roman jurists. On the basis of the limited evidence available, this account seems a 
reasonable one; it is certainly the case that the maxim was known and utilised to 




In general, the early law reflects the social and economic requirements of the closely 
knit mediaeval community. Moveable property raises particular issues regarding 
evidence of ownership, and the use of warrantors was a response to this typical of 
many jurisdictions. Given the limitations of the early sources, it is difficult to draw 
any firm conclusions as to how the Scots lawyers of the time reasoned about property 
rights. As in many mediaeval systems, there was little scope for good faith 
acquisition of stolen goods; “the property was…identified with the thief, and the 
quality of stolen was attached to it as if it were a physical quality of the property 
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 It is suggested that the relation between the owner of moveable 
property and his or her object was not considered in an abstract way, but rather as 
embedded in particular social relations. For example, the buyer had a relation of trust 
with the seller. The system of warranty and the use of “borghs” emphasised that 
questions of property could not be separated from relations of friendship and kin. An 
owner also had a claim against anyone who had wronged him or her by taking his or 
her property without consent. Lord Cooper has described the mediaeval Scots law 
thus: 
 
[i]t is hardly an exaggeration to say that each pursuer eventually presented 
himself before the tribunal in the guise of ‘an infant crying in the night, And 
with no language but a cry’, and that the whole of Scots Law had been 




The popularity of spuilzie, and the emphasis upon cases of theft, reflects precisely 
such a focus on wrongs. Although the right of ownership of moveable property was 
certainly recognized, and protected, the materials available indicate that court 
procedure was structured around redressing particular injustices, rather than asserting 
more abstract rights. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the precise extent of the role 
played by the maxims of the Digest in mediaeval Scots law. 
 
C. SIXTEENTH-CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS 
 
(1) Legal Culture 
 
The sixteenth century brought a number of important legal developments. It has been 
argued that the foundation of the College of Justice in 1532 caused “a significant 
change in the organization of central justice in Scotland.”
256
 A gradual cultural shift 
occurred, “[creating] a milieu in which formality, the forms and procedures of the 
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law, the written authenticated record, had an appeal and an authority which would in 
the end far outweigh the amateur justice of lord and kin.”
257
 The Session in the 
sixteenth century has been characterised as a “ius commune” court, in the sense that 





The late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries also saw the preparation of 
several important collections of authorities known as “Practicks” from which Scots 
law began to emerge as a distinctive body of learning. In particular, Balfour’s 
Practicks “stands as the pre-eminent written record of Scots Law until the 
publication of Stair’s Institutions.”
259
 Balfour attempts primarily to collect the laws 
and customs particular to Scotland, and does not, unlike Stair a century later, draw on 





(2) Actions for the Recovery of Moveables 
 
In general, a more sophisticated approach to the division of actions is evident. 
Reference is made to the distinction drawn in Regiam between civil and criminal 
proceedings; civil proceedings “pursewis and concludes ane pecunial pane, and not 
life or lim.”
261
 More importantly, claims involving property rights are distinguished 
from those concerning possession: “sum civil actiounis concern propertie and ground 
richt, and utheris ar of possessioun allanerlie.”
262
 Cases of spuilzie based only on 
violent
263
 dispossession began to be differentiated from other actions, in which it was 
necessary to libel a title.
264
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In respect of the owner’s claim for recovery, both criminal and civil actions 
involved a similar allegation of wrongful taking. The rules mentioned by Balfour are 
largely based on provision in the Quoniam Attachiamenta, but are worth quoting: 
 
[T]he persewar may challenge it criminallie, gif he pleisis, alledging that the 
samin was his lauchful and hame-hald cattel, the quhilk was thiftuouslie 
stollin fra him sic ane day, sic anezeir, and with-haldinfra him sic ane space 
of time; or it is fre and leasum to him to challenge the samin civillie, 
alledging the horse or beist to be his awin hame-hald gudis, and wrangouslie 
stollin fra him, to his damnag and skaith, extending to sic ane sowme, and 




These provisions refer to stolen horses and cattle, but similar rules were applied in 
respect of any accusation of theft.
266
 The focus remains on the fact that the owner 





Records of some courts of the period demonstrate that the civil and the 
criminal aspects of a case were often dealt with together, the question of ownership 
impliedly resolved as part of a criminal process. In the Court Book of the Barony of 
Carnwath, a case is recorded in which a charge of pykre (a form of theft) is repelled 
by evidence that the accused had bought the stolen sheep, which are to be restored to 
the rightful owner.
268
 In another case, the buyers of another man’s sheep are ordered 
to produce their warrantors, and restore the sheep to the owner.
269
 Where goods are 
challenged as stolen, the court orders the goods to be returned to the owner, and the 
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possessors to produce the person from whom they coft (bought) the stolen goods.
270
 
This approach is consistent with the close correspondence between civil and criminal 
claims described above. 
 
As well as reclamation in the course of an allegation of theft, it is probable 
that some form of action was available simply for asserting ownership of moveables 
analogous to the vindicatio. Balfour states that a victim of theft may decide to seek 
“simple restitutioun,”
271
 which requires only proof, by sufficient witnesses, of the 
fact of ownership; if the possessor refuses to make restitution, an accusation of theft 
may be brought. The Roman terminology, although not a common cause of action 
compared to spuilzie, was recognised in Scotland. In 1566 a ship was claimed “per 
rei vindicationem” from the possessors; the defence that the defenders had been 
imprisoned on the ship by pirates and had “hazardit their lyves” to bring it safely to 
port failed to convince the court that they should be allowed to keep it.
272
 Godfrey 
describes an attempt to recover a loaned horse which had subsequently fallen into the 
hands of other parties on the basis of the pursuer’s ownership; the defender alleges 
that he has bought the horse and calls his warrantor but unfortunately the case was 




These moves towards the development of a vindicatory action, however, must 
be placed in the context of the popularity of remedies protecting possession. Spuilzie 
continued to grow in importance as a remedy during the sixteenth century.
274
 
Especially in the case of moveable property, it was a useful device to settle questions 
of right without protracted litigation; for example, spuilzie could be used to contest a 
poinding.
275
 Even more attractively, it often afforded the pursuer chance to recover 
possession without allowing the defender a chance to establish a competing right by 
calling a warrantor.
276
 In the mid-sixteenth century, the question of whether the 
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defender could call a warrantor was controversial.
277
 In one case reported in 
Sinclair’s Practicks, a warrantor was permitted.
278
 However, the issue was a recurrent 
one.
279
 It may be surmised from this that actions of spuilzie were often used as a 
proxy for disputes about ownership; once possession had been regained, the burden 
of proof shifted to the other party to establish his or her ownership. 
 
(3) Proving Ownership 
 
There continued to be reliance on the obligation of warrandice, with the oath of 
“borgh and hamehald” continuing to apply to the purchase of cattle and horses.
280
 
Balfour includes the provisions of Regiam and the Burgh laws mentioned above 
requiring sellers of moveable goods to grant warranty.
281
A record of the giving of 
warranty on sale of a horse appears in the Council Register of the Burgh of 
Aberdeen. The warranty was to last for a year, and part of the payment was retained 




If a person was accused of theft of cattle or horses and wished to defend the 
action, alleging that he or she acquired the beast lawfully, he or she was required, 
based on the provision of the Quoniam Attachmienta, to call a warrantor, who should 
also provide a “borgh” (cautioner) to compensate the defender if the action was 
successful. The possessor was required to find security and exhibit the beasts at a 
specified time and date.
283
 If no caution was found, the challenger could take the 
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The warrantor might in turn call a warrantor, and, following Quoniam, this 
could occur up to three times.
285
 An example of such a process is found in the Sheriff 
Court Book of Fife in which the warrantor of the seller of a horse is called,
286
 and 




In order to be successful the pursuer must prove his or her ownership, 
producing two witnesses to support his or her allegation, and, again following the 
provision in Quoniam, swear that he or she never donated, sold or otherwise 
alienated the beasts in question: 
 
And gif na ressonabill caufe be alledgit in the contrare, the persewar sall 
hame-hald, and with him away have, the said beist or cattel, havand twa 
witnessis with him, makand faith, and preivand the famin to be his proper 
gude, conform to his clame, and that he never gave, sauld, nor ony maner of 




The reference to alienation here implies that mere transfer of possession did not 
prevent the owner from recovery. The similar provisions of the Leges Quatuor 
Burgorum dealing with the procedure where stolen goods or gear are found at fairs 




(4) Bona Fide Acquisition and the Nemo Plus Rule 
 
(a) The position of the bona fide purchaser 
How was a good faith purchaser treated under these rules? A bad faith purchaser 
would forfeit his or her claim in warrandice against the seller.
290
 However, the 
account given above does not specifically cover the outcome if the defender and his 
or her warrantors are able to prove that the cattle were legitimately acquired but the 
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pursuer successfully establishes that they had not been voluntarily alienated. There is 
no mention of the position if the property had been entrusted; the focus on the owner 
having consented to alienation (rather than transfer of possession) might imply that 
the owner could vindicate in such an instance. Alternatively, perhaps the fact that 
three warrantors have been called and each proven their lawful acquisition meant that 
no recovery was possible; in this case the successful production of three warrantors 




In general, it seems that sale in open market would defend against an 
accusation of theft but not recovery by the original owner. If a possessor of stolen 
goods or gear bought “believand that thayar lauchful merchandice, and knawis 
nathing of the steilling thairof… in fair or mercat, befoir the Baillies, or honest men, 
quha beiris testimonie and record thairof, and payit toll and custume thairfoir, 
conform to the law of the realme”, “he fall be quite and fre fra all danger and pane of 
thift; bot fall be compellit to mak restitutioun of the saidis gudis to the awner 
thairof… and in this cais he may not seik restitutioun fra the awner of that quhilk he 




Interestingly, if the goods were not bought “in fair or mercat”, the possessor 
might be accused of theft,
293
 indicating that purchase in open market provided at 
least some measure of protection. An onus was placed on individuals to ensure that 
all goods found in their possession had been legitimately and publicly acquired. If 
cattle or horses were found wandering, they should be delivered to an appropriate 
official; if a person found someone else’s goods or gear, he or she should attempt to 
find the owner thereof, or risk being accused of theft.
294
 One exception to the general 
rule was when a ship had been taken as a prize,
295
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Some early reports in Morison’s Dictionary also deal with the position of the 
bona fide purchaser. In Beveridge v Indwellers in Cupar,
297
 a decree on the basis of 
which goods had been sold at auction was reduced, and the purchasers were 
subsequently found liable to restore the property. Both parties referred to the civil 
law in support of their contentions.
298
 The case is an interesting one, because it does 
not involve an obvious wrong such as theft. However, the report in the Dictionary is 
brief and, as the defenders were the immediate beneficiaries of the reduced juridical 
act, it is not clear whether the decree in question was void or merely voidable and 
therefore whether a subsequent purchaser would be in the same position. 
 
There remains little discussion of the problem of the recovery of entrusted 
property from a third party purchaser. It is difficult to know whether this is because 
the pursuer would have had no competent cause of action, or whether the act of 
transfer in itself was treated as a theft, allowing the owner to recover it from any 
detentor. There is some indication that property initially transferred with the consent 
of the owner was not treated as stolen,
299
 but the later work of George Mackenzie 




(b) A role for possession? 
Did the non-violent acquisition of possession play any part in determining questions 
of ownership? There is some tenuous evidence of protection based upon possession: 
on the challenge of a horse, the defender is allowed to “hald” the horse “ay quhill he 
awin [owns] him lawfully that awcht him.”
301
 “Awcht” is defined in the Dictionary 
of the Scots Language as “that which is owned or possessed by one; possession(s), 
property.” One interpretation of the judgment is thus that “he owns him lawfully that 
possesses him.” However, there is little other evidence of the application of such a 
rule, and the wording of the (short) judgment is ambiguous. 
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(c) Canon law influence 
(i) Nemo plus 
As noted earlier, ius commune “proverbs” such as nemo plus were frequently quoted 
in the College of Justice.  Dolezalek has pointed to several references to the nemo 
plus maxim in the sixteenth-century cases collected in Sinclair’s Practicks. These 
occur, for example, in a case concerning the principle “confiscatioun makis na mair 
rycht to the king than pertenit to the convict man,”
302
 a case about the claim for 
payment of a debt already repaid in kind to an agent
303
 and another concerning the 
sale of lands originally only granted in security.
304
 As well as quotation of the Latin 
maxim directly from the Civil or Canon law sources, court records from the early 
sixteenth century show that the principle was cited in English, and seems to have 
been accepted as forming part of the law of Scotland. For example, in an action for 
reduction of an order to pay maills and duties the pursuers argued that “no one can 
transfer or give to another a greater right than he has himself,”
305
 a clear reference to 
the Latin maxim. 
 
Being principally concerned with Scots custom, Balfour does not refer to the 
nemo plus principle. The same may be said of the later collections of Thomas 
Hope.
306
 No specific references to the principle in relation to transfer of moveable 
property by a non-owner have been found prior to 1625.
307
 This may be due to the 
fact that moveable property was often less valuable, and therefore less likely to have 
been the subject of protracted litigation. However, given that Roman law is 
acknowledged to have had “considerable influence” on the law regulating derivative 
acquisition of moveable property,
308
 the early sources are surprisingly silent. 
 
(ii) Bona fides 
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Recent scholarship has explored the development of the good faith requirement in 
the context of usucaption in mediaeval Canon law.
309
 Although not intended as a 
platform for development of good faith acquisition, decretist Summae have been 
argued to have created in the European legal tradition an awareness that acquisition 
of rights from a non-entitled party presupposes good faith.
310
 Although full 
exploration of the status of concepts of good faith in Scots law is outwith the scope 
of the thesis, the Canon law developments provide an important context for the later 
moves to establish protection for good faith purchasers discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
(iii) The obligation of restitution 
Doctrinal development was further influenced by the notion of the obligation of 
“restitution” (“restitutione.”) This theological doctrine, which is argued by Dolezalek 
to have reached its apogee in the sixteenth century, covered circumstances which in 
classical Roman law would have been dealt with using the action of rei vindicatio.
311
 
The doctrine is based on the idea that acquisition from a non-owner creates an 
imbalance which must be remedied. For example, Thomas Aquinas talks of 
“unevenness with regard to something (tangible or intangible) which one has among 




The duty to make restitution arises from the fact that the thing in question is 
owned by another.
313
 Even if the acquirer is not at fault, a wrong has still been 
committed in violating the will of the owner: 
 
Nullus potest licite retinere illud quod contra voluntatem domini acquisivit, 
puta si aliquis dispensator de rebus domini sui dar etalicui contra voluntatem 
et ordinationem domini sui, ille qui acciperet licite retinere non posset.
314
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A duty is therefore placed upon the holder to restore any property transferred without 
the owner’s consent: “hoc quod aliquis privetur eo quod accepit, non solum est 




Jan Hallebeek has published a fascinating study of the doctrine of restitution 
and its role in the development of the concept of unjust enrichment in Scholastic 
thought.
316
 The influence of these ideas can be identified in the decisions of the 
newly established Court of Session. In a case concerning the duty of a master to 
return property stolen by a servant, reference is made to the Canonical doctrine: 
“Quod cum aliena iactura quis recepit, restituere tenetur”.
317
 Although not expressly 
stated, it may be inferred that ownership implied a duty on the part of any possessor 
to restore, an idea which would be developed further in the institutional period. 
 
Purchasers of spuilzied goods risked at the least civil liability, and possibly 
prosecution for theft, if they could not convince the court that they had acted 
properly. In 1552 an action was successfully raised for disgorgement of the profits 
made by buyers of spuilzied figs, who had resold them. It was argued by the buyers 
that they were not liable as they were no longer in possession of the figs, and 
moreover they had bought them in good faith, believing them to be spoils of war. 
These exceptions were rejected.
318
 In light of the discussion above, this emphasises 
the close connection between questions of property, and what in modern discourse 
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Overall, then, the sixteenth century saw a growth in the influence of Canonical and 
Civilian principles and procedures. However, the substance of the law continued to 
reflect its mediaeval Germanic origins, with the system of warranty remaining the 
principal means of resolving disputes over ownership. Although there is no concrete 
evidence as to the treatment of the good faith purchaser when entrusted property was 
transferred without the consent of the owner, stolen property could certainly not be 
acquired, even by a purchaser in good faith. Although the number of fairs and 
markets increased throughout the sixteenth century, this does not yet seem to have 
influenced the laws recorded by Balfour. The emphasis remains upon protection of 
ownership, with the system of warranty providing, at least in theory, financial 
compensation for those who lost out. 
 
D. EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
 
(1) Recovery of Moveables 
 
Although it is only in the latter half of the seventeenth century that the key phase of 
Scottish legal development known as the “institutional period” can really be said to 
begin, the foundations for the works of Stair were arguably laid in its early years. 
Apart from a few general comments, Sir Thomas Craig’s Jus Feudale omits 
moveable property almost entirely from consideration, but his reasoned and 
philosophical consideration of the feudal law, with its reference to numerous ius 




The early seventeenth century also saw rapid social and economic changes, 
particularly in the number and geographical distribution of fairs and markets. Non-
burghal markets became numerous from the sixteenth century; there was also a rise 
in the recognition of non-Royal Burghs throughout the seventeenth century.
320
 The 
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deregulation of local markets, and the (presumed) increase in the number of 
transactions
321
 meant that the system of warranty faced new pressures. 
 
How then, did legal procedures reflect these changes? In 1600, a good part of 
the business of the Court of Session was related to the restitution of moveables, in 
particular horses.
322
 These might have been spuilzied or stolen; spuilzie as an action 
was distinct, as it did not require proof of the pursuer’s ownership.
323
 The issue of the 
distinction between the civil and criminal remedies was subject to debate until the 
mid-seventeenth century,
324





At some point, a radical change seems to have occurred in the way that 
ownership of moveable property was conceptualised. The collections of Practicks 
made by Sir Thomas Hope represent one of the first attempts to systematise Scots 
law on the basis of the civilian distinction between real and personal rights.
326
 The 
law of actions is clearly structured around the right of the owner to follow the thing 
and recover it from unauthorised possessors: “Actiones reales semper sequntur rem, 
in whois hands sover it be, and whither moveable or immoveable”.
327
 Hope refers 
extensively to the French jurist Jacques Godefroy
328
 and his work on the customs of 
Normandy;
329
 Godefroy’s description of a real action as based on a real right in a 
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thing as opposed to an undertaking (promesse) made by the possessor is an obvious 




In the Minor Practicks, Hope refers to the vindicatio as the appropriate action 
for claiming moveable property: “Jus in re in mobilibus, est ubi proprietas rei 
mobilis ad aliquem pertinet et actio quae ob hanc competit dicitur rei vindicatio, a 
quocunque possessore, sive naturali, sive civili”.
331
 The importance of these 
statements is the recognition of the action as derived from the right of the owner, 
rather than any wrong committed; “Jus in re, or a Right in a Thing, is a Power or 
Faculty competent by Law, and inherent in the Thing itself, producing to the 
proprietor an Action against the Thing, towards the Recovery thereof.”
332
 There is 
further evidence of this in Lord Durie’s report of Brown v Hudelstone,
333
 which 
refers to the owner’s right to vindicate “à quocunqe fuerit possessa” as well as to the 
nemo plus rule. 
 
In terms of procedure, actions solely aimed at enforcing ownership (rather 
than redressing a wrong such as spuilzie) existed. For instance, we find a case in 
which, although no theft is alleged, an owner is permitted to recover a horse on the 
strength of witnesses to the fact of his ownership.
334
 Brown v Hudelstone
335
 also 
refers to an action available against any possessor. 
 
Whether through training in Canon law or from direct contact with the 
Digest, by the seventeenth century the nemo plus maxim was well established within 
Scots legal discourse. Craig makes several references to the maxim in the context of 
transmission of feus,
336
 indicating that it was seen as relevant to property transfer. It 
is also interesting that the Roman law is seen as particularly applicable to transfer of 
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moveables: “So it has cometh that we Scotsmen follow the precedents and principles 
of Roman jurisprudence, particularly in the department of moveable rights.”
337
 Craig 





(2) Protection of Purchasers 
 
(a) Sale in public market 
There remains little evidence in relation to entrusted property, but the purchaser of 
stolen goods continued to be vulnerable to the claim of the original owner. The Court 
Book of the Barony and Regality of Falkirk records in a case of 1642 that the buyer 
of stolen goods was required to return the goods to the owner.
339
 In Morison’s 
Dictionary, Bishop of Caithness v Fleshers in Edinburgh
340
 concerned an action for 
return of (yet another) stolen horse. A bona fide purchaser in public market was 
found liable to restore the horse, but was not to be subject to criminal penalties. 
 
In Ferguson v Forrest
341
 the defender had two arguments: that he was a bona 
fide purchaser for value at a regular market, and the horse in question was now dead, 
and could not be restored. It was held that the recipient ought to have taken “borgh 
and ham-hold” from the seller, in conformity with “the old laws of the realm.” 
Although the horse in question had died, the purchaser was still found liable to 
refund the purchase price. It is difficult to discern the basis for this judgment; 
restitution of the price was said to be “in place of” restoration of the horse, but the 
report does not explain why the death of the horse did not end the defender’s 
obligation. Perhaps he was considered at fault for not finding caution for the 
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 or perhaps the death of the horse was thought to have enriched the 




A further confirmation that sale at public market in itself did not provide 
protection is found in Hay v Eliot,
344
 in which the landlord’s hypothec
345
 over the 
tenant’s crops was found to be good against a purchaser in public market who was 
forced to repay the value of the hypothecated corn. 
 
Despite the lack of protection afforded to purchasers, the cases recorded in 
Morison’s Dictionary demonstrate that the question was relatively frequently 
litigated.  The fact that “borgh and hamhold” were described as part of the “old laws” 
indicates that the practice of obtaining a warrantor was seen as of less contemporary 
relevance. However the system apparently remained in use; in one case the buyer of 
a stolen horse pursues his seller’s author, who in turn pursues a man indebted to his 
own author (who has fled upon being accused of stealing the horse.
346
) Habukkuk 
Bisset in his Rolment of Courtis records that in 1579 the Lords changed had 
abrogated the “langsum, tedius and sumptuous” form of process whereby the calling 
of warrantors would delay settlement of the original question. Instead, the case was 
now to be decided immediately, but action reserved to the defender to pursue his 
warrantor “quen and how sone he plesis.”
347
 This statute is also recorded by Hope, 




 but has not been traced. In 1634, a 
Baron Court at Killin attempted to legislate that no “blocker or buyer” of horses or 
other animals was to buy without the caution of “burgh and hamer” guaranteeing that 
they are “weill come”. If no “burgh” was taken, the buyer risked execution if the 
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goods were shown to be stolen.
349
 Despite increasing Romanist influence therefore, 
the contours of the early seventeenth-century law continued to follow those of the 
earlier mediaeval provision. 
 
(b) The presumption of ownership from possession. 
One element which may have played a key role in ensuring that the law maintained a 
balance between original owner and innocent purchaser is the development of the 
presumption of ownership from possession. Although it is only in the later writings 
of Stair that the presumption is expressly set out, it seems to have originated in the 
early seventeenth century. The earliest cases cited by Stair in the 1681 edition of his 





In Turnbull T’s cow was poinded by B’s creditor, K, while in B’s possession. 
The Lords found that goods remaining “diverse years” in the possession of the debtor 
were lawfully poinded by a creditor. This was apparently due to a “presumptive 
qualification of Property, consisting in the retention of Possession sundry years”. 
Although the owner offered to prove himself the true owner of the goods, alleging 
that they had been “bred upon his own Heretage” and only given to the defender for 
the purpose of grazing, this was not thought to be relevant where there had been two 
years where the owner had not been in “real Possession”.  Unlike in later cases, once 
established this “presumptive quality” does not appear to be rebuttable, meaning that 
the doctrine resembles a short form of acquisitive prescription rather than the 
evidential presumption later developed by Stair. 
 
Brown also concerned an accusation of spuilzie against a creditor poinding 
cattle not owned by his debtor. The Lords found the possession relevant to defend 
against spuilzie, and also against the delivery of the cow, which the pursuer insisted 
for rei vindicatione, arguing that, although the defender might be assoilzied of 
spuilzie and violence, possession of the cow for 2 years was not enough to extinguish 
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his right. The cow was held, however, to come under the poinding, because of the 
two years possession. Stair’s interpretation of this decision will be discussed later, 
but Lord Durie’s report again implies a form of short acquisitive prescription rather 




Interestingly, it is stated that original owner continued to have an action for 
restitution of the cow against the person who had “received” it. It is unclear whether 
this amounts to recognition that the cow could be vindicated from a future possessor, 
or a reference to a right of action against the original depositary. As will be seen, 
“restitution” could be used to demand restoration of property, but could also refer to 
compensation for an unjustly received benefit. In the event that the depositary/ 
receiver no longer possessed the property, presumably “restitution” would amount to 
a claim for the cow’s value. 
 
Spottiswoode does not mention the presumption, but he does state that an 
owner wishing to vindicate his thing is better off trying to obtain possession through 
one of the possessory interdicts available, as it is difficult to prove ownership as 
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CHAPTER 3: THE INSTITUTIONAL PERIOD 
 




The late seventeenth century has been recognised as a crucial period in Scottish legal 
history. As John Cairns writes, “[a]t the beginning of the century the law was in an 
uncertain, confused and disorganised state, while by 1700, modern Scots law had 
definitely taken shape.”
353
 What follows describes the changes that took place in the 
law regulating bona fide acquisition of moveable property and examines the factors 
which may have impacted on juristic accounts of the problem. An important question 
is the extent to which the position in English law influenced Scottish legal debate. 
There is some (limited) evidence of pressure to adopt the English doctrine of market 
overt, which protected bona fide purchasers in open market.
354
 The development of 









 was also discussed by Scottish jurists. 
Lastly, the philosophical climate, in particular the theories of property and ownership 
developed by Grotius and Lord Kames, influenced juristic responses to the bona fide 
purchase problem. 
 
Chapter 2 noted the growth of non-burghal markets during the seventeenth 
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de Paris (1922, repr 1972) 116-119. 
70 
 
century. This was particularly the case in the period after 1660, with the creation of 
new market centres reaching “an unprecedented level” between the Restoration and 
the Union of 1707.
358
 143 new centres had been established between 1550 and 1660, 
but 346 were authorised between 1660 and 1707.
359
 It is reasonable to assume that 
these changes would have had some influence upon the character, and perhaps the 




More generally, a new intellectual and philosophical climate emphasised the 
role of law as adaptive to stages of social development;
361
 there was increasing 
recognition of the role of law in facilitating economic life.
362
 Although it was only in 
the eighteenth century that Scottish theorisations of the role of law in the new types 
of commercial society reached their apogee,
363
 the jurists of the late seventeenth 
century were certainly sensible to the changes occurring around them. The general 
importance of law in fostering economic development permeates the work of Stair, 
who refers to it numerous times. Indeed, he states in his introductory title that “all of 
[the Principles of Equity and of Positive Law] aim at the maintenance, flourishing 




With the Scottish economy at this point still based predominantly on trade in 
agricultural produce and raw materials,
365
 corporeal moveable property remained of 
great economic importance. The impact of the new demands, both practical and 
philosophical, upon the rules regulating bona fide purchase is discussed below; there 
are also other instances in which modification of the law of moveable property to 
accord with new economic conditions is mentioned. For example, Stair comments on 
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the development of the law relating to inhibitions: 
 
experience did early show, that there was a necessity for current course of 
Moveables, and that it could not consist with Traffick and Commerce, that no 
man could securely buy without inspection of registers; and therefore, 




(2) Recovery of Moveables: Stair’s Account of Restitution 
 
(a) Prior sources 
Spottiswoode’s Practicks provide some insight into the sources relied on in legal 
practice prior to the publication of Stair’s Institutions.
367
 John Cairns has emphasised 
Spottiswoode’s reliance on contemporary civilian works, “the “common law” was 
coming to appear as the ius civile rather than as the utrumque ius”;
368
 his title 
concerning rei vindicatio fits this general depiction. The text is substantially
369
 taken 
from a work on the Institutes by German professor and judge Joachim Mynsinger 
von Frundeck (1514-1588).
370
 On Spottiswoode/ Mynsinger’s account, rei vindicatio 
is a real action (actio realis), which is given to the owner against any possessor in 
order to recover his corporeal thing.
371
 If the defender denies that he is the possessor, 
he is not compelled to submit to judgment, but the actio ad exhibendum will be 
competent against him for production of the thing.
372
 Although adjusted to 
incorporate feudal landholdings,
373
 the basic structure of the action described is thus 
that of the Roman law. Spottiswoode’s collection does not, in itself, demonstrate 
reception of the vindicatio in Scotland but it nevertheless provides an important 
                                                          
366
 Stair, Institutions (1681) 23.25. 
367
 The Practicks were compiled by Sir Robert Spottiswoode from the 1620s to the 1640s, and 
published by his grandson in 1706. On Spottiswoode’s sources, see Cairns, “Ius Civile” 158-167. 
368
 Cairns, “Ius Civile” 167.  
369
 The first paragraph and the final one of the title on “Rei Vindicatio” correspond more or less word 
for word with that of J Mynsinger’s Apotelesma sive corpus perfectum scholiorum ad quattuor libros 
institutionum iuris civilis (1589) 4.6 §Omnium 30. The correspondence of the middle paragraph is 
less exact but it appears to be based on Mynsinger, Apotelesma 4.6 §Omnium 35.  
370
 On Mynsinger, see O F Robinson et al., European Legal History: Sources and Institutions (2000) 
11.3.8. 
371
 Spottiswoode, Practicks 275. 
372
 Spottiswoode, Practicks 275. 
373
 There are said to be two kinds of rei vindicatio, directa and utilis. These are competent to the 
superior and the vassal respectively: Spottiswoode, Practicks 275. 
72 
 
indication of the relevance of the Roman law remedy and, by implication, Roman 
concepts of ownership and possession. Prior to the publication of the first printed 
edition of the Institutions in 1681, there are also several cases which make reference 




(b) The 1681 edition of the Institutions 
Stair’s treatment of the recovery of moveable property, and the position of bona fide 
purchasers, does not occur at the point one might expect in the Institutions, i.e. under 
the titles treating of the law of property. Rather, these topics are dealt with under the 
law of obligations, under the heading “restitution.” Explicit reference is made to 
Grotius’ De Jure Belli et Pacis and the title “Of the obligation that arises from 
property” was clearly an important influence.
375
  Both Stair and Grotius distinguish 
the obligation of restitution, which arises from the mere possession of another’s 
property, from those arising from any wrong
376
 or, according to Stair, voluntary 
engagement.
377
 This is in obvious contrast to the earlier law discussed in Chapter 2. 
The obligation to make restitution arises in a wide range of situations, including to 





There are several innovative aspects to Stair’s account of restitution. In 
contrast to, for example, Grotius, he places obligations first in his scheme, treating of 
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them before rights of property.
379
 Moreover, in contrast to the position under the 
classical Roman law, he argues that there is an obligation on a possessor to restore 
property which belongs to another to its rightful owner.
380
 If a person buys the 
property of another bona fide, he or she must thus return it and pursue his or her 
seller in warrandice for its price.
381
  On the basis of this obligation to restore, Stair 
distinguishes restitution from the real action of vindication, which is an effect of 
property.
382
 This differs slightly from the way the obligation is conceived by Grotius, 
who seems to view it as more firmly derived from the right of ownership: it is “the 
Essence of property… that every Man who is possessed of another’s goods, is 




The philosophy underlying Stair’s concept of restitution, it is submitted, was 
heavily influenced by moral theology. Dot Reid has pointed to Protestant 
Scholasticism, and its influence at Glasgow University, as providing the intellectual 
context for Stair’s work;
384
 there are correspondences between Thomas Aquinas’ 
account of restoration of property as necessary to preserve equality
385
 and the 
circumstances in which Stair identifies an obligation of restitution.
386
 Scholasticism 
also influenced Stair’s acknowledged sources, importantly Grotius,
387
 who states that 
“the very design of Property was to preserve an Equality, that is, that every Man 
might enjoy his own.”
 388
 Whether through Grotius, or directly, Scholastic thought 
thus informed Stair’s work in several ways. However, as Feenstra notes, the 
Scholastics “did not care for the Roman distinction between actiones in rem and 
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 For this reason, Stair’s account covers obligations arising 
from what would, in the modern law, be understood as unjustified enrichment, and 
obligations arising from the fact of possession of property owned by another.
390
 On a 
moral level, these cases are perhaps equivalent. From the point of view of the 
structure of private law, however, this is a potentially problematic move as it neglects 





Among others, Gordon has also emphasised the impact of natural law 
thought, and in particular the prologmena to de Jure Belli ac Pacis on the structure of 
the Institutions.
392
 Against Grotius, Stair argues the obligation of restitution to be 
derived from natural law laid down by God rather than tacit consent or contract; 
“though there were no Positive Law, these Obligations would be binding.”
393
 
Grotius’ account of the obligation arising from property is linked to his vision of 
human society as a network of mutual rights and obligations, arising from the 
sociable nature of humanity.
394
 The maintenance of social order requires that we 
return that which is another’s.
395
 Stair’s understanding of property is clearly 
influenced by Grotius’ historical narrative,
396
 but he wishes to retain God as the 
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From the “right of restitution” arises the action of exhibition and delivery, 
which involves the conveyance of any moveable thing, in particular writings, before 
a judge, where questions of right can be decided and delivery to the pursuer 
ordered.
398
 This is interesting because, although Stair emphasises the existence of a 
personal obligation on possessors, the results do not seem, in practice, to be 
substantially different from those obtained using the vindicatio. Scots law appears to 
follow an essentially Roman scheme, with the actio ad exhibendum necessary to 
force a reluctant defender to produce the thing in order that the pursuer can seize it. 
However, the structures provided by the Roman law are placed in a new theoretical 
and philosophical framework, and attempt is made to merge them with the pre-
existing local custom. 
 
(c) Mackenzie’s Institutions 
In the first edition of the Institutions, Mackenzie does not mention the obligation of 
restitution. His description of a real action as “that whereby a Man pursues his Right 
against all singular Successors, as well as the person who was first obliged” fits the 
action for vindicating moveable property.
399
 However, in the 1688 edition of the 
Institutions, this Scots definition of a real action based on its availability against 
successors is contrasted with the “Civil law” definition of a real action as arising 
from a real right and founded in dominium or property, the prime example being the 
rei vindicatio.
400
 This change may follow Stair in seeking to distinguish the 
vindicatio founded on property from the Scots conception of real action, but it is not 
entirely clear. 
 
The only reference to the procedure for claiming moveable property is the 
description of the action for exhibition and delivery, which is in similar terms to that 
of Stair.
401
 It is implied that the pursuer in this action may crave delivery of 
moveable property, but no further detail is given. 
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(d) The 1693 edition of Stair’s Institutions 
(i) Stair’s account of restitution 
The account of restitution given in the second printed edition of 1693 is substantially 
similar to that of 1681. However, it includes an extra book, dealing with actions, in 
which the following inference is drawn from the obligationary nature of restitution: 
 
But we make not use of the name or nature of Vindication, whereby the 
Proprietar pursues the Possessor, or him who by Fraud ceases to possess, to 
suffer the Proprietar to take possession of his own, or to make up his damage 
by his fraud. This part of the action is rather personal than real, for reparation 
of the damage done by the fraudulent quiting possession. Yea, the conclusion 
of Delivery, doth not properly arise from Vindication, which concludes no 
such obligement on the haver, but only to be Passive, and not to hinder the 




This represents a significant addition to the account given in the edition of 1681. The 
claim that “we make not use of the name or nature of Vindication” is particularly 
surprising. On the accuracy of Stair’s contention, even in Stair’s own reports of cases 
such as Van Porten v Dick
403
 the term rei vindicatio is frequently used.
404
 It seems to 
be interchangeable with “restitution” in referring to the claim of the owner for 
recovery of moveable property against any possessor.
405
  Analysis of the case law of 
the intervening period does not yield any evidence that the term had fallen into 





As for “the conclusion of delivery” not arising from vindication, it is true that 
the Roman vindicatio did not expressly conclude for the delivery of the thing but 
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rather a pecuniary condemnatio if the thing was not restored.
407
 The aim of the 
action, however, was certainly the restoration of the thing to the pursuer. A text from 
Paul in the Digest states that restitution should occur either where the thing is or at 
the place where the action is brought.
408
 If the possessor is in good faith, the pursuer 
should bear the expense of transporting the thing to site of the judgment.
409
 Although 
no express obligation is placed upon the possessor, Roman law hence demonstrably 
was concerned with the return of the thing to the owner, should he or she succeed in 
his or her claim. Stair refers to an action given by the Praetor which rested on the 
fiction that the pursuer had acquired by usucaption, presumably the Actio 
Publiciana,
410
 as the first provision for recovery of possession;
411
 on the basis of the 




It is possible that Stair wished to emphasise the distinctiveness of Scots law 
as body of learning not simply derivative of Roman law.
413
 Additionally, focus on 
the personally binding nature of restitution corresponds better with his broader 
philosophical scheme, and in particular the moral aspect of restitution as understood 
in Scholastic thought. Unlike the Roman law, the theological perspective is centred 
on the individual conscience of the possessor.
414
 Although the concept of a “Real 
obligation upon Possessors… to Restore or re-deliver”
415
 does not fit well with the 
traditional civil law divide between property and obligation,
416
 it emphasises the 
binding nature of the duty involved and the necessity for personal involvement of the 
possessor in the restitutionary process. 
 
Stair’s scheme also allows a clearer demarcation of his distinction between 
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actions declaratory, petitory and possessory, with the vindicatio being merely 




(ii) Mackenzie’s Treatise on Actions 
Mackenzie’s Treatise on Actions contains a passage which directly contradicts 




By our Law we call also these real Actions, by which we pursue for any 
Thing that is ours’ and where the Action is competent against singular 
Successors if they be Possessors; and… in effect all our Declarators of 
Property are Vindications, whether we pursue for the Property of Lands, or 
particular Things which belong to us in Property, tho’ the Possession of them 
be carried away to another, and the Actions for declaring the Property of 
Land, because of the more noble Signification, called only Declarators of 
Property; yet if my Horse had strayed from me, and were possessed by 
another, my Action for recovering him, is in effect a Declarator of Property, 
tho’  we call such Actions for every Thing else (except Lands) Action for 




It is argued that the term “vindication” is indeed recognised in Scots law, and 
moreover, that an action for recovery of moveables is “in effect a Declarator of 
Property”, and hence amounts to a vindication. This conflicts with both facets of 
Stair’s pronouncement; both the name and the nature of vindication are after all part 
of Scots legal discourse. The passage also emphasises that it is more difficult to 
classify the action for the recovery of moveables as wholly declaratory or wholly 
petitory than Stair suggests. 
 
Questions exist regarding the text’s authorship and date of composition. The 
Treatise on Actions was printed posthumously; given Mackenzie’s death in 1691 
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before the publication of the second edition of Stair’s Institutions it is assumed that it 
is Stair’s treatment which is in response to Mackenzie’s (then unprinted) work.
420
 
Perhaps any correspondence between the two accounts is coincidental.
421
 As the 
volume was edited and published after his death, it is also possible that the text in 
question was not written by Mackenzie himself but by a later editor, in which case 
the text would be in response to the 1693 edition of the Institutions.
422
 Given the 
text’s consistency with Mackenzie’s views on Roman law,
423
 however, this seems 
unlikely. While Stair’s account has proved more influential, it is significant that 
disagreement existed on such a fundamental issue; at least as regards the historical 
accuracy of his statements Stair’s depiction of Scots doctrine is called into question. 
 
(3) The Position of the Bona Fide Purchaser 
 
(a) Recognition of the nemo plus principle 
(i) Stair’s Institutions 
Although Stair does not explicitly cite the nemo plus principle, he quotes the maxim 
jus superveniens auctori accrescit successori,
424
 which Carey Miller argues to be of 
equivalent effect.
425
 The fact that a non-owner cannot transfer ownership follows as a 
logical consequence from the key role of the owner’s consent in derivative 
acquisition; “[i]t must needs then be the present dispositive will of the Owner, which 




Stair also refers numerous times to the existence of a “vitium reale” or “labes 
realis” (“real vice”) preventing acquisition in cases where property has been obtained 
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by theft or robbery.
427
 It was noted in Chapter 2 that a Digest text concerning 
usucaption distinguished vices “ex re” and “ex persona”; this distinction between 
real and personal vices was developed further by Bartolus, who differentiates the 
force used in expulsion or taking from that used in compulsion.
428
 The sources of 
Stair’s concept are not clear, but substantial discussions of the distinction between 
real and personal vices also appear in the work of sixteenth and seventeenth-century 





 and Johann Brunnemann (1608-1672)
431
 and, whether directly or 
indirectly, Stair draws on this body of learning. 
 
(ii) Mackenzie’s Institutions 
Again, although the principle is not expressly cited it is implicit in the scheme of 
property transfer set out by Mackenzie. “Tradition” is defined as “a delivery of 
possession by the true owner, with a design to transfer the property to the 
Receiver.”
432
 This definition logically excludes the possibility of acquisition by 
buyer in good faith from one who is not the “true owner”. Such a supposition is to be 
borne out by Mackenzie’s discussion of the acquisition of fruits by a bona fide 




(iii) Case law 
The importance of the principle, then, permeates the work of Stair and Mackenzie. It 
is also evident in the case law of the period. In Stair’s report of Gordon vs Chein and 
Crawfoord,
434
 the maxim is referred to as a “general Principle[…] of Civil Nations.” 
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That case dealt with assignations, as does another case in which the maxim is 
referred to as a “common ground of Law”, Mackenzie vs Watson and Stuart,
435
 
emphasising the status of the maxim as a general principle of derivative acquisition. 
 
(b) Protection of the bona fide purchaser                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
(i) Stair’s Institutions 
(i)(a) English influence? 
According to Stair the position in respect of bona fide purchases is thus that, as in 
Roman law, the owner can recover his or her property from any possessor. By way of 
comparison, English law had by this period developed a special rule in respect of 
sales in “market overt”, which could confer a valid right even in respect of stolen 
property.
436
 Although protection for purchasers in open market had been a part of the 
common law since at least the mid-fifteenth century, Coke’s report of the Case of 
Market Overt in 1596
437
 made clear that the rule applied to all fairs and markets in 
England. Coke also referred to the doctrine approvingly in his Institutes.
438
 Stair does 
not explicitly refer to Coke, but a copy of the 1670 edition of Coke’s Institutes and 
also his Reports from 1656, 1677 and 1680 were available in the library of the 
Faculty of Advocates in 1692;
439





Although there were a number of Scottish cases in the early seventeenth 
century in which it was argued that a sale in open market should protect a bona fide 
purchaser, Stair does not explicitly comment on the market overt rule. The English 
“priviledge of fairs” is mentioned, but the case of Ferguson v Forrest
441
 cited to 
demonstrate that, in Scots law, even a bona fide purchaser in open market must 
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restore the goods to the original owner.
442
 There is little evidence of explicit pressure 
to adopt the English approach, but it was presumably one obvious solution to the 
tensions caused by late seventeenth-century commercial expansion. 
 
(i)(b) Recognition of a principle of good faith protection 
The obligation of restitution requires that the thing be restored to the owner, leaving 
the purchaser to claim against his or her seller or accept the loss. Reference is made 
to “some cases, wherein Positive Law secures the buyer, and leaves the owner to 
seek the seller”,
443
 but this is not elaborated further. Stair’s account of derivative 
acquisition emphasizes that the passing of ownership implies the “present dispositive 
will of the owner.”
444
 A logical consequence of this approach is that, in the absence 
of intention on the part of an owner, ownership can never pass to a bona fide 
acquirer. 
 
There is a clear tension between the moral obligation of restitution and the 
need to protect commerce in moveable property, which may often be transferred with 
very little in the way of evidence. Although the development of a presumption in 
favour of the possessor, discussed below, goes some way towards resolving this 
tension, relieving bona fide transferees of the need to establish their right, acquirers 
are still vulnerable to the loss of the property. The natural law understanding of 
property does not, however, necessarily imply that ownership must always be 
absolutely protected. As the laws of property developed in conjunction with, and for 
the benefit of, human society, they can be modified or restricted where this will be of 
public benefit.
445
 Stair sets out that, for reasons of public expediency, the doctrine 
that transfer requires the owner’s consent may be departed from: 
 
So may the publick content of any people introduce ways of Appropriation, 
as they find most convenient, for publick good, […] and albeit it be a good 
and solide rule, Quod meum est, sine me alienum fieri nequit, yet it hath the 
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exception of publick sanction, or common custom, and so though it be not by 
the sole and proper consent of the owner, yet it is by the consent of that 
Society of people, or their Authority, wherein the submission or consent of 





Interestingly, this passage is far more reminiscent of Grotius’ account of property as 
flexible and a product of human society than the earlier account of restitution.
447
 It 
leaves space for the development of rules protecting bona fide purchasers, 
particularly where it is required for the public good. Indeed, Stair mentions other 
instances in which commerce has required that bona fide purchasers in public market 




In this regard, it is worth considering Stair’s discussions of the effect of fraud 
upon purchasers. The 1681 edition of the Institutions comments that “nothing is more 
prejudicial to Trade, then to be easily involved in pleas, which diverts Merchants 
from their Trade, and frequently marres their gain, and sometimes their credit; 
therefore we allow not the quarrelling of Bargains upon presumed fraud…”
449
 
However, the 1693 edition includes a much stronger statement of the invulnerability 
of purchasers to claims of fraud: 
 
Yet in moveables, Purchasers are not quarrellable upon the Fraud of their 
Authors, if they did purchase for an Onerous Equivalent Cause. The reason is 
because Moveables must have a current Course of Traffick, and the Buyer is 
not to consider how the Seller purchased, Unless it were by Theft or 
Violence, which the Law accounts as labes reales, following the subject to all 
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This passage would later be used by George Joseph Bell as the foundation for his 
argument that, where property had not been taken by theft or violence, a bona fide 
purchaser was free from the claim of the original owner.
451
 Although numerous 
statements elsewhere in the Institutions appear to refute such contentions, Stair’s 
reasoning is persuasive. The reference to the need for a “current Course of Traffick” 
emphasises the social demand for a more rapid circulation of commodities which 
was, even in the late seventeenth century, beginning to be felt. 
 
However, it is submitted that Stair is not proposing here a general rule 
protecting purchasers from any claim which would have been good against the 
seller.
452
 He refers only to fraud, the scope of which is in itself an interesting topic.
453
 
Elsewhere Stair refers to fraud as labes reales at common law;
454
 this perhaps 
indicates that his comments regarding moveables represent an exception to a then-
prevailing general rule.
455
 It is not clear whether transfer by a party entrusted with 
possession, such as a depositee, was understood as fraud.  In general, Stair 
distinguishes cases where consent has been given to transfer from cases in which, 
due to factors which take away the “knowledge and reason” of the transferor, there 
has been no consent at all.
456
 Where consent to transfer is lacking, this will prevent 
the initial transfer and also acquisition by a later party in good faith. Unauthorised 
transfer by a depositee is described as theft, a real vice which would affect 
subsequent purchasers.
457
 On this basis, it seems likely that Stair’s exception referred 
only to those who had acquired, albeit on the basis of a challengeable transaction, a 
valid right. Those with no right at all would still not be able to confer ownership, 
even on a good faith purchaser. 
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(ii) Mackenzie’s Institutions 
Mackenzie’s treatment of bona fide possession, although brief, is predicated on the 




(iii) Case law 
Thus far, the sources suggest that the “borgh of haimhald” secured a purchaser in 
public market against financial loss but not restitution of the thing. In Gordon v 
Menzies,
459
 an action of spuilzie was brought against the defender in respect of 
horses allegedly stolen. The defender had bought these horses in public market, and 
taken “burgh and hamehald” (borgh of haimhald) from his author. This was found to 
be a sufficient defence not only against the action for spuilzie, but against a claim for 
restitution. This is a surprising decision, as the earlier evidence implies that the 
seller’s borgh would protect only against an allegation of theft and not the owner’s 
claim for recovery of the goods.
460
 One explanation is that the decision in the case 
was anomalous; another is that at this point, sale in a public market with borgh of 
haimhald did indeed secure the purchaser against the original owner’s claim. If this is 
true, an obvious question is why the defence was not raised in other cases? It may be 
that the requirements of the borgh of haimhald were simply too cumbersome, but if it 
had customarily offered such security to purchasers, why was there no attempt to 
adapt the system to suit contemporary commercial requirements? Geographical and 
cultural differences may be a factor here: Cosmo Innes reports a note of Lord 





(c) The presumption of ownership from possession 
How, then, did Scots law balance the owner’s right to recover with the need to 
protect purchasers? It has been suggested that facilitation of commerce was an 
important consideration in doctrinal development. An excellent example of its 
influence on juridical reasoning is Stair’s development of the presumption of lawful 
                                                          
458
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acquisition from the possession of moveable property. Chapter 2 referred to a 
number of cases in the early seventeenth century which appeared to attribute some 
significance to long-term possession, but it was in the first printed edition of Stair’s 
Institutions,
462
 and his reports of the decisions of the Court of Session that these early 
moves were consolidated. 
 
In the first printed edition of the Institutions, the presumption is set out in this way: 
 
[I]n the Commerce of moveables, write useth not to be adhibite, and it would 
be an unseparable labour, if the acquirer thereof behoved to be instructed by 
all the preceeding acquirers; as if one should instruct that he bought or bred 
such goods some years agoe, the present possessor behoved either to instruct 
a progress of them, through all the hands they passed from the first owner, or 
lose them, which being destructive to Commerce, Custom hath introduced 
this way, that possession being present and lawful, presumeth property 
without further probation, unless the pursuer condescend upon a clear 
probable way of the goods passing from him, not by alienation, as if they 




Two important points emerge from this account: the key role played by custom and 
practice in legal development, and the need for law to facilitate commercial life. The 
arguments given bear a striking resemblance to the terms in which Stair reports the 
earlier case law. In his Decisions of 1683, he reports the defender’s argument in Scot 
v Sir John Fletcher, a case of 1665, as being that 
 
in mobilibus possession praesumit titulum; seeing, in these, writ nor 
                                                          
462
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witnesses use not to be interposed; and none can seek recovery of such, 
unless he condescend quo modo desiit possedere; else all commerce would be 
destroyed; and whoever could prove that once any thing was his, might 




This case was also reported by Newbyth, and although not inconsistent, it is only in 
Stair’s report that the applicable rules of evidence are rationalised as a 
presumption.
465
 Newbyth’s report focuses on the question of whether written proof 
was necessary to establish that valuable books had been loaned to the defender (and 
were therefore liable to be returned to the pursuer). 
 
A number of other cases in which the sole printed report is Stair’s are also 
cited in the Institutions as evidence for the existence of the presumption.
466
 The only 
other authorities mentioned are the earlier reports by Lord Durie discussed in 
Chapter 2;
467
 it was argued earlier that these establish only an ambiguous role for 
possession as a possible basis for prescriptive acquisition. The first printed report 
from a source other than Stair expressly recognising a presumption is Home v 
Atchison,
468
 which, although making reference to a doctrine that “Possession in 
mobilibus supposes a title”, does not explicitly set out the key requirement that the 
pursuer to libel how the property left his or her possession. 
 
Stair’s construction of the presumption, then, centres on the claim that the 
                                                          
464
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pursuer must libel, not only ownership of the thing in question, but that possession 
was lost otherwise than by voluntary alienation. The presumption is, therefore, 
primarily a matter of how ownership is established rather than how it is transferred; it 
is a rule of evidence rather than property law. Although in the case of fungibles, and 
things indistinguishable from others of the same kind, such as money, possession 
may be seen as actually constitutive of ownership, this is not the general case.
469
 The 
main impact of the presumption is thus to force the owner to establish that the 




Given others’ mistrust of judge-made law,
471
 Stair’s argument for the 
existence of the presumption can also be seen as an argument for the value of judicial 
decisions (and his own opinions in particular) as evidence of “a body of forensic 
custom”.
472
 This point is reinforced if we consider other significant work of the 
period, the Institutions of Sir George Mackenzie, which does not specifically 
mention the presumption.
473
 That fact in itself is interesting, for by the time of 
publication of the first edition of the Institutions in 1684, the presumption had 
featured in both Stair’s Institutions and his Decisions.
474
 Although Mackenzie’s 
Institutions is shorter than that of Stair, and is obviously not intended to be 
exhaustive, it is possible that this reflects the differing importance placed by 
Mackenzie and Stair upon the role of judge-made law.
475
 The development of the 
presumption through judicial decision may not have accorded with Mackenzie’s 
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view of legislation as the supreme source of law.
476
  Alternatively, he may simply 




Mackenzie does discuss the presumption in a treatise printed after his death in 
a collected works of 1722.
478
 He appears to argue that, certainly on the part of the 
pursuer in an action of rei vindicatio, it will not be enough for the pursuer to simply 
libel that he or she was in possession, this is only appropriate in a case of spuilzie. He 
considers the case of Ramsay v Wilson as reported by Stair, and although he does not 
expressly state that the presumption does not exist, he criticises the decision for 
attending to the wrong facts. In particular, he sees the main issues as being whether 
the defender’s author had violently seized the jewels in question, creating a vitium 
reale, and whether the defender had admitted that the jewels belonged to the party to 




On the question of the presumption, the defender’s main argument had been 
that his possession presumed property; the pursuer raised two exceptions arguing that 
the presumption should not apply in this case. Mackenzie dismisses these as of “no 
Moment”,
480
 implying that he does not find the presumption itself to be a relevant or 
convincing defence.  This contention may find some support in the fact that none of 
the other reports of the case explicitly mention the presumption at all; on one reading 
the arguments are limited to whether a form of acquisitive prescription of moveable 
property exists and in what circumstances a bona fide acquirer could be expected to 
have known that a seller was not the owner of moveables.
481
 Again, it is not clear 
whether Mackenzie objects to the presumption as part of a more general rejection of 
judge-made law, or whether he feels that there is simply not much evidence for its 
existence outside of the opinions of Stair. 
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In assessing the importance of the presumption, it is thus difficult to establish 
to what extent Stair’s account is an accurate representation of contemporary legal 
debate. Further, it is not clear that the presumption was a significant departure from 
the previous practice, given the reference in Quoniam Attachiamenta to the owner 
swearing he had not sold or otherwise alienated the property. The attention given to 
the question of bona fide purchase indicates that it had become a focal point of legal 
contention. The presumption goes some way towards mitigating the burden placed 
on purchasers of moveable property, whilst maintaining the theoretical availability of 
the vindicatio to the original owner. 
 
Scots developments in this area were not unique. A similar approach is found 
in Grotius’ Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence.
482
 Grotius refers to a statement in 
the Code of Justinian that an owner must prove his or her ownership before he or she 
can compel another to restore his or her property.
483
 Possession (used here in the 
sense of physical occupation with intention to retain for oneself)
484
 was thus enough 
to place the burden of proof on anyone else who wished to claim ownership. 
 
B. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
 
(1) The Importance of the Nemo Plus Principle 
 
The eighteenth century was an extremely rich period for legal writing in Scotland, 
with a profusion of juristic texts building on the work of Stair and Mackenzie to give 
reasoned and systematic accounts of Scots law as a distinctive body of learning.
485
 
The principle that no one can transfer what he or she does not have maintained a 
central place in legal discourse relating to derivative acquisition. For example, the 
pursuer’s argument in Bell v Gartshore was reported as being that “[i]n the 
transference of rights there is no principle more plain and equitable than that Nemo 
plus juris tribuit quam ipse habet. The assignee, therefore, debet uti jure auctoris. 
                                                          
482
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 For an overview and evaluation, see Cairns, “Institutional writing”. 
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This holds with regard both to real and personal rights.”
486
 In Benton and Fowler v 




Bankton discusses the nemo plus maxim at some length in the title of the 
Institute entitled “Rules of Law Illustrated”, also quoting the related maxim from D 
50.17.175.1 “non debeo melioris…”
488
 He describes these principles as “founded in 
the nature of things, it being impossible, that there could be an effect without a 
cause”
489
 However, the nemo plus principle does not prevent the transfer of 
moveable property free from existing personal claims: “the ipsa corpora of 
moveables, as household-furniture, and other such goods, must pass likewise to 
purchasers, free of any embargo, by the deeds or debts of the sellers, for the facility 
of commerce.”
490
 The fact that a distinction is made by Bankton between real and 
personal claims,
491
 with only real objections good against singular successors, 
demonstrates the limitations of the natural law approach: although one may be able 
to derive the nemo plus principle through application of natural reason, it is more 
difficult to deduce from first principles which claims should be enforceable against 
successors. 
 
One way of overcoming this problem is by reference to the will of the owner. 
As in the work of Stair and Grotius, great emphasis is placed by the eighteenth-
century writers upon the power of the owner to control the interactions of third 
parties with his or her property. Erskine writes that “if another had a right to dispose 
of the subject, or so much as use it, without his consent, it would not be his property, 
but common to him with that other.”
492
 Forbes links this principle to a Lockean 
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vision of property as consequence of and incentive to labour:
493
 “for no man would 
labour without hopes to enjoy as his own, and not to be quite deprived of it 
…without his own consent.”
494
 Building on the civilian distinction between real and 
personal vices, cases in which there has been no form of consent to transfer (for 
example because the owner lacked capacity or the property was acquired by 
violence) can then be distinguished in a principled manner from those instances in 




(2) The Position of the Bona Fide Purchaser 
 
(a) Forbes 
Like Stair, Forbes expresses concern about the promotion of commerce
496
 but 
recognises a fundamental right of the owner to recover property transferred without 
his or her consent. A bona fide purchaser must “make restitution without getting the 
price he paid and recur for that to his warrandice against the seller”.
497
 “[T]he nature 
of movables that require to be current in all kinds of bona fide commerce” 
498
 
prevents undisclosed hypothecs and burdens, apart from the landlord’s hypothec,
499
 
from affecting bona fide purchasers. 
 
(b) James Innes 
James Innes was a Scot living and working in London; his text appears to have been 
primarily aimed at giving an English audience a basic understanding of Scots law, 
“for it’s the Collation and Observation of the Constitutions of other Countries, that 




Given the brevity of the volume (it is 142 printed pages) and its introductory 
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nature, it would be unwise to rely on it too heavily. However, one observation is 
made which is worthy of attention: 
 
the Venditions of Moveables …  are sustained, tho’ not made by the real 
Owners of them. But in the Alienation of Lands, the Seller is Necessarily 




The other sources considered contradict this statement, but, although without further 
evidence it must be presumed to be incorrect, it highlights the ease with which the 
Scots position could be distorted. It is not clear whether the English doctrine of 
market overt influenced Innes’ recollections of Scots law; it is later shown that the 
availability of greater protection for purchasers in England played some role in 
shaping Scottish debates. 
 
(c) Bankton 
Bankton’s account is heavily influenced by that of Stair.
502
 He states that “things 
bona fide acquired from others than the proprietors, in a fair way of trade, or by 
lawful deeds: these ought likewise to be restored to the right owners, without 
returning the price, which must be sued for against the author,”
503
 for “it is incident 
to real rights of property, that if we lose the possession of things belonging to us, 
there is an action competent for recovering them from all havers or detainers.”
504
 The 
English rules protecting bona fide purchasers, even of stolen goods, in open market, 
are noted,
505
 but there is no extensive commentary on them, or suggestion that they 
would be suitable for Scotland. Statutory provisions restricting the operation of the 
market overt rule in favour of original owners, for example in the case of stolen 
horses, are also mentioned.
506
Authority for the proposition that “we allow not that 
privilege of fairs, which elsewhere takes place”
507
 is given as the cases of Ferguson v 
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 Scot v Sir John Fletcher
509
 and Boid [Boyd] v Hay,
510
 indicating 




Bankton also refers to ius commune works, demonstrating particular reliance 
on Dutch jurists as sources of shared Romanist principle.
512
 The rule that an owner 
can recover property alienated by a dishonest borrower is said to be “plain from the 
civil law [and] is conform to the custom of other countries.”
513
 Voet’s Commentarius 
ad Pandectas and the Censura forensis of Simon van Leeuwen are cited in support of 
this contention.
514
 Both Voet and Van Leeuwen describe local statutes restricting the 
extent to which the owner can recover from a bona fide purchaser but conclude that, 
whatever the commercial arguments in favour of such provisions, as these statutes go 
against the common law (“juris communis”)
515
 they should be strictly interpreted. 
Although the Roman law position prevailed, there is evidence that Roman-Dutch 
rules protecting purchasers also had some influence on the development of Scots law. 
The maxim “mobilia non habent sequelam” (moveables cannot be followed) is 
referred to by Bankton at numerous points, but it is not clear exactly what the scope 
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Kames’ account of the development of rules protecting ownership reflects his 
theories about the relationship between law and society,
517
  with a settled agricultural 
society naturally involving a stronger nexus between person and thing which 
required legal protection: 
 
Property, it is certain, is a very great favourite of human nature, and is 
frequently the subject of a very strong affection. In the fluctuating state of 
human affairs, before regular governments were formed, property was seldom 
so permanent as to afford great scope to this affection. But in peaceable 
times, under a steady administration of law, the affection for property 





Property is further necessary to encourage “labour and industry”
519
 in relation to 
objects we consider our own. Kames notes that the affection that we bear for things 
we consider our own often “enhances the Value of it in our Imagination above 
Reality, and above the value we attribute to any other Thing,”
520
 prefiguring the work 
of modern economists and psychologists on the psychological aspects of 
ownership.
521
 Perhaps influenced by David Hume,
522
 Kames argues that this 
“consciousness of property”, which makes the object particularly valuable to the 
owner, can be lost over lapse of time.
523
 On the other hand, a bona fide possessor, 
over time, will also develop affection for the thing.
524
 In this situation it is “against 
nature and reason” to return the thing to the original owner.
525
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Kames recognises, however, that both the bona fide purchaser and the 
original owner may make a persuasive case for their right; “[b]etwixt pretensions so 
equally balanced, how can a judge otherwise interpose than by pronouncing, quod 
potior est condition possidentis?”
526
  He argues that early laws tend to favour the 
possessor, referring to a number of German sources including Johann Gottlieb 
Heineccius’
527





commentary on the law of Lubeck
530
 and Benedict Carpzov’s
531





Kames is of the opinion that the ancient law of Scotland did not allow 
recovery of stolen goods from a bona fide purchaser due to the fact that, according to 
a statute of 1661, the whole estate of a convicted thief was forfeited to the Crown.
533
 
It is true that this statute claimed to tackle the problem of “lords of regalities and 
other justiciars pretending right to [...] goods stolen”, but in light of the sources 
discussed in Chapter 2 it is conjectured that this problem would only arise where the 
owner of the stolen property was unable to recover it before the thief was executed 
and his or her property seized by the Crown. More substantial evidence would be 





The “borgh of haim-hald” also had the effect, according to Kames, of 
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Entwicklung des gutglaubigen Fahrniserwerbs in der Epoche des usus modernus und des Naturrechts 
(1991) 177-188. 
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Commentarius in Ius Lubecense (1642) 4.1.2. Mevius’ work in many ways laid the foundations for 
the contemporary German jurisprudence on bona fide purchase, see Hinz, Entwicklung ch 2; A Völkl, 




 Jurisprudentia forensis Romano-Saxona (1638) Part 4 Constitutio 32 Definitione 23. 
533
 Kames, Law Tracts 136, citing RPS 1661/1/295. 
534
 Kames also cites a regulation prohibiting buying and selling except in open market (this is perhaps 
a reference to the rule set out in Balfour, Practicks 528, discussed in ch 2 C(4)), but  it does not 
logically follow from this that a bona fide purchaser in open market was protected against recovery. 
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rendering a purchaser in open market “secure against all the world”,
535
 with the seller 
or the “borgh” liable to the original owner in damages. He admits, however, that 
judges would now be “in hazard” of permitting a rei vindicatio against a purchaser in 
open market. While there is some doubt
536
 over the effect of obtaining a “borgh”, the 
evidence cited by Kames
537
 does not fully resolve the issue. In Macpherson v Grant, 
the borgh did not protect a buyer of stolen goods and indeed, was even argued by the 
pursuer to be an indication that the defender had engaged in a suspicious transaction 




Defending prescription, rather than instantaneous bona fide acquisition, 
Kames points out that the cause of security of property can actually be served by a 
system of cutting off claims: possessors secured in their possessions are more likely 
to make industrious use of them, and pleas “pernicious to society” such as claims of 
fraud or forgery in the distant past will be eliminated.
539
 Moreover, it is often 
impossible to evidence original acquisition.
540
 Although it is a “sacred” rule that no 
person’s property should be taken from him or her without consent, security of 
property is a complex notion and the purposes served by a system of property law 
may require exceptions to be made.
541
 Indeed, the English rules on market overt are 
contended to be, not for the promotion of commerce, but to “secure property” and 




Kames’ comments here reflect his view of property as a system which has 
developed to serve certain ends of human society. It is “a principle of the law of 
nature, and […] essential to the well-being of society, that men be secure in their 
possessions, honestly acquired. The right of an individual yields here to public 
utility…”
543
 This does not mean that property law rules can be assessed using a crude 
utilitarian calculus, but rather that legal doctrines cannot be detached from the 
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 Kames, Law Tracts 143. 
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 Ancient Laws 161, Fragment 4, discussed at ch 2 B(2)(e). 
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 (1755) Mor 11671. 
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 Kames, Elucidations 232. 
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 Kames, Essays 106. 
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 Kames, Law Tracts 137. 
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Erskine’s account is strongly Romanist, with little scope available for the protection 
of good faith possession. He makes clear at several points that an owner may always 
recover his or her property, even from a bona fide purchaser: “No person, though he 
should possess optima fide, is intitled to retain a subject, not his own, after the true 
owner appears and makes good his claim to it; for the strongest bona fides must give 
way to truth.”
544




In his discussion of whether the bona fide purchaser should be entitled to 
fruits, Erskine argues that “the loss ought [in the case of fruits percepti by the bona 
fide purchaser] to fall on the owner, who had all the while neglected to look after his 
property”
546
 This interesting statement implies that the extent to which the owner 
may be thought to have been negligent is a factor which should be taken into account 
in the balancing of the interests of the owner and the bona fide purchaser. Although it 
is made only in the context of fruits, it suggests that in appropriate circumstances, the 
bona fide acquirer might actually be the more deserving party. As regards the 
importance of sale in a public market, it is further described as “contrary to both 
equity and public policy” that, according to the old Scots practice, the landlord could 




(f) Case law 
Contemporary judicial decisions, consistent with the Romanist approach, do not 
evidence much sympathy for the position of the bona fide purchaser. In Leslie v 
Hunter,
548
 despite the lack of vitium reale (i.e. theft) the presumption of ownership 
                                                          
544
 Erskine, Institute 2.1.25, perhaps a reference to D 50.17.136.   
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 Erskine, Institute 3.1.10. 
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 Erskine, Institute 2.1.25. See also Forbes, Great Body 357. 
547
 J Erskine, The Principles of the Law of Scotland: in the Order of Sir George Mackenzie's 
Institutions of that Law, 5
th
 edn (1769) 2.6.27. See also J Stewart, Dirleton’s Doubts and Questions in 
the Law of Scotland, resolved and answered, 2
nd
 edn (1762) 222. 
548
 (1752) Mor. 2660. 
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from possession was held to yield to the “truth”
549
 of the pursuer’s ownership. 
Counsel in Robertson v MacGowan
550
 referred to Voet’s Commentarius
551
 to support 
the contention that a seller without right could transfer no right to another: “Nothing 
could give more encouragement to fraud on the one hand, and to a supine 
indifference in purchasers on the other”.
552
 Nemo plus was also cited as a general 
principle in argument in Benton and Fowler v Brink,
553
 in which the disputed ship 




(3) Recovery of Moveables 
 
(a) The presumption of ownership from possession 
(i) Case law development 
The eighteenth-century cases in which the presumption is referred to add little to 
Stair’s account of the doctrine. In Pringles v Irvine of Gribton,
555
 a question again 
arose between the holder of jewellery pledged by a non-owner, and the heirs of the 
original owner.
556
 On proof that the pledgor was not the owner the presumption was 
held to be displaced and the defender’s arguments rejected.
557
 Despite the fact that 
the presumption could be overcome, proving the modus quo desiit possidere 
undoubtedly made recovery more difficult for an owner, as for example in a case 
where goods alleged to have been taken without consent were presumed to have been 




(ii) Institutional accounts 
                                                          
549
 Again perhaps a reference to D 50.17.136.   
 
550
 (Unreported. See Information for Robert Robertson, April 24
th




 At 4.3.3. See Information (ibid.) at 22. 
 
552
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553
 (n 487) at 11954. 
 
554
 On the law relating to prize, see Bankton, Institute 2.2.11-2.2.20. 
555
 (1710) Mor 9123. 
556
 The jewels had originally belonged to the pursuers’ mother who had apparently been beheaded for 
adultery and conspiracy to falsely accuse her lover’s wife of poisoning; see A Alison, Principles of 
the Criminal Law of Scotland (1832) 369-370. 
557
 For another case in which the presumption was overturned, see Warrander and Stirling v 
Alexander and Thomson (1715) Mor 10609. 
558
 Hariet [Hariot] v Cuningham (1791) Mor 12405.  For a further example in which it was not 
established beyond doubt how the pursuer parted with possession of the property, see Fergusson v 
Officers of State (1749) Mor 11618.   
100 
 
Whatever dissenting views had existed, Stair’s account of the presumption was 
accepted by the jurists of the eighteenth century. In an extensive discussion, Forbes 
sets out the presumption in very similar terms to Stair, citing the same authorities 
along with additional references to the Civil and Canon law:
559
 “Because movables 
passing in commerce without writ, and often without witnesses perhaps thro a 
thousand hands, it were impracticable to instruct a progress of rights to them”
560
 He 





Bankton mentions the presumption in a number of places, to the effect that a 
dispossessed owner of moveable property must libel not only that he was once 
owner, but that he lost possession otherwise than by voluntary alienation.
562
 Erskine 
gives a similar account, referring to “the natural connection between property and 
possession.”
563
 Again, the important role played by the presumption in moderating 
the dogmatic account of ownership to fit social circumstance is obvious: “Commerce 
could not have a free course, if it behoved the possessors of moveables, which often 





(b) The owner’s action for recovery 
(i) Case law development 
By this point, the distinction between an allegation of spuilzie, based solely on non-
consensual
565
 dispossession, and a claim for restitution based on ownership, seems 
firmly established.
566
 The civil process for recovery of moveables was also clearly 
distinguished from a criminal proceeding, although an allegation of theft in the 
                                                          
559
 Forbes, Great Body 353. Reference is made to D 41.2 and to the triennial prescription applicable 
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course of such an action was still treated extremely seriously.
567
 It remained the case, 
however, that in the course of a trial for theft, a Justiciary court (dealing usually with 




Regarding the nature of the action for recovery, Roman terminology remains 
in evidence, but frequent reference is also made to restitution.
569
 In one fascinating 
case, rei vindicatio was found to be competent in respect of a collier who had moved 
to an alternative employer based on the pursuer’s right of property in the collier.
570
 In 
theory, as in Justinianic law the action for vindication/ restitution was competent 
against the possessor, or one who had disposed of property in bad faith. This was 
acknowledged in Scot v Low
571
 (in which case, however, no fraud was proved). If the 
defender had parted with possession in good faith, recovery was held in Scot only be 




Scotland’s relationship with its ius commune heritage during this period is a 
complex one,
573
 but at least in the early eighteenth century, Dutch jurists such as 
Johannes Voet were particularly influential.
574
 Several references have been found to 
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Liddel v Davidson (1711) Mor 11589. Hunter v Captain Keith Stewart (1764) Mor 11957 refers to 
the vindicatio. 
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restitution.) On the position of colliers, see B F Duckham, “Serfdom in Eighteenth Century Scotland” 
(1969) 54(181) History 178. 
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 See Cairns, “Historical Introduction” 162-168. 
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 See J W Cairns, “Importing our Lawyers from Holland: Netherlands’ Influences on Scots Law and 
Lawyers in the Eighteenth Century”, in G Simpson (ed), Scotland and the Low Countries 1124-1994 
(1996) 136; R Feenstra, “Scottish-Dutch Legal Relations in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries”, in T C Smout (ed), Scotland and Europe 1200-1850 (1986) 128. 
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Title 6 of Voet’s Commentarius ad Pandectas;
575
 for example, discussion of the 
scope of the vindicatio in Robertson’s Creditors v Udnies and Patullo is based 
around Voet’s title De rei vindicatione.
576
 Stair’s account of restitution does not 
appear to have displaced a fundamentally Romanist understanding of the owner’s 
action,
577
 finding most significance in cases concerning recovery of value rather than 




(ii) Juristic accounts 
The modern doctrinal confusion regarding how to reconcile Stair’s moral obligation 
of restitution with Romanist property principles is evident in the eighteenth-century 
accounts. Forbes’ treatment of the action for the recovery of moveables is based 
upon that of Stair. He mentions the obligation to restore the property of others under 
the title “Obligations arising from quasi contract”, stating that it gives rise to an 
action for exhibition and delivery on the part of the owner.
579
 Following Stair, he 
distinguishes the Scots action for recovery based on the personal obligation of 
restitution from the Roman vindicatio based in property, a move which, to the extent 
that it denies the existence of a right to recover based in ownership, is inconsistent 




Bankton devotes a substantial title to restitution, which he classifies as a 
natural (as opposed to a conventional) obligation.
581
 His structure draws upon that of 
Stair, covering lost and strayed goods, goods acquired from thieves and pirates, 
things acquired bona fide and then things given for a cause that fails and payments 
                                                          
575
 Kenneth Reid describes the Commentarius as the “indispensable stand-by of eighteenth-century 
pleaders in Scotland”: “Banknotes and Their Vindication in Eighteenth-Century Scotland”, in D Fox 
and W Ernst (eds), Money in the Western Legal Tradition (Forthcoming, 2014), available at SSRN: 
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 A similar pattern is observed by Carey Miller in South Africa, where Voet was also extremely 
influential: The Acquisition and Protection of Ownership (1986) 264. 
578
 Reference is made to Institutions 1.7.10 in Walker (n 569). A relevant passage in the Institutions 
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Reid, “Banknotes” 15, although the relevant text was not in the title on restitution.  
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580
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 However, his characterisation of the owner’s right to recover is 
grounded in civilian learning and seems more overtly Romanist in outlook. He makes 
reference to a rich range of continental jurists,
583
 including the Belgian Paulus 
Christinaeus (1553-1681),
584





 and Simon van Leeuwen (1626-1682),
587





As with Stair, the obligation to restore is based upon present possession: if 
the defender is no longer in possession, he or she will only be liable “as to the 
overplus of the price”.
589
 From the “right of restitution” (which is presumably 
correspondent to the obligation to restore) arises the action of exhibition and 
delivery, “which concerns all moveables, but especially writings in another’s 
possession.”
590
 Unlike Stair, Bankton does not criticise the Roman law’s lack of 
provision for specific recovery by the pursuer. Rei vindicatio is mentioned as an 
action which may be brought for the recovery of moveable property; if the defender 





 passage from the Digest is cited as authority for the 





In terms of classification, the owner’s action for recovery is ascribed a dual 
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nature close to the modern understanding:
594
 “[a]n action for the delivery of 
moveables, is either a Personal Action, or a Real, as it is founded on the defender’s 
obligation, or on the pursuer’s right of property; but the defender is decreed to 
deliver the thing, tho’ the pursuer’s claim be founded in his right of property in the 
same.”
595
 The precise relationship between the action for exhibition and delivery and 
the rei vindicatio is unclear, but, to the extent that a claim for delivery is also 





Erskine discusses the duty placed upon possessors to restore goods belonging 
to another under the heading of obligations.
597
 His brief account is clearly based on 
that of Stair,
598
 and does not make any substantial additions. Later he refers to 
actions declaratory of property, which “conclude nothing against the defender.”
599
 
These may be distinguished from petitory actions, in which “some demand is made 
upon the defender, in consequence either of a right of property or credit in the 
pursuer.”
600
 An action for restitution of moveables, following Stair, is thus a petitory 
action.
601
 It is unclear whether a declaratory action in respect of moveables (as 
Erskine and Stair would classify the vindicatio) is in use in Scots law. It is stated that 
declarators for heritable property are seldom brought;
602
 presumably, if available at 
all, declarators in respect of moveable property were even more infrequent. 
 
C. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 
(1) Possession and Ownership 
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(a) Separation of ownership and possession 
A recurring problem in nineteenth-century case law was the proliferation of credit 
devices separating possession and ownership such as hire purchase.
603
 These divided 
judicial opinion. In Acme Machine Co v Scanlan, the owner of a wringing machine 
was criticised by Sheriff-Substitute Guthrie for “enabling their customers to commit 
frauds on themselves and others” by delivering the machines on terms of hire 
purchase.
604
 It was opined that the defender pawnbroker should not have to take 
“extraordinary precautions” to ensure that customers owned pledged property.
605
 The 
pursuers were not allowed to recover their machines without repaying the sums 
advanced by the pawnbrokers. 
 
It was (and is) difficult to distinguish a valid sale and subsequent lease back 
to the original owner from a sale retenta possessione
606
 (then not a valid means of 
transferring ownership in Scots law).
607
 In Shearer v Christie, Lord Mackenzie 
referred to “the danger of holding that by a mere secret agreement, whether oral or 
written, without any act of delivery or change of possession, a husband may transfer 
all or part of the moveables belonging to him to his wife, so as to exclude the 
diligence of his creditors, and that post contractum debitum, seems very 
considerable.”
608
 In Orr’s Tr v Tullis a distinction was drawn by Lord Justice Clerk 
Moncreiff between cases where the seller simply continues to detain the thing and 
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 (1842) 5 D 132 at 141.  
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where a “new title of possession, specific and determinate” is acquired.
609
 In such 
situations although there is not a transfer of natural possession there is a transfer of 
civil possession. There seems to have been a presumption that such a transaction was 





It was not always the case that moral evaluation of the act involved was 
negative. For example, Lord Cuninghame opined in Shearer that the deed concerned 
was an “onerous and praiseworthy act”. 
611
 In Anderson v Buchanan, Lord Moncreiff 
(dissenting) referred to the purchase of a bankrupt’s furniture by a friend as “fairly 
and openly transacted, and… so just, humane and right.”
612
 In Thomson v Scoular, 
Lord Young found the sale to a friend of the bankrupt to be an “honest” transaction 




(b) “Reputed ownership” 
(i) Basis 
Perhaps as a response to these tensions, the concept of “reputed ownership” 
developed to protect acquirers relying on the apparent ownership of a possessor. This 
doctrine seems to have emerged from the work of Bell, who bases it in “collusion, or 
gross negligence” on the part of the owner.
614
 According to Lord M’Laren’s notes to 
the 7
th
 edition of Bell’s Commentaries, the doctrine of “ostensible ownership” is a 
form of “estoppel” based in fraud and collusion.
615
 Lord Gifford in Marston v Kerr’s 
Tr describes it as applying to cases “where the true owner allows another to assume 
publicly the appearance of ownership, and to do acts which imply ownership, and so 
to deceive and mislead creditors by raising a false ground of credit”
616
 Fraud and 
                                                          
609
 (n 606) at 946. See also comments by Lord Blackburn in M’Bain v Wallace (1881) 8 R (HL) 106 
at 112-113. 
610
 Orr’s Trs ibid. at 947. 
611
 (n 608) at 142. 
612
 (1848) 11 D 270 at 283.  
613
 (1882) 9 R 430 at 433. 
614
 Bell, Commentaries (1804) 232. 
615
 Notes to Bell, Commentaries, 7
th
 edn (1870) vol 1 305. The doctrine is described as based on 




 (1879) 6 R 898 at 901. 
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holding out  are also mentioned in Dougall v Marshall.
617
 Some of the earliest cases 




There is some doubt about the extent to which the doctrine was “borrowed 
from the law and practice of England”.
619
 Bell describes a “rule of the common law, 
grounded on the principles of justice and equity” equivalent to the English statutory 
rule.
620
 In Anderson Lord Moncreiff referred to a principle borrowed from English 
law based on fraud and unfair collusion.
621
 In Marston v Kerr’s Tr. the English law is 
treated as relevant but not determinative of the Scottish position.
622
 Mungo Brown 
describes the English statutory reputed ownership
623
 under s 10 of the Bankruptcy 




The doctrine may also reflect confusion about the role of the presumption of 
ownership from possession.
625
 In Anderson, Lord Justice Clerk Hope relies on what 
appears to be a form of irrebuttable presumption of ownership from possession of 
domestic goods.
626





Where the doctrine applied, it appears that it prevented the true owner from 
recovering the thing: “reputed ownership has the effect of causing moveable 
property, that really is transferred habili modo, to be held, in a question with 
creditors, as the property of the disponer, their debtor, in whose possession it had 
                                                          
617
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Neaves; Marston (n 616) at 900 per Lord Ormidale. 
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been allowed to remain.”
628
 As with the later doctrine of personal bar there is some 





The scope of the acquirer’s protection was, however, limited; “there is hardly 
[..] any doctrine in law which admits of more qualifications and exceptions.”
630
 Even 
in 1882 reputed ownership was “no longer of much importance”.
 631
 Possession alone 
was not enough for the doctrine to apply, 
632
and allegations of fraud had to be 
assessed in each separate case.
633
 If property was held on some legitimate contract no 
question of reputed ownership could arise:
634
 “[n]o one is entitled to attribute 
possession to a title which would carry the property, where there is a subordinate title 
to which it may be ascribed”.
635
 It was further settled that the owner could recover 




(2) The Position of the Bona Fide Purchaser 
 
(a) Case Law development 
During the nineteenth century, Scots law saw an increasing focus on the judicial 
decision as a means of legal development. It has been suggested that this enhanced 
the importance of links with the English legal system, which already placed great 
                                                          
628
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  In several cases it was argued that there was, or should 
be, increased protection for the bona fide purchaser in Scots law. An especially 
interesting debate took place in Henderson v Gibson.
638
 Numerous reasons for the 
judicial development of a rule protecting bona fide purchasers were given; Scottish 
society was argued to have advanced so much that it would be unjust to apply the 
former rule.
639
 The custom of purchasers obtaining security by demanding a borgh of 
haimhald was argued to have fallen into desuetude, so that anyone now attempting to 




Blackstone’s account of the English doctrine of market overt was also 
cited,
641
 and although it was recognised that Scots law differed on this point, it was 
implied that it would be beneficial to commerce to adopt the English position: 
 
[I]t is impossible to suppose that the fair trader has been left without that 
security which is absolutely essential to commerce…in the same manner as in 
England, from which we have borrowed most of our commercial 
regulations…the altered state of the country calls for a rule which is more 




Although the arguments in Henderson were not successful, there are several points 
about them which are worthy of attention. The concerns expressed reflect a number 
of broader nineteenth-century debates, for example in the emphasis on harmony 
between English and Scots law, particularly in commercial matters.
643
 Further, not 
only is it recognised that law should adapt to the state of society, but it is implied that 
the judiciary can, and should, update the law where necessary. Indeed, it is contended 
that, in other cases, it has been expedient to discard the existing Scots law in favour 
                                                          
637
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In Dunlop and Co v Earl of Dalhousie,
645
 the Scottish doctrine protecting 
bona fide purchasers in public market from the landlord’s hypothec was likened in 
the House of Lords to the English doctrine of market overt.
646
 The Lords ultimately 
held that the hypothec was enforceable against purchasers at a sale by sample; the 
publicity caused by “open exposure” of the goods was seen by the judges in the Inner 
House as a crucial factor in determining whether a purchaser should be able to take 
free of the hypothec.
647
 Lord Alloway, dissenting, echoed Adam Smith
648
 in referring 
to the “unprecedented advance of this country in commerce” and its “particular 




(b) Bell’s Commentaries 
(i) Context 
Perhaps the closest Scots law has come to adopting a general rule protecting the bona 
fide purchaser of moveable property is the suggestion of George Joseph Bell that 
such a purchaser acquired ownership, unless a real vice such as theft was involved. 
The 1804 and 1810 editions of Bell’s Commentaries do not explicitly detail such a 
rule.
650
 A clear distinction is made between real and personal rights;
651
 “[t]he direct 
right which we have in a thing; that by which we call it ours, […] which entitles us, 
by every means in our power, to defend it, or, if violently carried off, to recover it; is 
called “jus in re”.
652
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 Earl of Dalhousie (n 647) at 632.  
650
 Bell, Commentaries (1804) vol 2 165 emphasises the necessity of the owner’s consent to transfer. 
See however, the statement at 187 that “[A] depositary may indeed fraudulently sell the deposite, and 
a purchaser in market may be safe against the claim of the proprietor for restitution…” Bell, 
Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland: and on the Principles of Mercantile Jurisprudence, 2
nd
 edn 
(1810) 151 refers to a principle that “goods, in the hands of factors and others, may no doubt be 
effectually sold to persons who have no notice of the want of title of the vendor.” 
651
 See for example Bell, Commentaries (1804) vol 2 38. 
652




However, there is evidence throughout these works of a concern with the 
impact of legal doctrine on commercial life, and it is opined that “[i]t would clog the 
wheels of commerce, were purchasers exposed to continual and latent challenges of 
bargains, which at the time they regarded as perfectly fair and unquestionable.”
653
 
Presumably in reference to Stair’s comments regarding fraud, Bell states that “the 
very existence of commerce requires that latent exceptions shall be unavailing 





Reference is made to Simon van Leewin (van Leeuwen)’s account of the 
“lösungsrecht”: the right afforded to a bona fide purchaser in open market to demand 
refund of the price paid before vindication was permitted to take place.
655
 Several 
comments made by Voet regarding the introduction of bona fide purchase protection 




(ii) Scope of Bell’s rule protecting good faith purchasers 
It is in the third edition of the Commentaries in 1816, however, that Bell’s proposed 
doctrine is set out explicitly: 
 
As possession presumes property in moveables, the purchaser of moveables 
at market or otherwise, in bona fide, acquires the right to them, although they 
may have been sold by one who is not the owner. This rule, of course, suffers 
the exception [of property affected by labes realis] but there are many cases 
in which persons intrusted with moveables may dispose of them, so as to 
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The rule hence does not apply where the thing in question is affected by “radical 
defect” in title. (Examples of the types of problem covered by this term include 
incapacity
658
and property obtained by theft or force and fear and or at “deathbed.”)
659
 
Contradictory accounts are given as to whether property delivered under a contract 




 It seems significant that protection is not limited to property bought at public 
market (as was the case in England at this point). Perhaps in order to emphasise that 
this was not simply an adoption of the English position, Bell attempts to ground his 
account in the previous Scots sources (such as Stair’s doctrine that possession 
presumes ownership). 
 
(iii) Reasons for introduction 
One of the interesting things about Bell as a jurist is his sensitivity to the complex 
relationship between legal doctrine and economic and social life.  Throughout his 
writings, he attends to any “difference of manners or change of principle which 
materially affects the rule of law, or the qualifications it receives by the opposition of 
contending rights.”
661
 In this, he is perhaps influenced by the stadial theories 
developed during the eighteenth century by figures such as Adam Smith and Lord 





The primary justification advanced by Bell for the protection of bona fide 
purchasers is the need to safeguard trade and commerce. Indeed, the “the very 
existence of commerce” is said to be threatened by the availability of “latent 
exceptions” against such purchasers.
663
 Changing economic conditions require 
property law to facilitate the “rapid circulation of commodities” on which markets 
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 To place the burden of investigating title on the purchaser of such 




The view that the lack of protection for bona fide purchasers failed to meet the needs 
of contemporary society would have been given force by the critique of the 
insecurity of purchasers in Henderson,
666
 in which it was argued: 
 
As this custom [of demanding a borgh of haimhald] has now gone into 
disuse, the purchaser at a market has no means of security; and it is highly 
expedient that the old law, adapted to this state of matters, should be modified 
to the existing circumstances of the country, in the same manner as has been 
done in other cases, when the ancient law was deemed incompatible with the 
present state of commercial transactions. 
 
Finally, Bell advances an argument based on fairness to the buyer in good faith, who 
may be unable to protect himself against defects in the seller’s right. By contrast, the 
original owner of the goods will suffer some hardship, but “has himself to blame for 
choosing an unfaithful factor or depositary[.]”
667
 As the original owner is in a better 
position to guard against the risk of the goods being fraudulently disposed of, it is he 
or she who should bear the cost if this occurs. 
 
(iv) Authority cited 
The key authority cited by Bell in support of his claim that protection of bona fide 
purchasers already formed part of Scots law is a passage from Stair already quoted, 
the crux of which is that “the buyer [of moveables] is not to consider how the seller 
purchased, unless it were by theft or violence, which the law accounts as labes 
realis”.
668
 As has been mentioned, however, Stair considered appropriation without 
the consent of the owner (for example by a depositary) as tantamount to theft. It 
seems likely that the statements in question were only intended to cover personal 
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defects affecting the seller’s contract of acquisition, and not cases where the seller 
had no right to transfer at all. 
 
The other authority quoted is Erskine: 
 
There was also a necessity for extending [the doctrine that purchasers shall 
not be affected by the fraud of their authors, if they themselves have not been 
participles fraudis] to purchasers of moveable subjects, and to onerous 




This passage again deals only with fraud, a personal exception. It was certainly well 
established that a transfer tainted by fraud nevertheless conferred ownership on the 
acquirer.
670
 To permit a non-owner to transfer ownership is, however, an entirely 
different case; the original owner has not given any kind of consent to transfer.  Such 
a radical extension would be contrary to how Bell himself understood the effect of 
fraud. The cited passages from Stair and Erskine do not, therefore, convincingly 




To what extent did English law provide a stimulus for these developments in Scots 
doctrine? Bell was clearly cognizant of the English doctrine of market overt, and 
makes reference to Blackstone and Coke.
671
 He quotes, presumably approvingly, 
Coke’s comment that the market overt rule is necessary so that “fairs and markets 
overt should be replenished, and well furnished with all manner of commodities 
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671
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However, Bell also refers to Voet’s Commentarius, which discusses various 
markets in the Netherlands in which stolen property could be acquired bona fide, 
subject to the original owner’s right to buy it back.
673
 Voet reasons that this is to 
assist commerce, and protect buyers who are not in a position to assess the condition 
of their seller’s title.
674
 He also discusses the arguments for and against allowing 
vindication of misappropriated entrusted property (promotion of commerce and 




What does this choice of sources say about Scots law and its relationship with 
the ius commune tradition? Bell seems to have chosen English and Dutch jurists in 
this instance not primarily because the law of either jurisdiction is persuasive in a 
Scottish court, but because they are both examples of successful trading nations, the 
laws of which face similar demands from the commercial arena. Rather than 
referring to a well of shared principle, as Scots jurists might have done in the past, 
Bell uses the laws of Holland as a useful comparator, a source for ideas which might 





How was this innovation received by the Scottish legal community? Just prior to the 
publication of the third edition of the Commentaries it had been held in Alexander v 
Black,
677
 in which George Joseph Bell appeared for the defender, that recovery was, 
in principle, possible where cattle were sold by a custodian to a bona fide purchaser. 
The pursuer had argued that there was no meaningful distinction between property 
which had been stolen, and that merely sold by a non-owner.
678
 It would place an 
unfair burden on an owner to allow the actions of a custodian to affect his or her 
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 Although the laws of other jurisdictions might provide for exceptions to the 
nemo plus rule, it remained the general principle.
680
 The English doctrine of market 
overt was also considered, but criticised as outdated.
681
 Moreover, the doctrine 





The defender argued for the commercial expediency of the English 
solution,
683
 but from the decision in the case, which appears to turn on the validity of 
the pursuer’s acquisition of ownership, it seems that these contentions were 
ultimately rejected.
684
 Bell reports that this case was decided on special 
circumstances,
685
 but it is obvious that the idea that Scots law should follow English 
law in adopting special protection for bona fide purchasers did not meet with judicial 
favour. 
 
The point is not specifically mentioned in Bell’s Principles, in which proof of 
ownership along with how possession was lost (e.g. theft, loan, hire) is admitted to 
overcome the presumption of ownership from possession.
686
  That Bell remained in 
favour of protection for good faith purchasers is apparent from the ambiguous 
statement that “if one in lawful possession of a thing sell it to another without notice, 
the sale is good.”
687
 However, his treatment in the Commentaries had been subjected 
to substantial criticism. 
 
As set out above, there is little evidence supporting the previous existence of 
such a rule, which was contrary to the weight of institutional and judicial 
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 Comments by Baron Hume in his Lectures contradicted the theory put 
forward by Bell, which Hume suggested was not supported by the Scots 
“practice”.
689
 Hume pointed instead to the presumption of ownership from 
possession as a means of protecting commerce and reducing the burden on 
purchasers of moveables.
690
 Bell was further criticised by Mungo Brown, who 
attacked the doctrinal coherence of his treatment, pointing out that in the case of a 
transfer affected by fraud, ownership passed to the fraudulent purchaser, albeit the 
conveyance was challengeable.
691
 In the case of a depositee who transferred the 
property without consent of the owner, however, the depositee had never acquired 
any right of ownership in the property, and therefore, applying the nemo plus 
principle, could not transfer such to a third party.
692
 For these reasons: 
 
[the rule] appears to be not only inconsistent with the principles of law which 
regulate the transference of property, but is contrary to the doctrine laid down 





Brown’s concerns were shared by Lord M’Laren, who attacked Bell’s position in his 
notes to the seventh edition of the Commentaries. M’Laren also points out that the 
existence of such a rule was not justified by the sources cited, and that Bell had 
expanded the presumption that possession of moveables presumes ownership far 
beyond its intended scope: 
 
[Bell] confounds the maxim that possession of moveables presumes property 
with the doctrine of ostensible ownership. The maxim alluded to is merely a 
rule of evidence- a prima facie presumption regulating the onus probandi in 
                                                          
688
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any case where moveables are claimed by a non-possessor from a possessor: 




During this period, the English rule of market overt had itself not been without 
criticism. In the Mercantile Law Commission Report of 1855, it was recognised that 
interests of commerce may actually require that buyers bear the risk of defect in title.
 
695
 “As a matter of public policy”, the rule in Scotland was thought to be preferable, 
due to the ease with which stolen goods may be transferred to a third party.
696
 
Abolition of the market overt rule was therefore recommended, and a provision to 
accomplish this was included in Mercantile Law Amendment Bill of 1856. It is 
significant that in comments submitted to the Commission the Faculty of Advocates, 
the Society of Writers to the Signet and the Faculty of Procurators were all against 




In Todd v Amour,
698
 a stolen horse had been bought in market overt in 
Ireland; recovery was then (unsuccessfully) sought from the purchaser in Scotland.
699
 
The Scots doctrine of vitium reale attaching to stolen property was argued by Lord 
Justice Clerk Moncreiff to be preferable, presumably on the grounds that none should 
benefit from theft. Interestingly, the question of whether the original owner had the 
right to buy back the property from the purchaser in open market was mentioned, but 
no opinion expressed. By the time that Mitchell v Heys
700
 was decided in 1894, 
Bell’s doctrine had been conclusively abandoned. In that case, the owner was 
allowed to recover loaned property which had been transferred to a good faith third 
party. In Murdoch and Co v Greig
701
 a harmonium obtained on hire purchase and 
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sold at public auction before ownership had passed was also held to be recoverable 
by the seller. 
 
(c) Hume’s Lectures 
Hume’s influential
702
 treatment is founded on the Romanist distinction between real 
and personal rights.
703
 His application of this doctrine to the problem of good faith 
purchase is worth quoting at length: 
 
if therefore, it should so happen that this right of his is infringed, and that 
thing is violently, surreptitiously or even casually taken from him, the title to 
vindicate and recover it attaches upon and follows the thing itself, […] , 
pursues it into the hands of any possessor, the most innocent of wrong on any 
occasion, and recovers it from him equally as from the person who by force 
or stealth took it away from the owner. The reason is obvious. The owner’s 
right was not founded on any relation, contracted to this or t’other individual. 
It was founded on a connection with the thing itself, independent of all 
personal considerations, and without regard to the will, consent or situation of 
anyone. This class of rights, which follow and are exerted over their ultimate 
objects everywhere, without respect of persons or circumstances, are 




Following the logic set out in this passage, a bona fide purchaser has no defence 
against an owner wishing to reclaim his or her thing. It is only when a conveyance, 
albeit challengeable, has taken place that the owner is divested of his or her right, and 





Several factors, therefore, combined to consolidate the influence of the nemo 
plus principle; Romanist logic and Stair’s moral theology played an important role 
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but security of property and protection of ownership were also central philosophical 





































This chapter explores the current doctrinal understandings of the nemo plus rule as it 
applies to the transfer of rights in corporeal moveable property, and the nature and 
extent of the exceptions recognised to the rule. Based on a mixture of common law 
and statutory provisions, these exceptions do not reflect a coherent set of principles. 
 
An important consideration is the relationship between Scots and English 
law, particularly in light of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 and its successor the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979. Despite the differences in understandings of ownership between the 
two jurisdictions
706
 affecting the interpretation of terms such as “title”, both are 
united in their fundamental adherence to the nemo plus rule.  
 
A further point of focus is the interaction with the law of security. In relation 
to goods held on hire purchase or some other limited title, reported cases often 
involve what is essentially a competition between a creditor who has attempted to 
create a non-possessory security and an unsuspecting third party. It is argued that it is 
in this respect, rather than as a general protection for good faith purchasers, that the 
relevant provisions of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 have gained most importance. 
 
B. DERIVATIVE ACQUISITION OF MOVEABLES: AN ABSTRACT OR A 
CAUSAL SYSTEM? 
 
There is some debate in Scotland about whether, at common law, transfer of 
ownership takes place only on the basis of a valid causa (the causal system), or 
whether an independently valid conveyance may be sufficient (the abstract 
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 It is well established that Scots law recognises a separation of contract 
and conveyance.
708
 Contemporary academic opinion appears to favour an abstract 
system.
709
 In relation to immoveable property, the abstraction principle also seems to 
be accepted.
710
 However, the common law is to some extent usurped by the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979, which provides that, in respect of transfers to which the Act 
applies, ownership will pass when the parties intend it to pass.
711
 Unlike at common 
law, there is no requirement of delivery;
712
 the Act thus significantly narrows the 
scope for transfer without a valid causa (in this context, contract of sale).
713
 
Nevertheless, to some extent at least, the Act preserves a distinction between contract 
and conveyance.
 714
 Gordon has argued that, where there is transfer of possession, the 
presumption of ownership from possession implies that theft or forcible 
dispossession must be shown in order to argue that ownership has not passed.
715
 
Certainly if delivery combined with intention to transfer ownership was enough to 
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The system of transfer adopted is relevant to the protection of ownership 
because it controls whether, in a given set of circumstances, A will be deemed to 
have transferred ownership to B. The more that is required to render a transfer valid, 
the more secure A’s right.
717
 In particular, under a causal system a valid contract 
between A and B is required before transfer of ownership can take place.
718
 Under an 
abstract system, only the conveyance is required to be valid. Moreover, delivery, in 




 necessary, providing notice 
to third parties of the transaction. Of course, a causal system may have an express 
rule protecting good faith purchasers.
721
 Abstract systems may also vary in 
recognising different exceptions to the principle of abstraction.
722
 In this respect the 





Nevertheless, some of the difficulties which may attend a causal system in 
which good faith third parties are afforded no general protection are illustrated by the 
complexities of the decision in Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson,
724
 in which the 
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 See comments and sources referred to by Van Vliet in Van Erp and Akkermans, Property Law 
837-843. 
723
 See comments by Eduard Meijers, one of the drafters of the 1992 Dutch Civil Code, collected in 
Van Erp and Akkermans (eds), Property Law at 832.  
724
 [2004] 1 AC 919. See in particular the criticism by Lord Millett at 954 F. 
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validity of the contract
725
 between a fraudster and a finance company determined the 
extent to which a good faith purchaser of a motor vehicle was protected. The nemo 
plus principle was used to justify protection of the finance company, which had 
contracted on the basis that the fraudster was a different (creditworthy) individual.
726
 
It appears to have been the decision in Ingram v Little,
727
 and the criticism in that 
case by Lord Devlin, then Lord Justice, of “theoretical distinctions” which “stand in 
the way of doing practical justice,”
728
 that prompted the English Law Reform 
Committee Report of 1966.
729
 As T B Smith has commented in relation to Ingram, 
the English law relating to transfer of moveable property might be seen as “largely 
secreted in the interstices of contract law”
730
 in the sense that the possibility of a 
conceptually separate conveyance of property rights is often ignored.
731
 The effect of 
error on the validity of transfer of ownership is, however, also controversial in an 
abstract system such as German law, so the importance of the system of transfer 




At common law in Scotland, it is well established that, in the absence of real 
vice, contractual defects do not usually affect a third party purchaser in good faith.
733
 
It is only where intention to transfer ownership has been entirely lacking that no right 
will be acquired (and thus none can be transferred to third parties.) This rule may be 
justified on the basis of the publicity principle: third party purchasers have no means 
of investigating the intricacies of previous transactions.
734
 Although the consent to 
                                                          
725
 The case turned on whether a contract of hire purchase had been concluded between the parties, 
triggering the good faith purchaser protection of the Hire Purchase Act 1964. However, the case dealt 
generally with validity of the contract (and by implication the transfer of ownership under SOGA) in 
cases of mistaken identity. See further D L Carey Miller, “Plausible Rogues: Contract and Property” 
(2005) 9(1) Edinburgh Law Review 150. 
726
 See for example the comments of Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough at 947. 
727
 [1961] 1 QB 31. 
728
 A case in which the facts were similar to those in Shogun: [1961] 1 QB 31 at 73. 
729
 Transfer of Title to Chattels (Cmnd 2958: 1966). The issue is described at para 6 as leading to the 
“greatest dissatisfaction with the present state of the law.” See E(2)(a) below. 
730
 T B Smith, Property Problems in Sale (1978) 170. 
731
 For some exceptions, see T Weir, “Taking for granted–the ramifications of nemo dat” (1996) 49 
Current Legal Problems 325 at 340-343; W Swadling, “Rescission, property, and the common law” 
(2005) 121 LQR 123; B Häcker, “Rescission of Contract and Revesting of Title: A Reply to Mr 
Swadling” (2006) 14 Restitution Law Review 106; L Gullifer, “Title Conflicts: Nemo Dat and its 
Exceptions”, in M Bridge et al., The Law of Personal Property (2013) paras 13-034-13-035. 
732
 See Häcker, Impaired Consent 62-63 and references given there. 
733
 See ch 3 C(2)(b)(iv). 
734
 T B Smith, “Error and Transfer of Title (1967) 12 JLSS 206 at 207. 
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transfer may be in some way challengeable, until reduction of the transfer third 
parties should be able to rely on the appearance of validity. The statutory incarnation 
of this principle in section 23 of the Sale of Goods Act is discussed below, as is the 
status of defects such as theft as exceptions to this rule. 
 
C. THE RELEVANCE OF THE NEMO PLUS PRINCIPLE 
 
(1) Doctrinal Basis 
 
In the modern era, the nemo plus maxim is cited by the leading academic texts as one 
of the fundamental principles governing derivative transfer.
735
 Although the 
challenges raised by new social situations, such as the increasing use of consumer 
credit devices separating possession and ownership, have raised questions about the 
scope of its application, its general relevance has not been contested.
736
 The hardship 
that this may visit on an innocent acquirer is, for the most part, accepted.
737
 As Reid 
notes, of the two innocent parties involved, the policy of the law is that the loss 




A further means by which the exclusivity of the owner’s power of alienation 
is fortified is the understanding that non-consensual transfers may be affected by                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
“real vice” (vitium reale). In Malaney v Union Transport Finance Ltd
739
 it was 
accepted that a vitium reale attaches not only in the case of property taken from the 
owner’s possession without his or her consent, but also to property possession of 
which has been transferred on some limited title such as hire. This was on the basis 
of the decisions in Helby v Matthews
740
 and Morrisson v Robertson,
741
 reflecting the 
view that where possession is on the basis of a void contract of sale (or a contract 
                                                          
735
 See Reid, Property para 669; Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables paras 8.03-8.04. On the general 
principles governing derivative transfer, see Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables para 8.03 and Reid, 
Property paras 597-618. 
736
 For discussion of the approach taken by the Scottish Law Commission in its Consultative 
Memorandum, see E(1)(a) below. 
737
 See Reid, Property para 669, commenting that “good faith on the part of the transferee is 
irrelevant, as it usually is in property law”; Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables para 8.04. 
738
 Reid, Property para 669.  
739
 1959 SLT (Sh Ct) 37. 
740
 [1895] AC 471. 
741
 1908 SC 332. 
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imparting some lesser right), such a possessor is not able to transfer ownership to a 
third party.
742
 Reference was also made in Malaney to the fact that, according to the 
criminal law, the crime of theft had come to include appropriation of entrusted 




This raises the somewhat troublesome issue of the relationship between the 
criminal and the civil law in this area: to what extent is the owner’s civil law remedy 
for recovery linked to the criminal law’s assessment of his or her conduct? Are the 
requirements for the crime of theft distinct from those regulating the type of conduct 
which will lead to a transfer being affected by a vitium reale? The answer to this 
question is arguably yes: the modern law sharply separates criminal and civil 
procedure. In particular, the concepts of guilt and wrong necessary to the criminal 
law are not relevant to the problems of property transfer, which involve consideration 
of different principles such as the need to facilitate commerce and ensure legal 
certainty.
744
 Property law rules are not equipped to evaluate wrong, but rather 
whether an owner has consented to transfer. Although both branches of law are 
ultimately concerned to ensure a just and peaceful society, each has an internal 
doctrinal logic which will not necessarily yield helpful results when applied in other 
contexts.
745
 Similar arguments apply in relation to the law of delict: the question of 
whether ownership has been validly transferred is independent from that of whether 




On this basis, although Malaney is correct that a vitium reale attaches to any 
property transferred without the owner’s consent,
747
 explanation of this fact does not 
                                                          
742
 See Reid, Property para 617 (Gordon). If an abstract theory of transfer of accepted, this leaves 
open the possibility of intentional transfer of ownership despite the contract being void: Carey Miller, 
Corporeal Moveables para 10.05. 
743
 1922 JC 55. 
744
 The issues surrounding ideas of blame and punishment in the criminal law are complex, but for an 
overview see C S Steiker, “Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil 
Procedural Divide” (1997) 26 Annual Review of Criminal Procedure 775.  
745
 For example, the judgments in Folkes v King [1923] 1 KB 282 were premised on the argument 
that the intention behind the Factors Act 1889 was to provide protection to bona fide purchasers; in 
this context the question of criminal wrongdoing was “immaterial”(per Scrutton LJ at 306). 
746
 Although certain delicts such as spuilzie will negate the possibility of transfer having taken place: 
Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables para 10.19. 
747
 Subject to some exceptions, for example where property is transferred by statutory authority. 
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require reference to the criminal law but reflects the fundamental tenet of property 
law that the dispositive intent of the owner is necessary for derivative transfer. 
Application of the nemo plus rule further implies that, where the initial transfer has 
been ineffective, no right of ownership will normally be acquired by subsequent 
transferees. Although the reasons underlying the identification of unauthorised 
transfer as a criminal wrong may be the same as those leading the transfer to be 
deemed ineffective in civil law,
748
 the conceptual separation between the two 
domains should be maintained. 
 
As regards other defects which may affect the owner’s consent to transfer, 
such as error, it is outwith the scope of the thesis to give an exhaustive account of the 
factors which may affect transfer.
749
 Broadly, it is only those factors which involve a 
total absence of intention to transfer ownership
750
 which should be treated as giving 
rise to a vitium reale; it is questionable whether all instances of error and force and 






Ultimately, it is the understanding of ownership as entailing an exclusive power of 
alienation
752
 which doctrinally fortifies the status of the brocard. Given this 
                                                          
748
 Both criminal and civil law are based on the principle that to deprive a person of his or her 
property without his or her consent is to wrong them in some meaningful way. 
749
 The factors which may affect intention under the contract are generally assumed to be the same as 
those which may affect intention to transfer ownership. See for example Carey Miller, Corporeal 
Moveables para 10.17. Reid, Property para 607 notes, however, that, on the basis of the abstract 
theory, the conveyance may be affected by factors which do not affect the validity of the contract 
such as offside goals. McBryde, however, characterises bad faith as also affecting the contract: W W 
McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3
rd
 edn (2007) paras 17-24-17-26. For an account of the 
effect of force and fear on intention, see W M Gloag, The Law of Contract, 2
nd
 edn (1929) 488-492.  
See also McBryde, Contract chs 13-17. 
750
 As opposed to intention to transfer possession, the solution suggested by the Scottish Law 
Commission: Corporeal Moveables: Protection of the Onerous Bona Fide Acquirer of Another’s 
Property (Scot Law Com CM No 27, 1976) para 56. 
751
 The Scottish Law Commission suggested that the position should be clarified by statute, and it 
should be expressly stated that error and force and fear do not affect good faith third parties: 
Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 19 and also Smith, Property Problems 170-171. On force and 
fear, see J du Plessis, Compulsion and Restitution (2004). On error, see McBryde, Contract paras 15-
01 ff; J Macleod, “Before Bell: The Roots of Error in the Scots Law of Contract” (2010) 14(3) 
Edinburgh Law Review 385-417; M Hogg, “The Continuing Confused Saga of Contract and Error” 
(2009) 13(3) Edinburgh Law Review 286. 
752
 See for example Stair, Institutions (1693) 3.2.3; Erskine, Institute 2.1.1. 
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assumption, it may seem merely a matter of logic to conclude that a non-owner 
cannot transfer a right which he or she does not hold. The accounts of ownership 
given by the institutional writers continue to influence the work of modern scholars 
such as Reid and Carey Miller, and indeed, the fundamental principles of derivative 




In particular, Baron Hume’s vivid depiction of the distinction between real 
and personal rights and the strong protection afforded to owners may be argued to set 
the tone for the current doctrinal position.
754
 With the exception of the work done by 
T B Smith and the Scottish Law Commission,
755
 Bell’s contention for a general rule 
protecting good faith purchasers has received little support from modern academics 
and judges.
756
 Indeed, the courts have been accused of a tendency to interpret the 
provisions of the Sale of Goods and Factors Acts narrowly, so as to favour the 
original owner.
757
 The protections afforded by the Acts are treated as exceptions, to 
be narrowly construed.
758
 This perhaps reflects the importance placed in property law 
upon the stability and certainty of property rights. On the other hand, the existence in 
various historical periods and across numerous different jurisdictions
759
 of some 
form of protection for bona fide purchasers indicates that property law is never 
entirely inflexible. Why, then, does the nemo plus principle continue to find such 
favour in Scotland? 
 
                                                          
753
 There are some exceptions, see for example the judgment of Lord Hope in Sharp v Thomson 1995 
SC 455. (The decision was subsequently reversed in the House of Lords: see 1997 SC (HL) 66.) On 
Sharp, see further Report on Sharp v Thomson (Scot Law Com No 208, 2007) and (among many 
comments) K G C Reid, “Sharp v Thomson: A Civilian Perspective” 1995 10 SLT (News) 75. Sharp 
deals, however, with immoveable property, substantial judicial commentary seems particularly 
lacking in relation to moveables.  
754
 Hume, Lectures vol 3 231-233. Hume is cited by Reid (Property para 669) and Carey Miller 
(Corporeal Moveables para 8.04). 
755
 Discussed below E(1)(a). 
756
 It is described by Reid (Property para 669) as “unfounded”. 
757
 See for example Denning LJ (dissenting) in Central Newbury Car Auctions Ltd v Unity Finance 
Ltd and Another [1957] 1 QB 371 at 381. See also his comments in Pearson v Rose & Young Ltd 
[1951] 1 KB 275 at 286. Although these comments could be argued to be addressed to the English 
courts, and there are fewer reported Scottish cases, the Scottish decisions that do exist could also be 
argued to give great weight to protection of ownership. 
758
 See e.g. Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams [1965] 1 QB 560 at 574G. 
759
 For a comparative overview, see Lurger and Faber, Principles 890. 
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In some cases, the emphasis placed on institutional authority reflects an 
attempt to prevent unthinking
760
 assimilation of Scottish property law to that of 
England by asserting its distinctive and civilian character.
761
 The defence of a 
distinctively Romanist approach to the law of moveable property may, in the context 
of legal nationalism, be an ideologically motivated move.
762
 However, it is not the 
general recognition of the nemo plus principle which differentiates the law of 
England and Scotland, but rather the underlying conceptions of ownership.
763
 The 
principle also interacts in different ways with the remedies afforded to the owner.
764
 
In fact, the links between English and Scots law may have served to fortify the status 
of the nemo plus rule in both jurisdictions.
765
 If harmonisation in the area is not to be 
jeopardised, cooperation would be required in order to make any substantial changes 
to the current law. Despite both Law Commissions reporting on the issue and making 
broadly compatible recommendations,
766
 this has not been forthcoming. The unity 
imposed by the Sale of Goods Act may thus explain why the recommendations of the 
Scottish Law Commission
767




D. EXCEPTIONS TO THE NEMO PLUS PRINCIPLE 
 
(1) General Position 
 
                                                          
760
 Prominent defenders of the idea of a distinctively Scottish tradition such as T B Smith were not 
opposed to English influence per se, but rather “forced and ill considered “anglicisation”” (T B 
Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative (1962) 117). 
761
 The Institutional period is characterised by T B Smith as a period where English influence was 
particularly weak: Smith, Studies 118-119. One of the main concerns of the Scottish Law 
Commission Memorandum, which Smith was instrumental in drafting, is to formulate a rule “more 
apt to harmonise with the common law of Scotland.” See Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 34. 
762
 See N Whitty, “Civilian Tradition and Debates on Scots Law” (1996) 3 TSAR 442 at 445-446. 
763
 See n 706 above. 
764
 On the differences between the owner’s remedies in Scots and English law see S Green and J 
Randall, The Tort of Conversion (2009) 56-58. 
 
765
As J H Dalhuisen (Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade 
Law (2013) vol 2 375) comments, it is “surprising” that the Common law is so close to the Roman 
approach. 
766
 See E(1)(a) below. 
767
 In Corporeal Moveables: Protection. 
768
 The memoranda produced on corporeal moveables were not mentioned by the former Chairman 
Lord Davidson in a 1995 review of the work of the Commission: see C K Davidson, “The Scottish 
Law Commission 1965-95” (1995/6) 1 SLPQ 18. 
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The application of the nemo plus rule means that all subsequent transferees will, in 
theory, be affected by an initial defect. In order to purge a vitium reale what is 
required is not merely a legitimate transfer, but some (preferably explicit) rule 
conferring ownership anew. It has been held, for example, that sale by a pawnbroker 




There is no general principle of Scots law protecting bona fide purchasers 
from an unauthorised seller, and hence no overarching role for good faith.
770
 
However, “[i]n a settled and industrial state some amount of genuine doubt as to 
ownership and title must unavoidably follow upon the complexity of men’s 
affairs.”
771
 The increasing tendency for possession and ownership to be separated in 
modern commercial life and the potential for this to prejudice third parties has led to 
the recognition of a number of exceptions to the nemo plus principle. 
 
(2) Exceptions at Common Law 
 
(a) Sale of poinded goods 
Poinding was a diligence exercised by a creditor against the corporeal moveable 
property of his or her debtor.
772
 In general, unless stated otherwise by statute,
773
 it 
was only competent against the property owned by the debtor.
774
 Possession by a 
debtor was not enough to allow diligence on the basis of a reputed ownership.
775
 
However, in respect of poinded goods subsequently sold at roup, a rule was, until 
overturned in Hopkinson v Napier,
776
 recognised that the true owner could not 
recover goods poinded while in the possession of a third party. Apart from the desire 
                                                          
769
 Hyslop v Anderson 1919 1 SLT 156. 
 
770
 It might be argued that Scots property law tends, in general, to penalise bad faith rather than 
reward good faith. See D L Carey Miller, “Good Faith in Scots Property Law”, in A D M Forte (ed) 
Good Faith in Contract and Property Law (1999) 103, in particular at 123-126, and argument in 
Mitchells v Ferguson (1781) Mor 10296. 
771
 F Pollock and R S Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (1888) 3. 
772
 See J Graham Stewart, The Law of Diligence (1898) 274-275. 
773
 See for example Glasgow Corporation v Midland Household Stores Ltd 1967 SLT (Sh Ct) 22. 
774
 Stewart, Diligence 341. In relation to goods held on contracts of hire purchase or conditional sale, 
it was therefore necessary to ascertain whether ownership had passed to the debtor. See e.g. Marston 
(n 616); Stewart, Diligence 341. 
775
 Glen (n 634). 
776
 (n 615). 
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to protect competing creditors from arrangements which amounted to non-possessory 
securities, a general discomfort at the expansion of relatively new credit 
arrangements
777
 seems to have played a role in the attitude of the courts: 
 
I have seen a good deal of these contracts of hire and sale in the Sheriff 
Court, and I am far from being persuaded that they are a blessing to the poor, 
or deserving of any exceptional respect…I have no idea that the law is going 
to step in for the protection of the Singer or other such company, and place 





The doctrine seems to have its origins in the case of Singer Manufacturing Co v 
Beale and MacTavish,
779
 in which sheriff officers who had poinded the property of 
the pursuers were sued for its value. The case did not concern the recovery of the 
actual goods; Lord Johnston emphasised that the poinding sheriff officer had relied 
on the statutory process, and that the owners must rely on the honesty of those to 
whom they had entrusted their property. It is understandable that the sheriff officers 
should not be liable for the value of the property (which was no longer in their 




However, the Sheriff in Grant v Napier
781
 refused to allow the owner to 
vindicate poinded goods sold at auction, even where the debtor had pointed out that 
the goods were held on hire purchase. This was supposedly on the basis of the 
inference of ownership arising from possession and the clean statutory title given by 
                                                          
777
 Compare the decision in Anderson (n 612), in which ownership was thought to be the “natural 
cause and concomitant of possession” of moveables for personal and household use. 
778
 Singer Manufacturing Co v Beale and MacTavish (1905) 8 F (J) 29 per Lord Johnston at 32. See 
also the comments in Benton and Co v Rowan (1895) 11 Sh Ct Rep 144 at 145 that hire purchase is 
“a bad system, leading to deception, imposition and litigation, and, worst of all, involving the 
ignorant and improvident of the poor.” Compare the more favourable approach taken by the Lords in 
Helby (n 740) at 482. 
779
 Ibid. See also Benton ibid. at 145. 
780
 It seems that the fact of the debtor’s possession was usually seen as enough to allow the officer to 
presume ownership: Stewart, Diligence 351. Compare Macleod v Aitken (1881) 25 J of J 387 in 
which officers ignoring the pursuer’s written evidence of title were found liable in delict. 
781





 (the terms of which, however, were not discussed.)
783
 
These are two very different arguments: the fact that sheriff officers might presume 
ownership does not exclude subsequent vindication by the owner,
784
 but a statutory 
conferral of ownership upon a purchaser certainly must. In general, the sheriff felt 
that the owners had failed to protect their interests and therefore should suffer; 
“[e]ntrusting the safeguarding of their interests to the honesty or alertness of [the 




It was only when the issue arose again in Hopkinson v Napier
786
 that the 
Inner House took the opportunity to clarify the law in this area. It was pointed out 
that the Acts in question did not, unlike for example the Sale of Goods Act, introduce 
an exception to the general law.
787
  Under the relevant legislation, notification of the 
true owner was inadequate and outdated, amounting to “three “oyesses” of the town 
crier.”
788
 Moreover, the desire to protect society from the expansion of dubious 
means of credit was not enough to justify such a doctrine which “would operate not 
only against the hire-purchase firm, but against the citizen who had left his watch to 




Although Hopkinson laid down a clear rule regarding the position of the 
owner before the property had been sold,
790
 the judges in the case reserved their 
opinion as to the position of a bona fide purchaser for value at a judicial sale.
791
 The 
Scottish Law Commission suggested that, in the interests of clarity, ownership 
should be conferred by statute on purchasers at judicial sale.
792
 However, in the 
subsequent Sheriff Court decision in Carlton v Miller, recovery was allowed from 
                                                          
782
 Presumably, given the reference to Singer, the Small Debt (Scotland) Act 1837. 
783
 Grant v Napier (n 781) at 4. 
784
 In Macleod v Aitken (n 780), as well as pursuing a claim in delict against the officers involved the 
pursuer seems to have recovered his furniture. 
785
 Grant v Napier (n 781) at 5. 
786
 (n 615). 
787
 Hopkinson (n 615) at 151. 
788
 Ibid. at 148.  
789
 Ibid. at 148. 
790
 See for example Second Memorandum on Diligence, Poindings and Warrant Sales (Scot Law 
Com CM No 48, 1980) at 6.11.  
791
 Hopkinson (n 615) at 148. 
792





 This was on the basis that to hold otherwise would be a 
“startling injustice to the true owner whose property would be confiscated behind his 
back”.
794
 Purchasers at judicial sale who may be acquiring the property at undervalue 
may also not be true “purchasers for value”.
795
 On returning to the issue, the Scottish 
Law Commission expressed concern about the adequacy of their proposed 
procedures for providing notification to the owner.
796
 The idea that purchasers at 





Poinding has now been abolished, and replaced by the diligence of 
attachment.
798
 The situation of a third party whose goods are attached under the Debt 
Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002 is, presumably, intended to be the 
same as where the goods had been poinded.
799
 Attachment is exigible only over the 
property of the debtor.
800
 However, an officer executing an attachment may assume 
that the debtor owns any property in his or her possession.
801
 The officer is not 
prevented from relying on such an assumption only because the property is of a type 
which is commonly held on hire purchase or an assertion is made that the debtor is 
not the owner.
802
 Subsequent to attachment, where property is sold by auction, there 
is no express provision conferring ownership on a purchaser. A third party’s claim of 
ownership, if made before the auction takes place and apparently valid, will end the 
attachment,
803
 but the position if the auction has already taken place is not 
mentioned. Extra protection for the owner was considered during the Debt 
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 1978 SLT (Sh Ct) 36. 
794
 Carlton ibid. at 37. 
795
 Carlton ibid. at 37. 
796
 Second Memorandum on Diligence 6.11. 
797
 Second Memorandum on Diligence 6.11. This was on the assumption that a Report would follow 
the Memorandum on Protection of the Onerous Bona Fide Acquirer. The subsequent Report on 
Diligence and Debtor Protection (Scot Law Com No 95, 1985), as there was no dissent from 
consultees, maintained this approach. 
798
 See Part 2 of the Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002. 
799
 Compare the (now repealed) s 40(3) of the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987 and s 34(2) of the Debt 
Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002. On the position under the 1987 Act, see G Maher 
and D Cusine, Law and Practice of Diligence (1990) 184-185; W A Wilson, The Scottish Law of 
Debt, 2
nd
 edn (1991) paras 16.2; 16.8. 
800
 Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002 s 10(2).  
 801 Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002 s 13(1). 
802
 Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002 s 13(4). 
803
 Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002 s 34(1). 
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Arrangement and Attachment Bill’s passage through the Scottish Parliament, but it 




Presumably, therefore, in the absence of any further authority the decision in 
Carlton
805
 will also be applicable to attachment. There may be sound reasons for 
allowing purchasers at judicial sale extra security; the issue is discussed further in 
Chapter 6.
806
 Whatever view is taken, an explicit rule on the question would be 
preferable to the current position. 
 
(b) Personal bar? 
Personal bar
807
  has an uneasy relationship with the law relating to transfer of 
moveables because, as a doctrine, it is concerned with what Party A may assert in a 
question with Party B.
808
 Property law, on the other hand, is usually concerned with 




At common law personal bar was recognised where representations had been 
made by an owner that another was entitled to sell or burden property, and there had 
been reliance on those representations.
810
 Unlike section 21 of the Sale of Goods Act, 
personal bar at common law does not require a completed sale, but will operate to 
bind the owner to any contract made in reliance on the representations.
811
 As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the doctrine of reputed ownership may have been a 
manifestation of personal bar;
812
 possession in itself is, in this context, not a 
                                                          
804
 See the proposed amendment to allow for time for third parties to prove ownership, Scottish 
Parliament, Official Report cols 12236-12237 (13 Nov 2002).   See also Scottish Parliament, Official 
Report cols 2966-2967 (6 June 2002), where the difficulties of establishing ownership are also raised. 
805
 (n 793). 
 
806
 See ch 6 F(1)(c). 
807
 For the history of the term “personal bar” in Scotland, see E C Reid and J W G Blackie Personal 
Bar (2006) ch 1. 
808
 See for example the definition by Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar at 2.01-2.03 
809
 See Reid, Property para 3.  
810
 See Mitchell (n 700) per Lord Kinnear at 610, followed in M’fadyean v Shearer Bros 1952 SLT 
(Sh Ct) 12; J Rankine, The Law of Personal Bar in Scotland (1921) 215-216, although Rankine 
characterises the doctrine of “holding out” as “commonly confined” to the law of agency.  
811
Assuming, of course, that the general conditions for the application of bar are met, on which see 
Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar chs 2-4. 
812
 See ch 3 C(1)(b); Gloag and Irvine, Rights in Security 237. 
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representation as to ownership,
813
 especially where it can be ascribed to a legitimate 
(non-collusive) contract.
814
 As to whether negligence could operate to bar recovery 
by the owner, there is some indication that this is accepted as a theoretical possibility 





The effect of the bar would certainly be to prevent the owner recovering his 
or her property. Whether it could operate to transfer ownership is less certain.
816
 To 
hold that the original owner retains a property right which he or she could potentially 
assert against subsequent transferees would be “curious and unprincipled”.
817
 
However, to deprive an owner of his or her right on the basis of inconsistent conduct 
could, in some circumstances, seem overly harsh.
818
 In other areas of property law, 
such as encroachment, personal bar does not operate to create new rights.
819
 The 
position under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 is discussed later, but the better view 
appears to be that, at common law, personal bar does not confer proprietary rights 
and is accordingly not a true exception to the nemo plus principle. 
 
With regard to the creation of subordinate real rights, what of rights (such as 
lien) which arise through operation of law rather than the consent of the owner?
820
 In 
general, a rule which allows ownership to be asserted by a non-owner will also allow 
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 Mitchell (n 700).  
814
 Marston (n 616); Hogarth (n 634); Robertson and Another (n 606); Bell, Principles 1315. 
815
 For example, in M’Kellar v Greenock and Port-Glasgow Loan Co Ltd (1918) 34 Sh Ct Rep 93, a 
servant stole a watch but it was held that, in the absence of a special reason to doubt the honesty of 
the servant, there was no duty upon the owner to take precautions against the theft. 
816
 The Sheriff in Peggie v Rex & Co (Falkirk) Limited 1945 SLT (Sh Ct) 25 seems to have assumed 
that reputed ownership could operate to transfer ownership to a purchaser. See at 26-27. However, 
Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar 5-23 argue that personal bar is not constitutive of proprietary rights. 
Reid, Property para 670 at fn 3 and at para 680 (Gamble) states that personal bar could not confer 
ownership.  
817
 K G C Reid and C G van der Merwe, “Property Law: Some Themes and Variations”, in Reid et al. 
(eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective (2004) 637 at 661-662. 
818
 Particularly given the general reluctance of the courts to impose a duty on the owner to take care 
of his or her property, see D(3)(c) below. Gloag and Irvine state that the principle will “very rarely be 
applied” to prevent recovery by the true owner of moveables: Rights in Security 203.  
819
 See generally Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar ch 6. On encroachment, see paras 6.22-6.25. 
820
 As the nemo plus rule applies to lien, it is however, to some extent a consensual security. On this 
difficult question, see Steven, Pledge paras 13-35-13-49. 
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the assertion of subordinate real rights.
821
  In Lamonby v Foulds
822
 the Inner House 
accepted the possibility that, in appropriate circumstances, a representation by the 
owner that a possessor was entitled to create subordinate real rights would prevent 
the owner from denying that a lien had been created.
823
 Merely entrusting a third 





(c) Tacit Securities 
The topic is outwith the scope of the thesis, but there also are a few special cases 
where, although the possessor could not transfer ownership, a subordinate real right 
will arise by operation of law. These may include an innkeeper’s lien
825





Prior to its restriction by s 208(4) of the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2007, the property of a third party in the possession of a tenant could 
be subjected to the landlord’s hypothec.
827
 This rule was traditionally justified by 
reference to the implied consent of the owner, rather than a reputed ownership due to 
the tenant’s possession;
828
 notification to the landlord should thus have been enough 
to rebut this presumption.
829
 Whether the property was held on some kind of limited 
                                                          
821
 So for example personal bar could (in theory at least) bar the owner from denying the pledge: 
Gloag and Irvine, Rights in Security 204-207; Steven, Pledge para 6-48. 
822
 1928 SC 89. See further Steven, Pledge para 13-50. 
823
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Blackie, Personal Bar 5.04-5.05. 
824
 Steven, Pledge para 13-50. 
825
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liability” placed by law upon innkeepers. See the judgment of Lord President Emslie at 72. See 
further Steven, Pledge paras 16-82-16-85. 
826
 Steven, Pledge para 13-36 is of the view that the law relating to a delictual lien is uncertain. 
827
 On the law prior to the 2007 Act, see A McAllister, The Scottish Law of Leases, 3rd edn (2002) 
5.46-5.62; J Rankine, Treatise on the Law of Leases in Scotland, 3
rd
 edn (1916) 374-379; G C H 
Paton and J G S Cameron, The Law of Landlord and Tenant in Scotland (1967) 203-206; A J M 
Steven, “The Landlord's Hypothec in Comparative Perspective” (2008) 12(1) Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law. 
828
 Jaffray v Carrick (1836) 15 S 43. This seems to have been accepted in Nelmes v Ewing (1883) 11 
R 193. Compare Adam v Sutherland (1863) 2 M 6 at 8; Pulsometer Engineering Co v Gracie (1887) 
14 R 316; Dundee Corporation v Marr 1971 SC 96. For a critique of the idea that the hypothec is 
based in personal bar in South African law, see J S McLennan, “A Lessor’s Hypothec over the Goods 
of Third Parties – Anomaly and Anachronism’” (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 121 at 123. 
829
 See Dundee Corporation ibid. at 101-102. 
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contract such as hire purchase
830
 or had been gratuitously deposited with the tenant
831
 
made no difference to the application of the hypothec. Much depended, however, on 




With regard to future development, the debates surrounding the landlord’s 
hypothec provide an excellent example of the wider politics of the law in this area. 
The distributional effects of private law rules on creditors and debtors cannot be 
ignored;
833
 judges, however, often declare themselves ill-equipped to deal with issues 
of public policy. The argument that fundamental changes in economic and social 
conditions had rendered the existing law obsolete met with little judicial favour in 
Dundee Corporation v Marr,
834
 with several judges commenting that development 





An important area not covered in the thesis is the law relating to bona fide acquirers 
of money. This is partly for reasons of space; there is also an argument that money is 
in some sense not “true” corporeal moveable property.
836
 There is an important 
distinction between “money” used in reference to circulating currency and other 
forms of note and coin the value of which may be principally historical or due to the 
materials contained therein.
837
 In relation to currency, under the Sale of Goods Act 
this cannot be sold.
838





                                                          
830
 See Rudman v Jay and Co 1908 SC 552; Nelmes v Ewing (n 828). 
831
 See Rankine, Leases 376-377. 
832
 See comments in Rankine, Leases 374-375.  
833
 On this topic, see further I Ramsay, “Consumer Credit Law, Distributive Justice and the Welfare 
State” (1995) 15(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 177.  
834
 (n 828). 
835
 See the comments by Lord Migdale at para 103 and Lord Cameron at paras 109-110. 
836
 Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables para 1.02. See further L Crerar, “Banking, Money and 
Commercial Paper”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2000) para 
143. For comprehensive analysis from an English perspective see D Fox, Property Rights in Money 
(2008) ch 1. 
 
837
 For an account of the legal and economic functions of money see Fox, Money paras 1.19-1.58. 
838
 SOGA 1979 s 61(1). Compare coins and notes of historical value: Moss v Hancock [1899] 2 QB 
111. 
839
 See Crerar, “Banking” para 143. 
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Due to this special status, it seems that currency provides an exception to the 
owner’s right to recover his or her property. This is probably on the basis of original, 
rather than derivative, acquisition, but the doctrinal basis for this and the relationship 
to other cases of original acquisition are obscure.
840
 The fact that it is usually difficult 
or impossible to distinguish one coin from another seems to be a factor. However, 
the requirements of commerce are also cited by Stair as justifying his view that 
currency “doth so far become the property of the possessor, that it passeth to all 
singular successors without any question of the knowledge, fraud, or other fault of 
the author.”
841
 There may be a distinction between marked and unmarked money,
842
 
but in general it seems that currency cannot be vindicated from a good faith party.
843
 
It may, however, be the subject of an enrichment claim. 
 
(3) The Sale of Goods Act 1979 
 
(a) History of the Act 
In respect of English law, “[p]rotection of purchasers for value without notice as 
against the legal owner is a principle well known in both law and equity.”
844
 In 
particular, the Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides a number of exceptions to the nemo 
plus principle. How are these to be understood and justified? The provisions of the 
1979 Act have their origins in a statute codifying the English common law of sale, 
the Sale of Goods Act 1893, which is in turn based on the Factors Act 1889 and a 
series of earlier English Acts regarding factors. 
 
In nineteenth-century England at least,
845
 the factor played an “increasing 
financial role…in the provision of trade credit”; provision of credit to the principal 
often necessitating the raising of funds from finance houses.
846
 The lack of legal 
                                                          
840
 See Crawfurd v Royal Bank (1749) Mor 875; Reid, “Banknotes”; Crerar, “Banking” para 144. For 
the English position, compare Fox, Money ch 8. 
841
 Stair, Institutions 2.1.34. 
842
 See Bell, Principles § 1333. 
843
 See, however, Henry v Morrison (1881) 8 R 692 at 693. In that case, “the object of obtaining 
possession of these vouchers may be something very different from the recovery of the money.”  
844




 edition of Bell’s Commentaries (1816) contains a new title (vol 2 326-324) on the law 
regarding mercantile agents and factors, indicating the topic also had relevance in Scotland. 
846
 See R Munday, “A Legal History of the Factor” (1977) 6 Anglo-American Law Review 221 at 260. 
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protection for a purchaser or pledgee where an agent sold or pledged goods in his 
possession without authority was attacked by some in mercantile communities as an 
impediment to the circulation of capital.
847
 The English Factors Acts were thus based 
on the principle that, “when one person arms another with a symbol of property… he 
should be the sufferer when a fraud …takes place, rather than the person who …is 
misled by the position in which the person is placed who is trusted by the owner of 
the property, and by that means is enabled to commit a fraud”.
848
 The Acts were 
originally aimed at mercantile agents entrusted with documents of title, but were 
extended to buyers or sellers in possession of the actual goods by the consolidating 
Act of 1889, a consequence which was perhaps not intended by the original 
drafters.
849
 The 1889 Act was described by Mackenzie Chalmers as a partial 
application of the French maxim “En fait de meubles...”
850
 Indeed, French law is 




Although during the nineteenth century the applicable Scots law was 
perceived as more friendly to commerce,
852
 the Factors (Scotland) Act 1890 applied 
the provisions of the English Factors Act 1889 to Scotland.
853
 It seems that this Act 
was passed rather hurriedly, without adequate opportunity for comment by the 
Scottish legal and mercantile communities.
854
 It was certainly already the case that 
Scots law had developed rules to prevent defrauding of third parties by those 
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 For a description of the campaign which led to the passing of the Factors Act 1823, see S Thomas, 
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Review 210 at 213. 
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 M D E S Chalmers, The Sale of Goods Act 1893 (1894) 118. On the history and scope of the rule 
in France, see J-L Bergel et al. (eds), Traité de Droit Civil: Les Biens, 2
nd
 edn (2010) 268-280; F 
Zenati-Castaing and T Revet, Les Biens, 3
rd
 edn (1998) paras 230-231. 
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852
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in Scotland in Vickers (n 848).  
854




possessing on some the basis of some limited right.
855
 Both English and Scots case 
law recognised a principle that, of two innocent parties, the one who had enabled the 




It is these concerns of nineteenth-century English law which were ultimately 
reflected in the drafting of what became the Sale of Goods Act 1893. The Act 
replicated sections 8 and 9 of the Factors Act 1889, again aiming to solve some of 
the problems arising from separation of possession and ownership. The Scottish Law 
Commission identifies three main norms governing the exceptions provided by the 
Act: the principle of publicity, the principle that the party who has facilitated the 




Rodger has depicted the extension of the 1893 Act to Scotland as enjoying 
substantial Scottish support.
858
 This would seem to accord with the general tone of 
the era: “No one, I presume, doubts the desirability of a gradual assimilation of the 
laws of England, Ireland, and Scotland.”
859
  It has been argued that the Act was 
based in a particular “jurisprudential ideology”:
860
 a set of beliefs regarding the 
value of codification and in particular its importance to commercial interests.
861
 A 
code would allow deductive, rather than inductive, reasoning, and was therefore 
seen as providing a more certain foundation on which the affairs of businessmen 
could be managed.
862
 Codification can also be linked to the politics of empire: not 
only should the nations within the United Kingdom be united by a common code, 
but the states at that time British colonies. “We should also [then] have done 
                                                          
855
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The Factors Act 1889 remains in force,
864
 so litigants can, in theory, choose 
whether to rely on sections 8 and 9 of that Act or Sections 24 and 25 of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979.
865
 Discussion focuses on the text given in the Sale of Goods Act, 
but where the provisions of the Factors Act provide wider or different protection, this 
is mentioned. 
 
(b) Good faith under the Act 
(i) General concept 
Due to the diversity of the situations in which norms of good faith are applied, it is 
difficult to construct a unified concept of good faith in Scots property law.
866
 In the 
context of acquisition a non domino, the closest thing to a general definition is that in 
s 61(3) of the Sale of Goods Act which, in presumed reference to the subjective state 
of mind of the acquirer,
867
 states that a thing is done in good faith when it is in fact 
done honestly. “In good faith and without notice” seems to include both objective 
and subjective elements:  subjective good faith is required, but the notice requirement 
implies the possibility of constructive notice.
868
  Scots law generally utilises both 
objective and subjective criteria.
869
 From an objective perspective, Carey Miller 
describes the role of good faith in certain contexts as a “control device”
870
 and also a 
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 J Dove Wilson, “The Proposed Imperial Code of Commercial Law-A Plea for Progress” 1896 
Juridical Review 329. 
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 It was originally intended to repeal the replicated sections of the Factors Act, but this was 
postponed for consultation with the original draftsman and subsequently not pursued. See Chalmers, 
Sale of Goods Act 55; S Thomas, A Comparative Analysis of the Rule of Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet 
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Solutions Plc [2006] BLR 150. 
866
 Carey Miller, “Good Faith” at 123-124. 
867
 J S Ulph, “Good Faith and Due Diligence”, in E McKendrick and N Palmer (eds), Interests in 
Goods, 2
nd
 edn (1998) 403 at 408. 
868
 See M G Bridge, The Sale of Goods, 3
rd
 edn (2014) paras 5.113-5.115. Bridge opines, however, 
that even if a doctrine of constructive notice were thought to exist it would have little impact given 
the informal nature of many sale of goods tranactions. 
869
 Reid, Property para 132. 
870
 Carey Miller, “Good Faith” at 103. 
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“norm of honest conduct”.
871
 In one of the few Scottish cases to deal with the issue, 
both objective and subjective elements are referred to: 
 
In order relevantly to aver mala fides… the pursuers must aver facts and 
circumstances from which the defender’s fraudulent or dishonest dealing with 
the vehicle may reasonably be inferred. If it cannot be averred that the 
defender knew that the car had been stolen, it must at least be averred…that 





In terms of factors which may be taken into account, sale at undervalue in itself does 
not lead to an inference of bad faith.
873
 Sale of a car without the registration 





(ii) Justificatory role 
Although the importance of good faith is recognised in both English and Scots law 
through sections 23-25 of the Sale of Goods Act, there is reluctance to give a wider 
role to good faith in English law by extending the operation of these provisions 
further than the terms of the Act necessitate.
875
 However, it would be “misleading” to 




Carey Miller argues that, following the general principles of derivative 
acquisition, bad faith will lead to a defect in the acquirer’s intention to acquire 
ownership (animus domini) both at common law and under the Sale of Goods Act.
877
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 Carey Miller, “Good Faith” at 103. 
872
 Mercantile Credit Co Ltd v Townsley 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 37. Compare Bridge, Sale para 5.114. 
873
 Jarvis v Manson 1953 SLT (Sh Ct) 93 at 94. This may of course depend on the circumstances; see 
GE Capital Bank Ltd v Rushton [2005] EWCA Civ 1556 at paras 42-47. 
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876
 Carey Miller, “Good Faith” at 125. 
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It is not clear what authority exists for this view in Scots law.
878
  The thesis is 
asserted to be based on principle rather than policy,
879
 but if intention to transfer is 
assessed objectively, it seems to amount to a policy decision. Animus domini may 
equally be argued to amount to a will to acquire, rather than a belief in being 
owner.
880
 There are sound reasons to exclude bad faith parties from acquisition (they 
did not trust in appearances, they may not have followed the appropriate market 
norms), but it is submitted that this does not justify conflating these two concepts. 
  
(iii) Proving good faith 
The burden of proving good faith will usually lie on the party seeking to assert a 
right, except, it seems, in the case of section 23.
881
 This has been criticised,
882
 but 
may arguably be justified by reference to the existence of an apparently valid consent 





(c) Preclusion by conduct: Section 21 
(i) “Title” 
Section 21 states: 
 
Where goods are sold by a person who is not their owner, and who does not sell 
them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no 
better title to the goods than the seller had 
 
This is, prima facie, a fairly clear restatement of two fundamental principles of 
derivative acquisition shared by Scots and English law: the rule that the owner’s 
                                                          
878
 No case law or institutional authority is cited by Carey Miller. For an overview of the position in 
civilian doctrine, see F Zenati, “Revendication mobilière” (1998) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil 
408 at 413. 
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consent is necessary to transfer property, and its corollary the nemo plus maxim.
884
 
One problematic aspect from a Scots perspective is the meaning of “no better title”. 
One may speak of “title to” a right or an interest,
885
 or “title to” do something (e.g. 
possess land),
886
 but what does “title to” goods refer to: title to possess the goods or 
title to a right in the goods? To speak simply of “title to” a thing elides the distinction 
between the two. 
 
It may be that the term “title” has a different import in Scots than in English 
law. Great significance is attributed to possession in English property law, indeed a 
principal concern is with competing rights to possess.
887
 To have a “title” to 
moveable property has been described as entailing a right to possess.
888
 Such a title 
might derive either from the right of ownership, or from the fact of possession. “Title 
to goods” is therefore a relative concept, with multiple titles possible to the same 
object.
889
 On this interpretation, Section 21 states that the buyer will not acquire a 
better right to possess the goods than that held by the seller. 
 
In the Scots context, however, although one may be concerned with who has 
the best right to possess, the fact of possession gives rise only to the right not to be 
dispossessed except by process of law.
890
 In respect of owned objects all rights to 
possession, whether real or personal, are derived from the owner of the thing.
891
 To 
have “title to” an object is therefore better understood as having a title to a right in 
the object, rather than a title to do something with it. Although multiple titles to the 
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same right may be possible, only one will be valid: there is only one right of 
ownership in the thing.
892
 A “title to goods” (singular) might thus be best explained 
as a “right in the goods”. To say that the buyer acquires “no better title” is to say that 
the buyer’s right will be no higher, his or her claim to hold the right of ownership 
will be no better, than the seller’s. 
 
(ii) Preclusion by conduct 
Section 21 continues by providing an exception: “unless the owner of the 
goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell.” At 
common law, an owner who had acted to clothe the seller or pledger with apparent 
authority was prevented from denying, in a question with a bona fide purchaser or 
pledgee, that he or she had given that authority.
893
 As Lord Herschell put it in The 
London Joint Stock Bank v Simmons,
894
 quoted and applied by Lord Kinnear in the 




The general rule of the law is that where a person has obtained the property of 
another from one who is dealing with it without the authority of the true 
owner, no title is acquired as against that owner… unless the person taking it 
can show that the true owner has so acted as to mislead him into the belief 
that the person dealing with the property had authority to do so. 
 
Did the drafter of section 21 intend it to be interpreted by reference to the English 
rules of estoppel (estoppel by negligence or estoppel by representation)?
896
 The 
authors of Chitty on Contracts argue that this was the intended effect of the 
provision, with the term “precluded” being used in an attempt to render the provision 
                                                          
892
 In the case of common ownership, each co-owner has a separate share in the right of ownership of 
the thing, but there is not more than one right of ownership. See Sharp (n 753) at  469 per Lord 
President Hope. 
893
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 edn 
(2010) 364-365; Ulph, “Conflicts” at para 5-032. 
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comprehensible to Scots law.
897
  As T B Smith highlights, however, Scots law knows 




The formulation used raises further questions. The “conduct” relied on must 
be some conduct of the owner, rather than a fraudulent third party
899
 and on the basis 
of the English doctrine of estoppel by representation, it was held in Debs v Sibec 
Developments Ltd 
900
 that such representations must have been voluntarily made. 
They must also have been such as to create a false impression as to the transferor’s 
entitlement to sell.
901
 Simply handing over possession is certainly not enough,
902
 nor 
is handing over vehicle registration documents.
903
 Section 21 does not appear to 
place a duty on the owner to, for example, register his or her interest with Hire 
Purchase Information Ltd
904
 as this does not amount to a “representation”.
905
 It seems 
obscure exactly what kind of conduct might thus be held enough to preclude the 
owner from asserting his or her right; perhaps the most that can be said is that 
something must have occurred which tips the balance of equities in favour of the 
innocent acquirer. 
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According to the English doctrine of estoppel by negligence,
906
 in some 
circumstances negligent conduct may also preclude the owner from denying the 
seller’s authority;
907
  it seems that the general principles of tort will apparently 
apply.
908
 However, the courts are reluctant to impose a duty upon owners to take care 
of their property, or to safeguard others against loss.
909
 It is therefore difficult to 
establish liability where an owner has carelessly entrusted the possession of goods or 
documents of title to an unreliable party.
910
 The authors of Benjamin’s Sale of Goods 
describe the reported cases as providing “no reliable affirmative guidance” on when 




There is no requirement that the buyer be in good faith, or act reasonably, but 
it has been argued that the courts would imply this.
912
 In general, the courts appear to 
interpret section 21 so as to favour the protection of the original owner; several 
scholars have pointed to the perceived reluctance of courts to apply the estoppel 
based exception in English law.
913
 There are unfortunately no reported cases in 
Scotland applying the provision. 
 
(iii) Effect 
It was argued earlier that personal bar at common law is a personal exception, which 
does not operate to remove the right of ownership but merely bars its assertion 
                                                          
906
 In Scotland, the leading text on personal bar states that “bar by negligence” should not be elevated 
into a category of its own. See Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar para 2-24. 
907
 See Atiyah, Sale 369-372. 
908
 Mercantile Credit Co Ltd v Hamblin [1964] 2 QB 242 at 271. For criticism of this view, see Ulph, 
“Conflicts” para 5-032, citing Saunders v Anglia Building Society [1971] AC 1004 at 1038 per Lord 
Pearson. In Scotland, however, it seems that a person pleading personal bar will not be required to 
establish a duty of care in the delictual sense. See Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar paras 2-24 and 2-
43. 
909
 See Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd (n 905) at 919; 925 and Atiyah, Sale 372. See also Central 
Newbury (n 757) per Morris LJ at 394: “It cannot be that ownership is lost on the basis of enduring 
punishment for carelessness.” 
910
See Atiyah, Sale 370. Even where there are steps (such as registration of a hire purchase agreement 
with H.P.I Ltd) that could be taken to protect the property, this does not place a duty on the owner to 
take such steps, see Moorgate Mercantile Co (n 905); Dominion Credit and Finance ltd  v Marshall 
(Cambridge) Ltd 1993 WL 13725833. 
911
 Bridge (ed), Benjamin's Sale of Goods 7-016. 
912
 Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar 11-23. 
913
 See e.g. Gullifer, “Conflicts” para 13-040; A Foster, “Sale by a non-owner: striking a fair balance 
between the rights of the true owner and a buyer in good faith” (2004) 9(2) Coventry Law Journal 1 
at  4 
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against a particular party.
914
  Section 21, on the other hand, implies that if the owner 
is precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell the buyer will gain a “better 
title” than the seller. English case law has interpreted this to mean that the owner 
gains a “real title” (i.e. one that is good against the world) rather than the 
“metaphorical title” that would be acquired through estoppel.
915
 In Scots law, which 
is not concerned with competing titles (rights) to possess, the best interpretation of 
“better title” seems to be “better claim to hold the right of ownership”.
916
 This would 
mean that, where the owner is precluded by his or her conduct from denying the 
seller’s authority, section 21 would operate to confer ownership by statute on the 




If ownership was not conferred on the acquirer, it is unclear how section 21 
would affect third parties coming into contact with the property in question. For 
example, if A is precluded by his or her conduct from denying B’s authority to sell to 
C, can he or she nevertheless enforce his or her right against a subsequent mala fide 
transferee, D? On the basis of the comments above, A’s ownership would have been 
extinguished and C would acquire a valid right. Carey Miller points out that 
acquisition by a mala fide party would be an exceptional case; it is undesirable as a 
matter of legal policy that the owner should be bound in a question with B, but not 
later acquirers.
918
 Although it is somewhat anomalous that a doctrine based on 
personal exception should have such severe proprietary consequences, it is important 
that it is clear who holds the right of ownership at any given point. Of course, where 
the owner is precluded from denying the transferor’s authority to sell but there has 
been no completed transfer under the terms of the Act, section 21 will not confer 
ownership on the buyer.
919
 
                                                          
914
 Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar 11-24. Carey Miller (Corporeal Moveables para 10.19 at fn 5) 
cites Rankine, Personal Bar as authority for the proposition that personal bar may operate to transfer 
ownership, but the passages quoted do not seem to include any substantial discussion of the issue. 
915
 See Eastern Distributors Ltd v Goldring [1957] 2 QB 600 at 611, approved in Moorgate 
Mercantile Co Ltd (n 905) at 918. See also Bridge (ed), Benjamin's Sale of Goods at para 7-008 and 
Atiyah, Sale 372. 
 
916
 The term “title” is not unknown in Scottish legislation, see for example ss 4 and 5 of the 
Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1924. The reference to “better title”, however, seems to imply a concept 
of relativity of title not applicable in Scotland. 
917
 This view is accepted in Reid, Property para 680 (Gamble). 
918
 Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables para 10.20 at fn 29. 
919




Where a rule of law or evidence (for example personal bar)
920
 prevents an 
owner from asserting his or her title, clear rules of positive (as well as negative) 
prescription are desirable in order to clarify the legal position.
921
 On the 
interpretation above, however, positive prescription would not be necessary as 
section 21 may operate not only to extinguish A’s ownership but to confer ownership 
on B. Conversely though, it will not purge all potential defects from the title, merely 
those connected with the lack of authority of the transferor in question. No original 




(iv) Statutory powers of sale 
A further exception to the nemo plus principle is contained in section 21(2), which 
states that the provision does not affect “the validity of any contract of sale under any 
special common law or statutory power of sale or under the order of a court of 
competent jurisdiction.” For a Scots audience, the reference to “contract of sale” is 
best understood as connected to the validity of the transfer of property (which, of 
course, under the Act is dependent on the validity of the underlying contract). 
 
There are a number of Scots statutes authorising transfer without the consent 
of the owner.
923
 According to Stuart-Smith LJ in Bulbruin Ltd v Romanyszyn
924
 
“there is no universal rule that the matter should be dealt with expressly either to give 
or to exclude title. Nor is there any presumption in favour of the principle of nemo 
dat quod non habet”.
925
 This is a surprising statement; where ownership is being, in 
effect, expropriated it seems desirable that there should be legislative clarity on 
                                                          
920
 The question as to whether personal bar is a rule of evidence or of substantive law is controversial. 
Rankine, Personal Bar at 1 characterises it as a rule of evidence, but Reid and Blackie argue that it is 
best understood as a rule of substantive law (Personal Bar 5-20.) 
921
 For an argument that the presumption of ownership from possession will suffice as a defence to 
the claim of the Crown in a case where the owner is barred from recovery by negative prescription, 
see D L Carey Miller, “Lawyer for All Time”, in A Burrows et al. (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in 
Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry 383 at 387-389. Whatever the merits of these arguments, it 
seems that a rule clearly conferring ownership would still be preferable. 
922
 See comments by Smith in Short Commentary 162. 
923
 For fuller discussion see Reid, Property paras 664-667. 
924
 [1994] RTR 273. 
925
 Bulbruin Ltd ibid. at 277. 
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whether this is the case. Moreover, it is submitted that in both England and Scotland 
the default rule of the common law is indeed nemo dat. 
 
(d) Section 23 
(i) “Voidable title” 
Section 23 gives a “good title” to a buyer in “good faith and without notice” where 
the seller has a “voidable title” which has not yet been avoided at the time of sale. 
Although it is considered here along with exceptions to the nemo plus principle, 
section 23 itself does not provide such an exception but merely confirms the common 
law position that certain contractual defects create only personal rights to avoid the 




The meaning of the term “title” in the Act, and in juridical discourse in 
general, is somewhat obscure. Section 23 is usually assumed to apply when the 
underlying contract of sale is voidable.
927
 This indicates that “title” is being used in 
the sense of a “title to a right”;
928
 understood as the chain of juridical acts on which a 
claim to hold a right is based, a “voidable title” refers to the presence of a voidable 
juridical act in this chain. Although under an abstract system a separate juridical act 
such as delivery is necessary to transfer the right to the property (and must thus be 
avoided separately e.g. by redelivery), under the arguably causal scheme of the Act, a 
voidable contract is probably enough to render the title to ownership voidable.
929
 
However, reduction of the contract will not necessarily act to reconvey the property 
to the seller; as the terms of the Act would not apply to such a transaction, where 




                                                          
926
 See ch 3 C(2)(b)(iv); Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables para 10.18; Reid, Property para 601 fn 
4. Compare, however, Bell’s comment in Principles para 529 that “[i]f one in lawful possession of a 
thing sell it to another without notice, the sale is good.” Some leading English authors accept section 
23’s status as an exception to the nemo plus rule: e.g. Goode, Commercial Law 459-460. 
927
 See for example Bridge (ed), Benjamin's Sale of Goods para 7-022. 
928
 Of course, a contract of sale may also be in itself a title to possess, but it is primarily a means of 
transfer of rights. 
929
 Compare for example Morrison v Robertson 1908 SC 332 and Macleod v Kerr 1965 SC 253. 
930
 See Reid, Property para 692; Smith, “Error”. Reid is cited by Carey Miller (Corporeal Moveables 
para 10.17). An alternative view would be that failure of the contract renders the conveyance void, 




(ii) Avoiding the contract 
In transactions to which the terms of the Act apply, transfer of ownership requires a 
contract of sale.
931
 If the contract is void, it is therefore implied that there will be no 
transfer of ownership, at least under the Act, and the buyer’s title will be void rather 
than voidable.
932
 The distinction between defects which will render a contract merely 
voidable and those which will render it void are largely outwith the scope of this 
study.
933
 However, in cases of mistake as to identity (typically a dishonest rogue 
impersonating a creditworthy person to obtain possession of goods), there is some 
confusion as to whether the result is a void or a voidable contract.
934
 From the point 
of view of property law, it seems desirable that such mistakes should be treated in the 
same way as other cases of fraud
935
 as third parties will usually have no access to the 
terms on which the seller acquired.  
 
Given this problematic interface between contract and property, it seems 
particularly important that, when rendering a voidable contract void, there should be 
adequate notification to third parties. There are differing approaches in England and 
Scotland to what is necessary to annul a contract.
936
 In the context of property law, 
given the importance of the publicity principle, it is submitted that a court decree, or 
at least notification to the party concerned,
937
 should be required in order to produce 
third party effects.
938
 There is English authority to suggest, however, that notification 
to the police has been effective against third parties.
939
 
                                                          
931
 SOGA 1979 s 1(1). 
932
 Scots law probably recognises a transfer of ownership where the causa has failed at common law. 
See B above. Intention to transfer ownership would always be required. In relation to English Law, 
see above n 728. 
933
 See McBryde, Contract chs 13-17; Gloag, Contract chs 26-29; H A Holstein, “Vices of Consent 
in the Law of Contracts” (1938-1939) 13 Tulane Law Review 362. 
934
 See discussion of Shogun at B above. In Scotland, compare Macleod (n 929). 
935
 I.e. as giving rise to a voidable contract. 
936
 For example, English law recognises equitable rescission, see Bridge, Sale para 5.55. On the 
position in Scotland, see McBryde, Contract paras 13.21-13.22; Gloag, Contract 532. 
937
 Notification would not perhaps operate to prevent transfer of title to the third party but would 
render his or her title reducible on the same basis as the first acquirer. 
938
 See Macleod (n 929) at 257-259. Although reference is made to rescission of the contract, this is 
treated as sufficient to return ownership to the original seller. Arguably that would require reduction 
of the conveyance by redelivery. See Reid, Property para 610. See also the comments in Carey 
Miller, Corporeal Moveables para 10.18. 
939
 See in particular Car and Universal Finance Co Ltd v Caldwell [1965] QB 525. W A Wilson, 




Moreover, in English law it has been held that where an original owner seeks 
to recover goods in the possession of somebody who is not a party to the voidable 
transaction the onus is on the possessor to show that he or she has a good title 
derived from a sale before the title was avoided.
940
 However, arguably in Scots law 
the application of the presumption of ownership from possession would amount in 
such a case to a presumption that the sale to the possessor had happened before the 
title was avoided, and the onus would be on the original owner to show that this was 
not the case. As mentioned above, even if the contract is successfully avoided it is 
not clear that this is enough in Scots law to reconvey the property to the former 
owner. Professor Diamond’s Review of Security Interests in Property recommended 
that, in order to protect third parties, repossession by the seller should be necessary to 
avoid the transfer.
941
 This would be consistent with the doctrinal logic of the Scots 
separation between possession and ownership. 
 
“Good title” under section 23 presumably means a title free from the defects 
which made the title voidable. Could the provision transfer title to stolen property? A 
title derived from a thief is not a “voidable” title but a void one. Although on a 
narrow reading of title to mean immediate “title of acquisition” or causa, a person 
acquiring stolen property on the basis of a contract induced by fraud would possess a 
voidable title, when title is considered on a historical basis the nemo plus principle 




(e) “Seller in Possession”: Section 24 
(i) Persons “having sold goods” 
Section 24 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 sets out that where a person “having sold 
goods”
943
 either “continues or is in possession of the goods”, the “delivery or transfer 
                                                                                                                                                                    
with “justice and reality”; Ulph, “Conflicts” para 5-052 argues that the current law encourages 
“diligent and swift” action by sellers. 
940
 See Thomas v Heelas 1986 WL 407651 at 4. Compare Whitehorn Brothers (n 881), distinguished 
in Thomas on the basis that that case was concerned with the onus of proof as between the parties to 
the voidable transaction. 
941
 A L Diamond, A Review of Security Interests in Property (1989) para 13.6.6. 
942
 See Gullifer, “Conflicts” para 13-037. 
 
943
 See Bridge, Sale para 5.123. 
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by that person, or by a mercantile agent acting for him” of the goods “under any sale, 
pledge, or other disposition thereof”
944
 to any person “in good faith and without 
notice of the previous sale” will have effect “as if the person making the delivery or 
transfer were expressly authorised by the owner of the goods to make the same.” 
 
It is assumed that the effect of the phrase “as if he were expressly authorised 
by the owner of the goods” is to render an otherwise ineffective transfer valid and 
effective.
945
 It might be thought that, given the section’s origins in the Factors Acts, 
the intention was to place the seller in the position of an authorised mercantile agent. 
However, this cannot explain the difference in terms between sections 24 and 25 
(discussed below).
946
 It has been argued on the basis of detailed scrutiny of the 
section’s legislative history that it is only where documents of title (rather than solely 
goods) remain with the seller that he or she can transfer ownership.
947
 This is clearly 
inconsistent with the way that section 24 has been interpreted by the courts.
948
An 
alternative explanation is that is the seller was (or has been assumed to have been) at 
one point the actual owner, justifying reliance by a purchaser even if the transaction 
is not in the ordinary course of business. The situation is otherwise under section 25, 
where a purchaser is transacting with someone who is not (and has never been) 
owner. 
 
One obvious question raised is whether the person “having sold goods” must 
have owned them at the time of the first sale. It seems that, on the basis of the 
general policy and scheme of both the Sale of Goods and the Factors Acts, this is 
indeed the correct interpretation.
949
 Although not logically necessary under the 
wording of the section, such a view would accord with the Acts’ general adherence 
                                                          
944
 On the meaning of “other disposition” see Bridge, Sale para 5.128; Atiyah, Sale 386; Goode, 
Commercial Law 467-468; Worcester Works Finance Ltd v Cooden Engineering Ltd [1972] 1 QB 
210. Section 8 of the Factors Act extends to a delivery or transfer “under any agreement for sale, 
pledge, or other disposition thereof”.  
945
 See Bridge, Sale paras 5.149-5.150. 
946
 This was the view taken in Newtons (n 758) at 578B. In that case it was held that there was no 
requirement in s 24 that the seller act as a mercantile agent (i.e. in the ordinary course of business). 
947
 See L A Rutherford and I Todd, “Section 25(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893: The Reluctance to 
Create a Mercantile Agency” (1979) 38 (2) Cambridge Law Journal 346. 
948
 For criticism, see Bridge, Sale 5.149-5.150. 
949
 See National Employers’ Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Jones [1990] 1 AC 24, per 
Lord Goff at 62. These comments were, however, obiter. 
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to the nemo plus rule. As T B Smith has commented, the policy of the Act to transfer 
the (possibly defective) title of the original seller, rather than confer a clean statutory 
title may be less satisfactory in some situations.
950
 However, the Act arguably does 
not contemplate a general protection for the good faith purchaser. As the Scottish 
Law Commission have commented, the provision in sections 21-25 is “somewhat 




The provision should be understood in the context of sections 17 and 18 of 
the Act regulating transfer of ownership, which establish that (contrary to the Scots 
common law)
952
 ownership will pass when the parties intend, despite postponement 
of delivery or payment or both. A seller may thus retain physical control over goods 
that he or she no longer owns. To protect third parties, who might be misled by the 
appearance of ownership created by physical control, section 24 provides that 
acquirers from such persons take as if the owner had consented to transfer. It is 





(ii) Continuing in possession 
Further, the seller must either “continue […], or be in possession of” the goods. The 
meaning of this phrase is contested.  “Possession” here includes civil possession 
through a tenant.
954
 In the Australian case of Pacific Motor Auctions Pty Ltd v Motor 
Credits (Hire Finance) Ltd,
955
 the Privy Council held that “continues… in 
possession” in the equivalent New South Wales legislation refers to continuous 
physical possession, and is not interrupted by an alteration in the title on which the 
goods are held.
956
 Physical possession has been praised as a simple and equitable 
                                                          
950
 Smith, Short Commentary at 151. 
951
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 38. 
952
 See Carey Miller, “Problem Transplants”. 
953
 Brown, Notes 124. 
954
 Atiyah, Sale 385, but see also Ulph, “Conflicts” para 5-061 referring to Anglo-Irish Asset Finance 
v DSG Financial Services [1995] 2 CLY 4491. 
955
 [1965] AC 867. 
956
 The previous English authority, Staffs Motor Guarantee Ltd v British Wagon Co Ltd [1934] 2 KB 
305, was said to be wrongly decided, although this comment was obiter. See paras 888-889 of the 
judgment. Pacific Motor Auctions was followed in Worcester Works Finance (n 944), but again these 
comments were obiter. It was again assumed by the Court of Appeal in Mobil Oil Company Limited v 
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basis for allocating risk.
957
 However, Pacific Motor Auctions has attracted criticism 
on the basis that the possession in question should be attributable to the sale, rather 
than on an entirely unconnected ground.
958
  Where there is no continuity of physical 
control (for example if the seller has handed over the goods but then regained 
possession as repairer)
 959





The main justification for protecting good faith acquirers under section 24 
thus seems to be reliance on the seller’s physical control.
961
 Section 24’s first 
appearance was as section 3 of the Factors Act 1877, which was passed in reaction to 
Johnson v Credit Lyonnais.
962
 In that case, tobacco had been sold to the plaintiffs, 
but after the sale pledged to the defendants using dock warrants as evidence of title. 
It was held that the plaintiffs could recover the value of the tobacco from the 
defendants, and this apparently caused “great alarm” among merchants and led to the 
passing of the 1877 Act.
963
 The application of section 3 was extended by section 8 of 
the Factors Act 1889 to goods, rather than only documents of title. Originally, 
however, its purpose was to protect those trading with someone bearing “symbols of 
ownership”.
964
 To protect anyone trading with a former owner in physical possession 
is a very different thing; physical possession does not necessarily imply ownership. 
The restriction of the provision to sellers retaining physical control can seem 
arbitrary, as in other cases where an innocent third party buys from a non-owning 
                                                                                                                                                                    
John Alan St. Pier 1986 WL 1255623 that the approach in Pacific Motor Auctions and Worcester 
Works was correct. 
957
 Atiyah, Sale 384-385. 
958
 See L Merrett, “The Importance of Delivery and Possession in the Passing of Title” (2008) 67(2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 376 at 388-389.  
 
959
 Bridge argues that where possession is regained as seller s 24 should continue to apply: Sale 
5.134-5.135. 
960
 See Mitchell v Jones [1905] 24 NZLR 932, 935, applied in Halfway Garage (Nottingham) v 
Lepley, and Olds Discount Company, Limited v Krett and Another [1940] 2 KB 117. In Fadallah v 
Pollak [2013] EWHC 3159 (QB) the seller did not possess prior to the sale but only after as bailee of 
the first buyer, this was not sufficient. Bridge, Sale para 5.34 suggests that, where the buyer should 
have appreciated the risk of the seller regaining possession, it is justified to continue to apply s 24. 
961
 See for example Mobil Oil (n 956) at 5; Bridge, Sale para 5.127. It is difficult to reconcile this 
with the requirement in Fadallah (n 960) that possession be as seller. 
962
 (1877) LR 3 CPD 32. See para 58. 
963
 See A Beilby Pearson, The New Factors Act Annotated (1890) 58. 
964
 J W Smith, The Law of Contracts, 7
th
 edn (1878) 453. 
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possessor, for example a fraudulent lessee who has never owned the property, no 
good faith protection will be available 
 
Different considerations may be applicable when the party who may lose 
ownership is a creditor who has what is essentially a monetary, rather than 
proprietary interest in the thing concerned. One situation in which the application of 
section 24 seems to be justified is in the case of a “sham sale”. This is essentially a 
device for a creditor to gain a non-possessory security through “ownership” of the 
debtor’s moveables. Although such a transaction is excluded from the scope of sale 
under s 62(4) of the Sale of Goods Act,
965
 in cases such as Michael Gerson Leasing v 
Wilkinson
966
 sale and leaseback arrangements have not been exposed to particularly 
critical scrutiny.
967
 It seems unfair that a good faith third party should be prejudiced 
by such an arrangement. 
 
(iii) “Delivery or transfer” 
Finally, what is the meaning of the requirement that there is a “delivery or transfer” 
by the seller in possession? Section 61(1) states that “delivery” means voluntary 
transfer of possession from one person to another. The question that arose in Michael 
Gerson
968
 was could such a transfer be a constructive, rather than an actual one? 
 
Michael Gerson concerned an action for conversion. A company, E Ltd, had 
entered into a sale and leaseback agreement with the plaintiff finance company, G 
Ltd, in respect of certain heavy plant and machinery. E retained physical control over 
                                                          
 
965
 Bridge, Sale para 5.125 criticises this, suggesting that s 62(4) should be denied application to 
three-party title problems.  
966
 [2001] QB 514. 
967
 On the validity of sale and leaseback used as a means of security in Scotland, see G L Gretton, 
“The Concept of Security”, in D J Cusine (ed), A Scots Conveyancing Miscellany (1987) 126; Styles, 
“Sales” (giving a contrary view as to when a sale is “intended to operate by way of… security”); 
Scottish Law Commission, Moveable Transactions (Scot Law Com DP No 151, 2011) paras 6.37-
6.44. In Wood v Gillies (1904) 20 Sh Ct Rep 141 s 62(4) was held to exclude a sale and leaseback of 
furniture from the scope of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 but the authority of this decision is 
questionable. The reasoning in the decision is that of the Sheriff-Substitute; the views expressed do 
not appear to have been referred to in later cases and persuasive arguments have since been made to 
the contrary. R B Wood, “Sale and Leaseback” (1982) 27 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland (W) 
267 at 286 argues that if there is no provision for redemption (retransfer of the thing to the original 
owner), a sale and leaseback is not a sale intended to operate by way of security.  
968
 (n 966) followed in Fadallah (n 960). 
157 
 
the goods. Subsequently, despite having transferred ownership to G under this 
agreement, E entered into a second sale and leaseback transaction with the defendant 
finance company, State (St), in respect of some of the items. As payments had not 
been maintained under the agreement, St sold these goods to S Ltd, who sold them to 
W, the first defendant. The case is complicated by the fact that, between the sale and 
leaseback agreement with St and the subsequent transfers by St to S Ltd, G had 
contracted to sell all the goods to S Ltd, who sold them to W around the same time as 
the goods it had obtained from St. G sued St for conversion in respect of the items 
sold to it by E, and W in respect of all the goods. 
 
G’s action against W was successful in part, but the main import of the 
decision was the finding that the second sale and leaseback transaction with St 
engaged the protection of section 24 of the Sale of Goods Act, meaning that although 
St never had physical control over the goods, “delivery or transfer” had taken place. 
St could thus pass ownership to S Ltd and W. 
 
Interestingly, full argument was not made on whether “delivery” in section 24 
could include constructive delivery. Clarke LJ opined that, on the basis of the High 
Court of Australia’s decision Gamer’s Motor Centre (Newcastle) Pty v Natwest 
Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd,
969
 which he had followed in Forsythe International 
(UK) Ltd v Silver Shipping Co Ltd,
970
 this was the correct analysis.
971
  As he himself 
acknowledged though, his comments on this are obiter dicta. 
 
On the assumption that “delivery” could include constructive delivery, the 
case turned on whether, on the facts, such constructive delivery had occurred.
972
 
                                                          
969
 (1985) 3 NSWLR 475. This case concerned constructive delivery by a “buyer in possession” 
under the equivalent legislation (s 28(2) of the NSW Sale of Goods Act 1923). Mason CJ thought that 
to allow delivery to be constructive would enhance the protection given to innocent purchasers (para 
27.  See also para 19 of Dawson J's judgment.) 
970
 [1994] 1 WLR 1334. Clarke J referred to Gamer’s case and s 1(2) of the Factors Act 1889, which 
states that a person may possess goods where they are “held by any other person subject to his control 
or for him or on his behalf.” Having accepted that possession could be constructive, he focussed on 
the meaning of “voluntary transfer” under s 61(1) SOGA. See paras 1345-1347 of the judgment. 
971
 Para 10. Compare Nicholson v Harper [1895] 2 Ch 415 and Bank of New South Wales v Palmer 
[1970] 2 NSWLR 532 (Overruled by Gamer’s Motor Centre) and NZ Securities & Finance Ltd. v 
Wrightcars Ltd. [1976] 1 NZLR 77. 
972
 Para 11. 
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Clarke LJ’s arguments were strongly influenced by the fact that, under the leaseback 
agreement, St was obliged to deliver the items to E Ltd. On his view, such delivery 
would only be possible if there had been a prior delivery (albeit constructive) to St.
973
 
The terms of the lease were only consistent with the ownership of St.
974
 There had 
been a change in the character of E Ltd’s possession; the sale and subsequent lease 





Clarke LJ argued that this approach made “commercial sense” and “make[s] 
sense in modern conditions.”
976
 Pill LJ declined to comment on this view, but agreed 
the question was whether a constructive delivery had occurred. He opined that the 
fact that the sale and leaseback were instantaneous should not exclude the possibility 
of delivery from E Ltd to St having taken place.
977
 He remarked, somewhat 
ironically, that such an approach would “produce further artificiality and fine 




One of the justifications usually cited for derogation from the nemo plus rule 
is commercial convenience. It is not clear, however, that Clarke LJ’s appeal to 
“commercial sense” provides a convincing reason for his decision. Although State 
was successful in defending its title against Gerson, the logical implication of the 
decision is that, had there been a third sale and leaseback transaction, this would 
have defeated its claim. Such an interpretation of section 24 may end up making 
purchasers under such agreements less, not more, secure.
979
  The finance industry 
may be more interested in the security of the original financier in the case (Gerson) 
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From the point of view of doctrinal coherence, academics have pointed out 
that the decision raises several apparent inconsistencies. Nikki McKay has 
commented that constructive delivery to the first buyer (G Ltd) does not seem to 
have the effect of preventing the seller from being a seller “continuing… in 
possession” under section 24.
981
 It seems logically undesirable that two different 
concepts of “delivery” and “possession” should be used in the same provision. It is 
therefore somewhat problematic that the relevance of constructive delivery to 
whether the seller has continued in possession was not considered.
982
 Finally, it was 
not thought necessary in the decision to identify a specific moment when “delivery” 





What import, then, does Michael Gerson have for Scots law? The objective 
of the Sale of Goods Act was harmonisation of the laws of Scotland and England,
984
 
so in respect of the meaning of section 24, English case law may well be persuasive. 
In the past, however, some scholars have suggested that, insofar as not entirely 
irreconcilable with the provisions of the statute, Scots judges should attempt to carve 
their own interpretation of the Act based on “indigenous” Scots tradition.
985
As full 
argument was not made on the question of whether “delivery” could be constructive, 
this could be seen as leaving the question open for future consideration. It can be 
assumed that, in such an instance, the reasoning in Gerson would nevertheless be 
influential. 
 
As regards the general principles of Scots property law, the requirement of 
publicity might be argued to favour an interpretation of “delivery” as transfer of 
physical possession. Hume, for example, comments that: 
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Without delivery, the buyer does not form any real connection to the thing, to 
make his claim attach on it. And possession is a substantial and ouvert 
circumstance, an outward evidence of right to guide and direct third parties 
conveniently, easily and safely in these transactions with the possessor. It is 




He reports a case of a sale and leaseback transaction in which delivery had been held 
to have occurred, but only because there had occurred “real and patent” possession 




On the other hand, the logic underlying the presumption of ownership from 
possession may favour protection of a third party acquirer, regardless of whether 
delivery has been made.
988
 Lars van Vliet has argued that, as long as the buyer has 
relied on the appearance of ownership created by the seller’s possession, it is 





To what extent does accepting that a transfer of possession under s 61(1) may 
take place without a change in physical control cause doctrinal problems for Scots 
law? In Gow’s view, Scots law should not allow third parties to be affected by “a 
secret change in the quality of the possession”, so a buyer from a lessee in a case of 
sale and leaseback should be protected.
990
   From a broader civilian perspective, 
however, Van Vliet notes that allowing the seller to change unilaterally what would 
otherwise be mere detention into possession sufficient to pass ownership may cause 
difficulties in other areas, such as prescription. He therefore argues that such an 
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There are strong arguments, however, for restricting third party protection to 
those who have acquired physical control of the thing.
992
 The original provisions of 
the Factors Act 1877 did not require delivery, but when the section was applied to 
goods this requirement was introduced. Gerson implies that, in a case involving 
multiple constructive deliveries, section 24 would protect the latest party to be 
constructively transferred possession. It is questionable whether the provision was 
ever intended to regulate such situations, it may be plausibly interpreted as designed 
to prioritise those who have fortified their claim to ownership with physical 
possession.
993
 Indeed, Chalmers in 1890 suggested that the effect of section 24’s 
forerunner in section 8 of the Factors Act 1889 was to harmonise the laws of England 
and Scotland by postponing passage of ownership until delivery.
994
 From this 
perspective, physical delivery is not merely incidental but crucial to the operation of 
the section. The most reliable indication of the seller’s ownership may not be his or 
her physical possession, but his or her ability to transfer this possession to a buyer. 
 
Usually in cases of competition between claims to a right, the earliest will 
prevail: prior tempore, potior jure. Strong justification is needed for departure from 
this rule. Given two innocent claimants, neither of whom are in possession and both 
of whom may have paid for the item, there does not seem any good reason for 
protecting the second acquirer at the expense of the first. It might be thought that the 
first buyer should be penalised for not taking physical possession, but given that the 
second buyer has not done this either, this is not a convincing explanation. 
 
On the facts of Gerson, section 24 is being used to solve what is essentially a 
problem of the law of security. The aim of the sale and leaseback transactions in 
question was to create what was, in effect, a non-possessory security.
995
  Reform of 
the law of security in this area may well be overdue, but it is doubtful whether rules 
protecting bona fide purchasers should be used to determine the outcome of a dispute 
between two parties whose respective interests in the thing are best characterised as 
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rights in security rather than ownership. The fact that neither party was concerned to 
take possession is one indicator of this fact.
996
 As one of the problems with non-
possessory securities is precisely the risk that third parties will be misled, it is 
somewhat ironic that the holder of such a security should use rules designed to 
protect third parties to enforce their own security at the expense of a prior creditor. 
 
It has been argued that the reasoning in Michael Gerson does not justify the 
application of section 24 in cases where the necessary “delivery” to the buyer has 
been constructive, rather than actual. The questions raised by the decision 
demonstrate that the terms “possession” and “delivery” in sections 24 and 25 require 
further judicial and academic attention. Given the complexities of defining either, it 
is unlikely that a coherent account will be immediately forthcoming; the most recent 
judicial consideration in Fadallah
997
 has not clarified matters. Careful thought should 
be given to who the provisions are trying to protect, and why. Reform of the law of 
securities might also help to prevent the issues in Gerson arising in future. 
 
(f) Buyer in possession: section 25 
(i) Persons having “bought or agreed to buy” 
Section 25 of the 1979 Act covers the opposite scenario: possession by a buyer who 
has not yet obtained ownership.
998
 It allows acquisition by a party “in good faith and 
without notice” where there is a “delivery or transfer…under any sale, pledge, or 
other disposition”
999
 from a “buyer in possession”: i.e. someone who “having bought 
or agreed to buy goods [who] obtains, with the consent of the seller, possession of 
the goods or the documents of title to the goods.”
1000
 The typical situation in which 
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 (n 960). 
998
 Under the Act, ownership may pass although the time of payment has been postponed: SOGA Act 
1979 s 17. 
999
 The parallel provision in section 9 of the Factors Act 1889 also protects an acquirer to whom there 
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this provision will be applicable is sale subject to a retention of ownership clause.
1001
 
Before full payment is made, and ownership transferred, the buyer resells the goods. 
On the insolvency of the first buyer, the original seller wishes to vindicate his or her 
property from the second buyer. 
 
To protect the second buyer from this risk, section 25 attempts to compensate 
for the first buyer’s lack of right. The effect of such a transfer by the first buyer is “as 
if the person making the delivery or transfer were a mercantile agent in possession of 
the goods or documents of title with the consent of the owner.” The precise scope 
and meaning of this phrase are somewhat obscure,
1002
 but according to a decision of 
the Inner House of the Court of Session, this means that the buyer has “the ostensible 
authority of a mercantile agent to pass property in the goods.”
1003
 A good faith 




One anomalous aspect of the way section 25 has been interpreted is that, 
where the “agreement to buy” is a hire purchase contract, it is only where there is an 
obligation to acquire ownership under the contract that section 25 will protect an 
innocent transferee.
1005
 In a (relatively) recent case, the overall aim of protecting 
third parties misled by the buyer’s possession did not impress the judge, who referred 
to the existence of registers of hire purchase agreements and the fact that purchasers 
might reasonably be aware of the potential risks.
1006
 Acquirers from a buyer under a 
consumer credit agreement within the meaning of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 are 
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also excluded from the protection of the section.
1007
 Such fragmentary provision 
again adds to the uncertainty faced by acquirers.  
 
Section 25 refers to the consent of the “owner”;
1008
 in a case where the 
original seller is not the true owner, it seems that the provision will not compensate 
for this lack of right. It will hence not serve to confer ownership of stolen 
property.
1009
 Although obtaining such a result requires a somewhat strained 
interpretation of the Act,
1010
 the situation which the provision clearly contemplates is 
the creation of a non-possessory security (through a retention of ownership clause) 
and protection of third parties from its effects, rather than a broader exception to the 
nemo plus principle. This is consistent with the Act’s general approach. 
 
(ii) “Delivery” and “Possession” 
When considering the meaning of the terms “delivery” and “possession” in section 
25, it is desirable that there should be some coherence with the interpretation of these 
terms in section 24. Constructive possession through a third party (or the original 
seller) on the buyer’s behalf will hence be sufficient,
1011
 so that delivery by the 
custodian directly to the acquirer will be sufficient for protection under the section. 
The fact that the seller’s consent to possession was obtained by fraud will not negate 
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 nor does it matter that the possession was on the basis of a loan rather 




A good example of a case where it is difficult to determine who is in 
possession is that of a builder using materials on a site owned and controlled by 
someone else.
1014
 An Outer House decision on those facts favoured an interpretation 
of possession as “actual custody”.
1015
 It seems that physical control of the goods is 




The question of constructive transfer of possession (i.e. constructive delivery) 
has already been mentioned in relation to section 24. In Archivent it was also held 
that the requirement for “delivery or transfer” under section 25 could be met by acts 
of appropriation such as measurement by a surveyor.
1017
 Although the builder had 
presumably continued to use the materials until its subsequent insolvency, these 
actions were apparently enough to transfer “real control”. The question of the 
relationship between delivery and possession is not fully explored in the judgment, 
but the reference to transfer of “real control” may indicate that possession was 
deemed to have been transferred. Whether or not this is the best interpretation of the 
situation, it is one which may create difficulties for third parties as there is very little 
external sign of this change in legal position. If the builders had subsequently 
purported to transfer the materials again, it would not be evident to third parties that 




 it was accepted that delivery could be 
constructive but that “some voluntary act” amounting to delivery was still necessary. 
Where the transfer took place because of the termination by ship owners of a 
charterparty, this was not a sufficiently voluntary action on the part of the 
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 The meaning of “disposition” is also controversial: in order to give the 
broadest possible protection to innocent acquirers it has been held to extend to 
repossession by a former owner,
1020
 but this risks creating incoherence with the 




(4) Other Statutory Exceptions 
 
(a) Hire purchase vehicles 
Motor vehicles present particular problems for the law; they are a prime example of 
valuable, highly mobile property which is frequently transferred and also often 
subject to quasi-securities.
1022
 Different rules apply to vehicles compared to other 
types of moveable property held on hire purchase or other conditional sale 
agreement.
1023
 This is because the “hardship” that afflicted bona fide buyers of hire 





As identified by Lord Wilberforce in Moorgate Mercantile Co v 
Twitchings,
1025
 the issues raised are inextricably linked to the law regulating 
securities over corporeal moveable property. Given the value of motor vehicles, and 
the ease with which they can be moved from one place to another, where they are 
used as security for debt the risk of sale to a party unaware of the security may easily 
arise. It has often been commented that some exterior indication of the hire purchase 
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agreement would be desirable.
1026
 One obvious solution would be a compulsory and 
comprehensive registration system of such securities.
1027
 Another option would be 
for the hire purchase company to retain the vehicle’s registration certificate and issue 
a certificate stating the terms on which it was held.
1028
 However, the cost of 
administering such a system was apparently felt by finance houses to be 




The current system has been described as “radical in the sense that it 
constitutes a drastic departure from the traditional common law position but… on the 
other hand, restrictive in terms of its scope.”
1030
 The relevant provisions are found in 
Part III (ss 27 to 29) of the Hire Purchase Act 1964.
1031
 They apply where a 





before ownership of the property has vested in him or her “disposes of”
1034
 the 
vehicle to another person.
1035
 The debtor’s ability to dispose of the vehicle is not 
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linked to his or her possession.
1036
 Even where the hire purchase company has sought 
to terminate the contract and require redelivery of the car, a good title can still be 
passed by the former hirer under s 29(4).
1037
 As regards what is sufficient for 
rescission, the comments made earlier
1038
 apply. To ensure the protection of 




The fact that termination will not affect the hire purchaser’s ability to transfer 
has led the authors of Benjamin’s Sale of Goods to question whether a debtor could 
transfer a vehicle of which the creditor has recovered possession.
1040
 Assuming such 
a transaction could be conducted in good faith,
1041
 it is submitted, in agreement with 
these comments, that to allow this would be contrary to the purpose of the statute. 
Although the basis for protecting a good faith party is not entirely clear (is it the fact 
that the hirer’s possession might mislead, or an idea that the hire purchase company 
is holding the debtor out to be owner?), the provision is clearly intended to prevent 
third parties from being misled. The interaction of the Hire Purchase Act with the 





Where the disposition is to a private purchaser in good faith without notice of 
the relevant agreement, it will have effect “as if the creditor’s title to the vehicle has 
been vested in the debtor immediately before that disposition.”
1043
 Assuming that the 
creditor is indeed the owner, the effect will thus be that a valid transfer of ownership 
can take place to the acquirer. There is no requirement that the disposition should 
include delivery to the purchaser and protection is not restricted to the first private 
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Chartered Trust Plc v Conlay [1998] CLY 2516.  Compare the situation where the contract is held to 




 Notification of the police was not thought to be enough in Cawston v Chartered Trust PLC 
[2000] CLY 2602. 
1040
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1041
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1042
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 it is theoretically open to the debtor to transfer the vehicle numerous 
times. The fact that a disposition by way of unconditional sale will divest the creditor 
of ownership means that if there is a second transfer by the debtor him or herself to a 
good faith private purchaser it will be of no effect. However, if the first “disposition” 
is a hire purchase agreement but, before transfer of ownership has taken place, the 
original debtor resells the vehicle to a third party, it would seem that this would 





Where the first disponee is not a private purchaser, but there is subsequently a 
disposition to a private purchaser in good faith and without notice, the disposition to 
the “first private purchaser” will have effect “as if the title of the creditor to the 
vehicle had been vested in the debtor immediately before he disposed of it to the 
original purchaser.”
1046
 It is only the first private purchaser (and those claiming 
through him or her) who are protected; if the first private purchaser is not in good 
faith subsequent private purchasers will not be protected, whether they are in good 
faith or not. Also, if the first private purchase is by means of a hire purchase 
agreement from a trade and finance purchaser and a further disposition to a good 
faith private purchaser by this second debtor takes place before transfer of ownership 




Section 27(4) deals with the situation when the first disposition to a good 
faith private purchaser is by way of hire purchase agreement (the purchaser thus not 
immediately acquiring ownership.) Provided that the initial disposition (conclusion 
of the hire purchase agreement) is in good faith, a subsequent transfer from the 
creditor under the agreement to the private purchaser will also have the effect set out 
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in s 27(3), even if the private purchaser is no longer in good faith and without notice 
of the agreement. 
 
Section 28(3) benefits only a good faith private purchaser who did not buy 
from the debtor.
1048
 It provides for a presumption that there was a good faith private 
purchase from the debtor, and that the good faith private purchaser in question claims 
under this original purchaser. The authors of Benjamin’s Sale of Goods suggest that, 
where s 28(3) does not apply, the burden of proving good faith may lie on the 
purchaser.
1049





Good faith is not defined in the Act. There is some authority to suggest that it 
should be interpreted in line with s 61(3) of the Sale of Goods Act as actual honesty, 
whether negligent or not.
1051
 It seems that extensive investigation into vehicles’ 
ownership history is not routine, even in the case of costly classic cars.
1052
 Sale 
below market value is not, of itself, enough to place a party in bad faith.
1053
 The 
expression “without notice” in section 27(2) means without “actual notice that the 
vehicle is or was the subject of any such [hire purchase or conditional sale] 
agreement”.
1054
 It has been held that, despite the reference to “any” agreement, only 
notice of the relevant agreement that will be taken into account. Moreover, notice 
that the vehicle was subject to an agreement which was said to have been discharged 




A car registration book (now form V5C) is not a document of title,
1056
 and 
indeed it is clearly stated on the document that it is not proof of ownership.
1057
 At 
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least in theory, therefore, an acquirer of a vehicle sold without the registration 
documents may still be in good faith.
1058
 Nor is there any duty on purchasers to 




Only private purchasers are protected by the provisions of the Act. It was felt 
that finance houses and car dealers “can and should be on their guard against buying 
cars which are on hire-purchase.”
1060
 It seems that the courts take a broad approach 
to the term “trade and finance purchaser”, with a focus on whether the vehicle was 
bought for the purpose of a profitable resale as opposed to use.
1061
 This is somewhat 
problematic; it cannot be assumed that any individual hoping to make a profit from 
resale possesses the specialist knowledge and resources of those who are routinely 
involved in the motor trade. The alternate possibility, that of a trade and finance 
purchaser buying in a private capacity, is likewise not satisfactorily resolved.
1062
 The 
restriction of the Act’s protection to private purchasers has also been judicially 
criticised.
1063
 Although both the hire purchase company and the commercial dealer 
are only interested in the exchange value of the car, the finance company may be 





                                                                                                                                                                    
1057
 In 2006, an unknown number of blank registration documents were stolen from a DVLA 
consignment, increasing the risk that a stolen car would have false registration documents. A new 
registration document in a different colour has now been issued, but the incident emphasises that theft 
or forgery of registration documents is always a potential risk. See A Lusher, “Motorists Unwittingly 
Buy Stolen Cars” The Telegraph, 1
st
 Aug 2008. 
1058
 Ulph, “Conflicts” 5-039 points out that such a purchaser might have difficult establishing good 
faith. In Stadium Finance Ltd v Robbins [1962] 2 QB 664 at 676, the fact that purchaser had not 
asked to see registration documents was not treated as inferring notice.  
1059
 Mercantile Credit Co Ltd v Townsley 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 37. 
1060
 Hansard: HL Debate, 6th July 1964, vol 259 col 820. 
1061
 In GE Capital Bank (n 1053), a purchase “as a business venture with a view to selling… at a 
profit” was sufficient to render a buyer a trade purchaser (per Moore-Bick LJ at para 40). See also 
Welcome Financial Services Limited v Nine Regions Limited (t/a Log Book Loans) [2010] EWHC 53 
(Mercantile). 
1062
 “Trade or finance purchaser” is defined in s 29(2) of the Act. In GE Capital Bank (n 1053) it was 
assumed (at 39) that a motor trader buying for his or her private use would be protected, but Goode 
(Commercial Law 475) criticises this, citing Stevenson v Beverly Bentinck Ltd [1976] 2 All ER 606. 
1063
 See comments by Lord Edmund-Davies in Moorgate Mercantile Co (n 905) at 922. See also the 
reference by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton to “honest traders” at 927. 
1064
 See Hansard: HL Debate, 6th July 1964, vol 259 col 820. See also Lord Denning’s comments in 
Stevenson v Beverley Bentinck Limited [1974] 1 WLR 483 at 486. 
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Under English law, a good faith trade and finance purchaser may be liable for 
the value of the car
1065
 as damages for conversion, even where he or she is no longer 
in possession.
1066
 In Scotland such a purchaser would only be liable to the extent that 




(b) Dispositions by Mercantile Agents 
Although the law relating to agency is largely outwith the scope of the thesis,
1068
 
there are certain circumstances in which a mercantile agent can transfer ownership of 
property without the authorisation or consent of the owner. Any exceptions relating 
to agency at common law are preserved by s 62 of the Sale of Goods Act. 
 
At common law, the doctrine of apparent authority operated to prevent the 
owner challenging an unauthorised transfer by an agent: 
 
Where an owner of property gives all the indicia of ownership to another 
person with the intention that he should deal with the property, the principles 
of agency apply, and any limit which he has imposed on his agent’s dealing 
cannot be enforced against an innocent purchaser or mortgagee or pledgee 




This doctrine seems to be a result of the owner being personally barred from denying 
the agent’s ability to transfer ownership.
1070
 There must have been a representation 
by the principal
1071
 that the agent had the authority to carry out the transaction in 
question, and reliance on the representation.
1072
 It may apply where there the agent 
                                                          
1065
 Or, if it is less, the amount outstanding under the hire purchase agreement. 
1066
 See Bridge (ed), Benjamin's Sale of Goods para 7-105. 
1067
 North West Securities Limited v Barrhead Coachworks Limited 1976 SC 68. 
1068
 On agency generally, see L Macgregor, The Law of Agency in Scotland (2013). 
1069
 Rankine, Personal Bar 226.  
1070
 See Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar 13-12. The question is, however, a controversial one, see L 
Macgregor, “Apparent Authority in Agency: Gregor Homes Ltd v Emlick” (2011) 15  Edinburgh Law 
Review 442 and comments in Macgregor, “Agency” paras 11-01-11-26, esp. at 11-05; 11-12. 
1071
 See M'fadyean (n 810), for a similar English case see Jerome v Bentley & Co [1952] 2 All ER 
114. 
1072




was formerly authorised, but ceases to be so.
1073
 It is important to distinguish holding 
out as an authorised agent from holding out as owner: in the former case any transfer 
must have been in the ordinary course of business for the type of agent in question, 




It was suggested in M’fadyean v Shearer Bros
1075
 that, at common law, an 
agent who had fraudulently gained the owner’s consent to possession could not pass 
a real right in the property. However, it seems that an exception was recognised in 
respect of the ostensible authority of some types of mercantile agent. In Pochin v 
Robinow and Marjoribanks
1076
 and Vickers v Hertz,
1077
 an agent who deceived the 
principal to fraudulently transfer the property in security was able to create a valid 
right in the transferee.
1078
 As the effect of personal bar would generally not be to 
create a real right,
1079
 these decisions are somewhat anomalous, and again illustrative 
of the difficulties in reconciling the principles of bar with those of property law. 
 
Fortunately, some of the questions regarding the common law are clarified by 
statute. Under the Factors Act 1889,
1080
 sale, pledge or other disposition
1081
 by a 
mercantile agent
1082
 acting in the ordinary course of business
1083
 who is in 
                                                          
1073
 For examples see M'fadyean (n 810) and Jerome (n 1071). 
1074
 See Lloyds and Scottish Finance v Williamson [1965] All ER 641; Atiyah, Sale 368-369. 
 
1075
 (n 810) 
1076
 (n 856).  
1077
 (n 848).  This reference is to the House of Lords decision, but it is noted at 114-115 that the 
unreported Court of Session decision was based on the authority of Pochin rather than the English 
Factors Acts. 
1078
 To some extent the decision in Pochin seems to rest on the function of delivery orders as 
analogous in mercantile practice to documents of title, but there are also references to a broader rule, 
see at 630 per Lord President; 637 per Lord Ardmillan; 639 per Lord Kinloch. For discussion, see 
Gloag and Irvine, Rights in Security 253-254. 
1079
 See the comments in Reid, Property at para 670. 
1080
 Applied to Scotland by the Factors (Scotland) Act 1890. 
1081
 On the meaning of “disposition”, see Worcester Works Finance (n 944); Bridge (ed), Benjamin's 
Sale of Goods para 7-041. 
1082
 For the definition of mercantile agent, see s 1(1) of the Factors Act 1889. A mere custodier is not 
an agent for this purpose: Martinez y Gomez v Allison (1890) 17 R 332. There is some English 
authority to suggest that person does not require to be a professional agent, but merely someone who 
sells goods on behalf of another: Weiner v Harris [1910] KB 285; Lowther v Harris [1927] 1 KB 
393. See generally Bridge (ed), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods para 7-032; Atiyah, Sale 376. 
1083
 This means “within business hours, at a proper place of business, and in other respects in the 
ordinary way in which a mercantile agent would act, so that there is nothing to lead the [disponee] to 
suppose that anything wrong is being done, or to give him notice that the disposition is one which the 





 of goods or documents of title
1085
 with the consent
1086
 of the owner
1087
 
to a third party in good faith and without notice
1088
 will have the same effect as if the 
agent had been expressly authorised by the owner. 
 
For current purposes, the most important aspect of the provision is that its 
protection is based on the owner’s consent to the agent’s possession. Although there 
is no Scottish authority directly on the point,
1089
 in Folkes v King
1090
 it was held that 
the categories of (English) criminal law were not relevant in deciding whether 
consent had been given in a commercial transaction.
1091
 Given that the intention of 
the Factors Acts is to protect unsuspecting third parties,
1092
 it seems that, where the 
Act applies, it should not matter that the consent to possession was vitiated by 
fraud.
1093
 On the other hand, a mistake as to identity may negative consent;
1094
 this 
                                                                                                                                                                    
230-231. In Pearson (n 757), it was thought that the sale of a car without the registration book would 
not be in the ordinary course of business. This view has been criticised- see Astley Industrial Trust 
Ltd v Miller [1968] 2 All ER 36 at 42; Bridge (ed), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods para 7-044. For other 
examples where it was accepted that the sale was not in the ordinary course of business, see Heap (n 
874) [generally suspicious transaction], Stadium Finance (n 1052) [sale of car without keys or 
registration documents].  
1084
 For the definition of possession, see s 1(2) of the Factors Act 1889.  There must be possession at 
the actual time of the sale: Beverley Acceptances (n 1056). 
1085
 Defined in s 1(4) of the 1889 Act. A motor vehicle’s log book is not a document of title: Beverley 
Acceptances (n 1056). See Bridge (ed), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods para 7-036. 
1086
 Consent is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary; see s 2(4) of the Factors Act 
1889. Where consent was initially given to agent’s possession, but this consent was subsequently 
withdrawn, purchasers will nevertheless be protected; see s 2(3) of the Act. There is English authority 
to the effect that a pledgee can be “owner” for the purposes of the statute: Beverley Acceptances (n 
1056) at 431. 
1087
 The different understandings of ownership in Scots and English law may lead to some confusion. 
It has been held in several English cases that a pledgee will in some circumstances be considered the 
“owner” for the purposes of the statute: Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bank of America National Trust and 
Savings Association [1938] 2 KB 147; Beverley Acceptances (n 1056) at 424 per Lord Denning. 
Given the more strictly defined concept of ownership in Scots law, it is doubtful that this view would 
be adopted by a Scots judge. 
1088
 On notice see Goode, Commercial Law 464. 
1089
 See however, the comments of Lord Gifford in Brown (n 848) and Gow, Mercantile Law 109. 
1090
 [1923] 1 KB 282. 
1091
 See in particular the judgment of Scrutton LJ at 306. Folkes was mentioned with approval in 
Pearson (n 757). 
1092
 Beverley Acceptances (n 1056) at 425-426 per Lord Denning. 
1093
 There is no direct Scots authority but see comments in Vickers (n 848) at 118 and Reid, Property 
para 671 (Gamble). In a case under section 25(1) of the Sale of Goods Act, fraud was held not to 
negative consent: Blythswood Motors Ltd (n 1012). For English authority see Folkes per Bankes LJ at 
297-298; Pearson (n 757); Du Jardin v Beadman [1952] 2 QB 712; Bridge (ed), Benjamin's Sale of 
Goods para 7-037. 
1094
 Du Jardin ibid. at 718. 
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would be consistent with the limitation of good faith purchase protection under the 




It seems clear from the wording of section 2(1) that where the party 
consenting to possession is not the true owner, its protection will not apply.
1096
 There 
is a delicate balance to be struck between the security of the original owner and that 
of third parties, who will usually find it difficult to ascertain under what 
circumstances an agent has been entrusted with goods. Similar issues are raised when 
considering the title on which the agent gained possession. In Staffs Motor 
Guarantee Ltd v British Wagon Company Ltd,
1097
 it was suggested that there must 
have been consent to possession as mercantile agent (rather than e.g. as friend or 
repairer.) As Goode suggests,
1098
 this is consistent with the position that possession it 
itself is not enough to establish an apparent authority. On this basis, persons 
possessing under a hire purchase agreement
1099
 or an agreement for sale or return
1100
 
do not possess as mercantile agents. 
 
However, this again reduces the extent to which third parties are protected 
and has been argued to run contrary to the needs of commerce.
1101
 It seems 
reasonable to require owners to take extra care when entrusting property to a person 
who acts in some contexts as a mercantile agent, even if the entrustment is for an 
unconnected purpse. 
 
Unlike under sections 8 and 9 of the Factors Act (replicated in sections 24 
and 25 SOGA) there is no requirement that the disposition involve a transfer of 
possession to the third party.
1102
 As an authorised agent can validly transfer 
ownership, the effect of the Act will be the acquisition of ownership of the goods by 
the good faith third party. However, the original owner’s rights against the agent for 
                                                          
1095
 (n 724). 
1096
 See comments in National Employers (n 949) at 60G.  
1097
 [1934] 2 KB 305 at 313, approved in Astley (n 1083); Atiyah, Sale 378. 
1098
 Goode, Commercial Law 455. 
1099
 See Astley (n 1083) at 41-42. 
1100
 Weiner v Harris [1910] 1 KB 285. 
1101
 See A Cohen, “On the Amendment of the Law Relating to Factors” (1889) 5 LQR 132 at 133. 
 
1102
 See Bridge, Sale para 5.103. 
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breach of authority will be unaffected.
1103
 It seems that the onus of proving good 




E. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
 
(1) Scottish Law Commission Consideration 
 
(a) “Protection of the Onerous Bona Fide Acquirer” (1976) 
One of the few modern instances in which a significant departure from the 
nemo plus principle has been considered is the Scottish Law Commission’s 
Consultative Memorandum Protection of the Onerous Bona Fide Acquirer. While 
accepting that “there is no manifestly right solution”,
1105
 the Commission advocated 
a distinction based on the way in which the owner lost his or her property, rather than 
the way in which the third party acquired. It was suggested that the notion of vitium 
reale should be restricted to cases of involuntary dispossession, whether by forcible 
or clandestine means.
1106
 Stolen property would thus continue to be excluded from 





Reference was made to numerous other legal systems including England, 
France, Germany, Switzerland and Quebec, as well as the Unidroit Draft Uniform 
Law.
1108
 However, in contrast to, for example, the English system, no importance 
was attached to sale at public market, or on trade premises.
1109
 It was argued that the 
actions of the owner, rather than the actions of a subsequent good faith buyer or the 
locus of his or her purchase, should determine whether ownership would be 
                                                          
1103
 Factors Act 1889 s 12(1). 
1104
 See D(3)(b)(iii); Heap (n 874). The decision was cited approvingly by the English Law 
Commission (Transfer of Title para 25). 
1105
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 5. 
1106
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 56. This would roughly replicate the French and German 
positions under Art 2276 Code Civil and § 932 BGB respectively.The role of a voluntary transfer of 
physical control in justifying acquisition by a bona fide third party is discussed more fully at para. 
1107
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 56.. 
1108
 See the comparative appendix. 
1109
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 59. The merits of varying a buyers protection according to 





 Moreover, the possibility of an insurance claim (or 
presumably any other form of monetary compensation) could not sufficiently 





Although not expressly tied to present possession on the part of the seller,
1112
 
the proposed solution is thus constructed on the premise that by the voluntary 
“handing over” of a moveable to a depositee or custodian
1113
 the owner “facilitate[s] 
dishonest dealing”.
1114
 The underlying assumption that an owner who hires to a 
fraudulent depositee has somehow enabled the fraud in a way that a careless owner 
who has negligently allowed his or her property to become lost or stolen has not 
seems questionable. The adequacy of voluntary transfer of possession as a 





The Memorandum reflects a desire to learn from, and perhaps ultimately 
harmonise with,
1116
 other legal systems, but also a quest to find a solution that would 
fit well with the common law of Scotland.
1117
 At the time the Memorandum was 
written, the doctrine of market overt still existed in English law and it was suggested 
that Scots law could adopt its own comprehensive rule protecting bona fide 
purchasers.
1118
 The main justifications identified for reform are the obscurity of the 
existing provisions,
1119
 their fragmentary nature
1120
 and the disjunction between the 
                                                          
1110
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 59. 
1111
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 64. 
1112
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 45. 
1113
 The position of the custodian would require further elaboration: Corporeal Moveables: 
Protection para 57. 
1114
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 57. 
 
1115
 See B(1). 
1116
 The main architect of the Memorandum, Professor Sir T B Smith, was also involved in drafting 
the Unidroit Uniform Law on the Acquisition in Good Faith of Corporeal Moveables. See Smith, 
Property Problems 190-196. 
1117
 See for example at para 34. These aims are not necessarily incompatible, see for example Smith, 
Studies at 71 suggesting that Scots academics should look to broader trends in Civilian thought (and 
in particular to other “mixed” legal systems) in order to produce a restatement of the laws of 
Scotland. 
1118
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 38. 
1119
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 34. 
1120
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 38. 
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statutory rules and Scots common law.
1121
 On the basis of the discussion in this 
chapter, it is submitted that the relevant provisions are indeed obscure and 
fragmentary but, minor inconsistencies aside, no serious conflict with the Scots 
common law and its general adherence to the nemo plus principle has been observed.  
 
(b) A Role for acquisitive prescription? 
One alternative to a rule allowing immediate acquisition by a party in good faith is 
to provide protection in certain cases through a short period of positive prescription. 
This was, for example, the approach in Roman law.
1122
 The current law regarding 
acquisitive prescription of moveables is unclear, but if it does exist, it seems that 40 
years possession would be required.
1123
 Prescription will therefore be of little benefit 
to most immediate acquirers. The Scottish Law Commission has recently produced a 
Report on Prescription and Title to Moveable Property.
1124
 However, the Report did 
not review the law relating to bona fide acquisition in general.
1125
 The prescriptive 
period suggested is 20 years.
1126
 As things stand, particularly in the case of high 
value goods which depreciate quickly in value (electronic equipment and most 
motor vehicles for example), acquisitive prescription is unlikely to be of significant 
assistance to a denuded purchaser. 
 
(2) English Reform Efforts 
 
(a) Consultative exercises 
In the context of the Memorandum, mention should also be made of the earlier 
English Law Reform Committee Report,
1127
 which recommended protection for good 
faith purchasers of goods possession of which the owner had parted with under a 
void contract.
1128
 It also suggested extension of the market overt doctrine to all sales 
at auction or trade premises, with the burden of proof placed on the person alleging 
                                                          
1121
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 34. 
1122
 See ch 2 A(3)(b)(ii). 
1123
 Prescription and Title to Moveable Property (Scot Law Com DP No 144, 2010) paras 2.20-2.23. 
1124
 (Scot Law Com Report No 228, 2012) 
1125
 See paras 2.6-2.7. 
1126
 See section 1(1) of the Draft Bill, in the Report on Prescription at 45. 
1127
 Transfer of Title.  
1128
 Transfer of Title para 15. 
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good faith, or alternatively its abolition.
1129
 Expansion of market overt was justified 
with reference to the desirability of protecting commercial transactions, and avoiding 
the need for protracted litigation between the parties in a chain transaction.
1130
 In this 
respect, the Law Reform Committee Report seems to have placed more emphasis on 
the perceived needs of trade and commerce than that of the Scottish Law 
Commission, which was concerned with the development of a coherent doctrinal 
approach. In a Reservation appended to the Report, Lord Donovan questioned the 
bona fides of the apparently bona fide purchaser, and argued that stolen property was 
already too easily disposed of. His remarks were quoted approvingly by the Scottish 
Law Commission in the Memorandum.
1131
 It is seemingly the inclusion of stolen 
property within the scope of bona fide purchase that led to “insuperable difficulties” 




A review of the law relating to rights in security by Professor Aubrey 
Diamond recommended protection for all purchasers in the ordinary course of 
business from a seller in possession with the consent of the owner, apart from those 




The Department of Trade and Industry released a Consultation Paper seeking 
views on an extension of protection for purchasers in the ordinary course of business 
of entrusted property, including all property held on the basis of a hire purchase 
contract or conditional sale.
1134
 Protection for purchasers of consumer goods was 
also considered.
1135
 However, perhaps in part due to the impact on motor vehicle 
financing schemes,
1136
 no further action was taken on this proposal. 
 
                                                          
1129
 Transfer of Title paras 31-33. 
1130
 Transfer of Title para 32. 
1131
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 64. 
1132
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection para 24. 
1133
 Diamond, Review para 13.6.3. 
1134
 “Transfer of Title: Sections 21 to 26 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979” (1994). For criticism of the 
way the consultation was conducted, see B Davenport, “Consultation - how not to do it” (1994) 110 
LQR 165. 
1135
 “Transfer of Title” para 5.3. 
1136
 See Davies, “Ostensible Ownership” 212. 
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More recently, seemingly in response to the decision in Shogun, the Law 
Commission
1137
 stated an intention to begin a project looking at transfer of title by 
non-owners. However, this was subsequently dropped as “[f]ollowing the Companies 
Act 2006, there appears to be little enthusiasm within Government or industry for 




(b) Abolition of market overt 
Although the market overt rule was never applied in Scotland, it is described by 
Brown as having exercised a “reflex influence” upon development of the law.
1139
  
Given that the objective of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 was to harmonise the law of 
sale in England and Scotland, the fact that the market overt rule was not introduced 
in Scotland may appear somewhat strange. The doctrine, however, had been subject 
to attack by the mercantile communities.
1140
 Following its criticism by the Mercantile 
Law Reform Commission in 1855,
1141
 it seems that an attempt was made to abolish 
the rule entirely.
1142
 It was felt that doing so would endanger the passage of the Sale 
of Goods Bill, and the rule hence survived,
1143
 but it was probably for this reason that 
no attempt was made to introduce it into the law of Scotland. 
 
The rule was subject to attack throughout the twentieth century
1144
 
and was finally abolished by the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1994 as a 
                                                          
1137
 Ninth Programme of Law Reform (2005) para 3.51-3.57. 
1138
 Tenth Programme of Law Reform (2008) para 4.4. This remained the case at the time of the 
Eleventh Programme of Law Reform (2011) (see paras 3.5-3.6) and, unless proposed again, it will not 
form part of the Twelfth Programme. 
1139
 R Brown, Notes and Commentaries on the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (1895) 113.   
1140
 It is recorded in Hansard that “a great meeting was held in the City of London upon the subject; 
and a most influential deputation waited …at the Board of Trade with reference to it”. However, “it is 
certain that gentlemen of very great influence in the City of London entertain sentiments directly at 
variance upon the point”. Hansard HC Debate, 10th Feb 1857, series 3 vol 144, col 455. 
1141
 See Royal Mercantile Law Reform Commission, Second Report 7-8. The Commission argued 
that he interests of commerce required that owners be protected when they entrusted possession of 
their property to others and that purchasers were able to bear the risk of defect in title. The 
Commission’s recommendations were included in Section 11 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Bill 
1856, which abolished the market overt rule but was never implemented. 
1142
 A Select Committee of the House of Commons attempted to substitute the following provision: 
“The buyer of goods in market overt shall not acquire any better or other title thereto than if the sale 
had taken place not in market overt”. See Brown, Notes 112. 
1143
 See Brown, Notes 112.  
1144
 See for example Hansard HC Debate, 24th March 1914, series 5 vol 60, col 214 W. The Law 





 after the doctrine prevented the recovery of certain paintings 
which had been stolen from Lincoln’s Inn.
1146
 Given the decline in the importance of 
local markets, it was not seen as being of any social benefit.
1147
 Although it was felt 
that reform of the Sale of Goods Act might be necessary,
1148
 no other protection for 
good faith purchasers was provided to replace market overt.  
 
With reference to the special protections afforded to good faith purchasers of 
motor vehicles, the fact that the nineteenth-century equivalent of the motor vehicle, 
the horse, was excluded from the full scope of the market overt provisions is 
surprising.
1149
 It is a reminder that ease of fraudulent transfer does not always imply 
increased protection for the bona fide acquirer, but may also be used to justify 
increased protection for the original owner. The desirability of market overt-type 







As Goode has put it, protection for the bona fide purchaser in both England and 
Scotland has been “developed piecemeal and interpreted restrictively.”
1151
 There has 
been some argument for a unified general principle protecting good faith purchasers, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
but was undecided whether it should be abolished or extended to cover all retail sales at trade 
premises. There continued to be a “marked diversity of opinion” surrounding the best solution. 
1145
 Hansard HL Debate, 12th Jan 1994, 5th series vol 551, col 210. 
1146
 The connection between the theft and the subsequent bill to abolish market over was (somewhat 
unconvincingly) denied by Lord Renton: “Although I am a member of Lincoln's Inn and used to 





 series vol 551, col 210). 
1147
 Hansard HL Debate, 12th Jan 1994, 5th series vol 551, cols 211-212. 
1148
 Hansard HL Debate, 12th Jan 1994, 5th series vol 551, col 212. 
1149
 Section 22(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893,  read in conjunction with 2 & 3 Philip and Mary c.7 
and 31 Elizabeth c.12, placed a number of extra restrictions upon the sellers of horses, including a 
requirement that all sales had to be witnessed and registered in the books of the market. The owner 
was also given six months to prevent ownership passing by informing a magistrate that the horse had 
been stolen. See further G H H Oliphant, The Law of Horses, 4
th
 edn (1882) 55-69. In other 
jurisdictions increased protection was given to acquirers of stolen horses, see for example Hinz’ 





 Goode, Commercial Law 459. 
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but it has generally been unsuccessful.
1152
 Even throughout the Sale of Goods Act, 
there is no uniformity of treatment in relation to such basic aspects as the relevant 
standard of good faith and the location of the burden of proof. 
 
There is an awkward tension between the exceptions contained in the Sale of 
Goods Act and the general law. In the case of transfer by a fraudulent depositary, the 
owner can recover his or her property, whether or not an innocent third party was 
misled by the depositary’s possession. However, this is not the case if one of the 
exceptions contained in the Act applies. Much of the modern litigation in the area has 
concerned motor vehicles held on hire purchase, but the strong good faith purchase 
protection in this area is something of an anomaly, caused by the absence of a 
registration system for securities. 
 
It is possible to overestimate the relevance of property law doctrine to the 
practical workings of markets. It seems unlikely that the general public conduct their 
transactions on the basis of a detailed knowledge of the Sale of Goods Act. It has 
been argued that it has often been the ideas of lawyers about what would be 
beneficial to commerce, rather than the views of the commercial community, which 
have shaped the direction of law reform projects. This does not mean, however, that 
economic activity is not founded upon clear and comprehensible rules of property 
law. 
 
Particularly in respect of transactions involving consumer credit devices such 
as hire purchase, or enforcement of debt, it is difficult to ignore the distributional 
effects (at the local level) of judicial decision making.
1153
 In the case of attachment 
by creditors of a third party’s property, the balance of equities may change 
depending on whether the true owner is a competing creditor,
 
 an unsuspecting 
family member,
 
 a bona fide third party or one in collusion with the debtor. 
 
                                                          
1152
 See for example the dissenting judgment of Lord Denning in Beverley Acceptances (n 1056) at 
426. 
1153
 For discussion of the distributive aspects of private law decision making in this area, see Ramsay, 
“Credit Law”, especially at 183-189. 
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There is also the question as to whether the strong protection afforded to the 
owner against third parties by the vindicatory action should be extended to those 
holding ownership for the purposes of security (for example a hire purchase 
company.)  One of the major criticisms of the then-current law by the Crowther 
Committee on Consumer Credit was the “unfair and irrational” set of rules governing 
conflicts between the secured party and third party rights.
1154
 Goode cites “the needs 
of those selling on credit to take security for the price” as a reason for denying 
protection to the bona fide purchaser.
1155
 In the case of motor vehicles, it has, 
however, been seen as appropriate to limit the owner’s remedy. The need for security 
could be met in other ways (such as a registration system).  
 
The final part of the thesis draws on this discussion of the current law to 



















                                                          
1154
 Consumer credit: Report of the Committee (Cmnd 4596: 1971) para 4.2.8. 
1155
 Goode, Commercial Law 451. 
CHAPTER 5: JUSTIFYING GOOD FAITH ACQUISITION 
 
A. THE NEED FOR NORMATIVE EVALUATION 
 
This chapter explores the different justifications which have been advanced for 
protection of bona fide purchasers, and the values which property law rules should 
seek to uphold. It proceeds on the basis that there is an inherent normativity in the 
relationship between original owner and possessor. By “normativity” it is meant that 
property law rules provide reasons for action.
1156
 If I know that a book is owned by 
Beth, I understand that I should obtain her consent before using it. Legal rules 
moreover provide what Joseph Raz terms “exclusionary reasons” i.e. reasons which 
prevent other potentially relevant reasons from being taken into account.
1157
 The fact 
that Beth’s book may be vital to my research is, at least from the point of view of a 
court called on to determine who may use the book, irrelevant. When assessing the 
adequacy of property rules, some attempt should therefore be made to investigate the 
normative considerations which may justify the adoption of one approach (protection 
of purchasers) over another (protection of the original owner). 
 
The first part of the thesis outlined the historical development of Scots 
property doctrine, with a focus on doctrinal concepts of ownership and possession. 
The good faith acquisition problem, however, may also be employed to challenge the 
classical doctrinal narrative as incapable of giving a satisfactory account of the 
normative choices inherent in legal reasoning. For example, it has been suggested by 
those working within the Law and Economics tradition that economic analysis, rather 
than doctrinal reasoning, is the best way to assess the various policy options.
1158
 The 
methodological debate over the appropriate way to justify a given solution reflects 
the tension that exists within legal scholarship between focus on the formal concepts 
                                                          
1156
 This definition is that used by Joseph Raz in Practical Reason and Norms (repr 1990).  
1157
 See Raz, Practical Reason 132-148. Raz’s work is useful here in exploring the way in which 
institutionalised normative systems such as legal systems pre-empt individual deliberations about 
how to act; from the point of view of a court, legal rules are exclusionary reasons. Of course, such 
judgements are only possible within any given legal system’s sphere of influence, and are dependent 
on respect for and the proper functioning of legal institutions. The question of what makes an 
institution a legal one will not be discussed here.  
1158
 For further discussion of the Law and Economics perspective, see C(3). 
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of an autonomous, logically closed property doctrine and attention to “external” 
considerations such as economic efficiency. While the present thesis has adopted 
what may be termed an “internal approach”
1159
 to property doctrine, other 
perspectives can contribute to understanding of the values at stake. 
 
It is not intended to provide a comprehensive theory regarding the 
justification of property, or more generally legal, doctrine. Discussion is therefore 
limited to the arguments used most frequently in the context of bona fide purchase. 
However, it is claimed that there are a number of internal values currently reflected 
in Scots property law regarding transfer of moveables which should be the 
foundation for any future reform, including coherence and certainty of rights. In 
addition, the distributive implications of property doctrine must be taken into 
account. As bona fide purchase rules are often justified by reference to furtherance of 
the ease and rapidity of transactions, a central concern is the market impact of legal 
policy. The relation between private law doctrine and “external” goals such as 
promotion of economic efficiency is controversial,
1160
 but it is necessary to expose 
the idea that bona fide purchase rules encourage commerce to proper scrutiny. To 
this end, the contribution of non-formalist perspectives such as the Realist and Law 
and Economics approaches is considered.  
 
B. DOCTRINAL VALUES 
 
(1) Epistemological Considerations 
 
                                                          
1159
 An internal account “deals with private law on the basis of the juristic understandings that shape 
it from within”: E Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, revised edn (2012) 13. On the various debates 
surrounding the distinction between an internal and external perspective, see B Tamanaha, “The 
Internal/External Distinction and the Notion of a “Practice” in Legal Theory and Sociolegal Studies” 
(1996) 30 Law and Society Review 163.  
1160
 For a particularly prominent attack on the role of “functionalism” in doctrinal scholarship, see 
Weinrib, Private Law. Compare R A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 8th edn (2011) ch1. Other 
scholars adopt a more nuanced approach, see H Dagan, “The Limited Autonomy of Private Law” 
(2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 809.  
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The means by which we acquire knowledge about property rights is in some respects 
as significant as the facts of their distribution.
1161
 A key value in property law 
doctrine is that of certainty; it is necessary for property rules to provide some 
measure of clarity regarding the nature and allocation of proprietary rights.
1162
 As a 
real right may be enforced against third parties, it is important that the public are able 
to comprehend its content and have a reliable means of ascertaining if and when it 
exists. This need for some kind of external signifier of right is sometimes known as 
the “publicity principle”.
1163
  Linked to it is the need for property rights to maintain a 
degree of stability; where the characteristics or distribution of rights are constantly 
changing it is difficult to achieve certainty.
1164
 In terms of the law relating to transfer 
of corporeal moveable property, it should be as clear as possible to both the owner 
him or herself and to all third parties where ownership lies at any given time. In the 
case of transfer by a non-owner, it should be foreseeable by the owner under what 
circumstances his or her right may be at risk. 
 
Although this description may appear more suited to Romanist systems, with 
their emphasis on the location of a unitary right of ownership, concerns of stability 
and clarity will apply, at least to some extent, to any system of private property 
rights. There is an inescapably public dimension to private law in the sense that the 
internal, private will can only be given effect to through external, public interactions. 
Regardless of whether there is an ethical basis for recognising individual property 
rights prior to the state and civil society,
1165
 it is only through collective organs such 
as courts that these rights are upheld and actualised. Property rules may, therefore, 
focus on what is publicly knowable (e.g. the state of possession) rather than facts 
                                                          
1161
 For an argument that well-defined (and hence enforceable) property rights are crucial to 
economic development, see H de Soto, The Mystery of Capital (2000) ch 2.  
1162
 For example, legal certainty is frequently cited in the context of prescriptive acquisition, see 
Lurger and Faber, Principles 956. 
1163
 See for example Scottish Law Commission, Moveable Transactions ch 11 for a discussion of the 
significance of the publicity principle in the law relating to security rights.  
 
1164
 Dalhuisen, Trade Law 370 refers to the need for finality. 
1165
 Kantian theory, for example, although maintaining that external private property rights can exist 
only in the civil condition, posits the origin of such rights as prior to civil society in the innate 
freedom of human beings and their right to bodily integrity. See I Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, trans 
M J Gregor (1996) paras 238; 250-256.  See also B Sharon Byrd and J Hruschka, “The Natural Law 
Duty to Recognize Private Property Ownership: Kant's Theory of Property in His Doctrine of Right” 
(2006) 56 University of Toronto Law Journal 217. 
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which may be difficult or impossible to investigate (the history of the ownership of a 
moveable.) Such epistemological concerns arguably underlie the Scots law 
presumption of ownership from possession. 
 
A further aspect of the maintenance of certainty and avoidance of 
arbitrariness is the aspiration to doctrinal coherence. When evaluating individual 
rules, “coherence” is intended here to refer to integration within a unified structure.
 
1166
 It involves the minimisation of conflict between rules and also some element of 
consistency at the level of systemic values and justifications.
1167
 The element of 
systematicity in doctrinal reasoning is necessary for the public knowability of law, 
without which it would lose part of its justificatory force.
1168
 A coherent system of 
property law also contributes to the certainty and predictability of dispute resolution 
as each particular case may be subsumed within a broader doctrinal logic.
1169
 In 
relation to transfer of ownership, in Scots law at least, nemo plus is one of the most 
important systemic principles, along with the requirement that the owner’s consent is 




The bona fide purchase problem illustrates the importance of these concerns, 
but also evidences the potential for conflict between the two values. Where 
ownership passes without written record, the public verification of a claim to 
ownership becomes difficult or impossible. Rules protecting bona fide purchasers, 
therefore, are often advocated as a means of increasing certainty and knowability by 
                                                          
1166
 One view of coherence in private law doctrine is that set out by Weinrib (Private Law 32 ff.) 
Weinrib argues that coherence requires a “single integrated justification”: Private Law 32. For a 
critique, see K Kress, “Coherence and Formalism” (1993) 16 Harvard Journal of Law and Public 
Policy 639. Although Weinrib’s discussion of the justificatory role of coherence is valuable, the term 
“coherence” is used here in a wider sense than in his work.  
1167
 The difficulties which may arise when the need for coherence is not met are illustrated by the 
concern over the decision in Sharp (n 753). See Discussion Paper on Sharp v Thomson (Scot Law 
Com DP No 114, 2001) paras 2.3-2.14. 
1168
 See E Weinrib, “Private Law and Public Right” (2011) 61 University of Toronto Law Journal 191 
at 197-198. 
1169
 This is not to suggest of course, that in practice any given system is entirely coherent, or that 




 See ch 4 C(1). 
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providing that acquisition under certain conditions confers a valid right.
1171
 In some 
systems, possession is adopted as an indication of ownership on which good faith 
transferees may rely.
1172
 This is at the expense of doctrinal logic which suggests that, 
at least where acquisition is by derivative transfer, a non-owner cannot transfer 
ownership. How should this tension be resolved? 
 
The extent to which bona fide purchase rules, particularly those permitting 
reliance on possession, actually address the difficulties in substantiating ownership of 
moveables is discussed further in Chapter 6, where it is argued that such rules do not 
actually decrease overall uncertainty.
1173
 As regards doctrinal coherence, it is hoped 
through clarification of the reasons for protecting purchasers to provide a foundation 
for a clear and consistent approach to bona fide purchase.  
 
(2) Corrective and Distributive Justice 
 
(a) The argument from corrective justice 
Apart from coherence and certainty, what other principles are relevant in justifying 
private law doctrine?  Weinrib argues that coherence in private law has no external 
referent.
1174
 This is due to his separation of his preferred justificatory rationale for 
private law (corrective justice) from distributive justice and the broader realm of 
politics.
1175
 According to Weinrib, corrective justice provides a single, integrated 
justification.
1176
 As private law is the actualisation of corrective justice, it justifies 
itself without need for reference to any further norm or principle. Weinrib’s account 
of the normative self-sufficiency of private law is based on his situation of corrective 
                                                          
1171
 For example, Kant, Metaphysics para 303 argues that courts should rely on what can be 
adjudicated most readily and surely (am leichtesten und sichersten abgeurtheilt werden kann), and 
therefore substitute formal (the acquisition was carried out in the proper manner) for material (the 
transferor was the actual owner) conditions of the transfer’s validity. 
1172
 Most obviously in French law, for which see Art 2276 Code Civil, but also in the importance 
attached to possession under ss 24 and 25 SOGA 1979. 
 
1173
 See B. 
1174
 Weinrib, Private Law 14. 
1175
 See generally Weinrib, Private Law ch 8. On the origins and historical usage of the terms 
“corrective” and “distributive” justice, see I Englard, Corrective and Distributive Justice: From 
Aristotle to Modern Times (2009). The adoption of the terms by modern private law scholars and the 
identification of corrective justice with private law are covered in ch 7. 
1176
 Weinrib, Private Law 37. 
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justice within Kant’s philosophy of right.
1177
 Rather than arising through an 
antecedent distribution, property rights are seen as arising out of the innate freedom 
of persons to use objects that belong to no one.
1178
 Rules protecting bona fide 
purchasers are a consequence of the need to publically enforce private rights, rather 
than a means of promoting some external goal such as commerce.
1179
 Such rules 
should therefore be limited in the extent to which they interfere with property rights, 
for example by affording the original owner an opportunity to repurchase the 




Leaving aside here a fuller exploration of the Kantian account,
1181
 the claim 
that property law can be understood without reference to the politics of distribution is 
not convincing. It is certainly possible to identify aspects of the bona fide purchase 
problem which appear to involve corrective justice. Following a transfer by a non-
owner, a decision must be made between the claims to ownership of the original 
owner and the good faith purchaser.
1182
 In a society in which entitlements are 
distributed in the form of private property rights, to deprive someone of his or her 
property rights without consent is generally recognised as a wrong.
1183
 This is 
reflected in the current default rules of Scots property law favouring the original 
owner, and indeed in the protections afforded by national constitutions
1184
 and 
international conventions such as the European Convention on Human Rights.
1185
 
Weinrib’s view draws on the Kantian idea of the will, and hence the belief that to sell 
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 Private Law ch 4. 
1178
 Kant, Metaphysics paras 246-247. 
1179
 Weinrib, “Public Right” 202.  
1180
 Weinrib, “Public Right” 202. 
1181
 See for example M J Gregor, “Kant’s Theory of Property” (1988) 41 The Review of Metaphysics 
757; H Williams, “Kant’s Concept of Property” (1977) 27  The Philosophical Quarterly 32; S Meld 
Shell, “Kant’s Theory of Property” (1978) 6 Political Theory 75; W F Buck, “Kant’s Justification of 
Private Property”, in B den Ouden (ed), New Essays on Kant (1987) 227. 
1182
 At least in a system such as Scots law with a unitary concept of ownership. In a system based on 
relativity of title such as English law, all that the court may be required to decide is which party has 
the best right to possess, see Bridge, Personal Property 28-29. 
1183
 The various justifications for and historical explanations for the existence of a system of private 
property rights are not explored within the thesis. For a prominent exploration of some of the 
justifications available, see J Waldron, The Right to Private Property (1988).  
1184
 See for example s 25 of the South African Constitution of 1996. 
1185
 On the human rights aspects, see ch 6 A(2)(b).  
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The classical Aristotelian account of corrective justice involves giving to 
each his or her own; where one party has unjustly gained at the expense of another, 
the judge must right this wrong by restoring the parties to their original position.
1187
 
Prima facie, this logic would seem to justify recovery by the original owner. A 
wrong has been committed, and the purchaser has gained possession of the thing 
whilst the original owner has lost. Usually the recovery of possession by an owner 
requires a particular kind of justification, the establishment of a connection between 
that person and that particular thing.  There must also be a correlation between the 
loss suffered by the owner and an unjust gain on the part of the possessor; obviously 
if the owner has consented to the possession, the possessor’s gain will not be unjust.  
The restoration of equality is the basis of Thomas Aquinas’ influential doctrine of 




(b) The relevance of distributive justice 
However, there is also a sense in which, if recovery is permitted, the original owner 
might be thought to be gaining at the expense of the acquirer. As both the original 
owner and the purchaser are “innocent” parties (neither has deliberately
1189
 caused 
the wrong), the direct link between wrong and restoration
1190
 in broken. There is 
hence insufficient correlativity between the purchaser’s gain and the owner’s loss. 
The problem hinges on how the purchaser’s claim is understood: does his or her 
connection with the thing merit the law’s protection? And if it does, what kind of 
                                                          
1186
 Weinrib, Private Law 80 ff. Following Kant, however, Weinrib does recognise that the public 
nature of law requires an external aspect to the transfer of property which may in some cases justify 
good faith acquisition.  (Private Law 107 and “Public Right” 198). For a fuller account of Weinrib’s 
view of the relation between property and distributive justice in Kantian thought, see E Weinrib, 
“Poverty and Property in Kant's System of Rights”, in Corrective Justice (2012) 264. 
1187
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans and ed S Broadie and C Rowe (2002) Bk 5 IV. 
1188
Aquinas, Summa II.ii. Q. 61, 62; Hallebeek, Unjust Enrichment 10-13. Aquinas distinguishes the 
obligation of restitution based on the having that which belongs to another from that which arises 
from an unjust taking (Summa II.ii. Q.62 Art. 6). When the purchaser realises that the thing belongs 
to another, it seems that he or she would therefore be obliged to return it. See also Aquinas, Summa 
II.ii. Q.100. Art. 6. 
1189
According to Aristotle, a person acting without knowledge as to the nature of his or her actions 
does not act unjustly: Aristotle, Ethics Bk 5 VIII. 
1190
 I.e. the link between doing and suffering: Aristotle, Ethics Bk 5 IV. 
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protection should this be? The claim to recovery of the actual thing, as opposed to a 
demand for financial compensation, is a special one; some owners (for example those 
holding ownership for the purposes of security) may find a monetary claim 
satisfactory, whilst others have an emotional or practical connection with the specific 
thing.  
 
Corrective justice in itself does not seem to provide a satisfactory way of 
answering these questions. At the level of individual interests, it is difficult to find a 
reliable means of distinguishing the claim of the original owner and that of the 
acquirer. Both may have acted in an entirely blameless manner, and both may suffer 
in various ways if deprived of their alleged right in the thing. Insofar as restitution is 
seen as protecting the subjective freedom of the original owner, either the owner or 
the acquirer may be a corporation, with no personhood-related interests in the thing. 
 
Even where it is possible to reach an adequate solution in a given instance, a 
calculus based on the respective qualities of one particular original owner and one 
particular acquirer does not provide a secure basis for a general rule. Rather, it is a 
principle of distribution which is best equipped to determine whether the purchaser’s 
actions in honestly purchasing are sufficient for him or her to acquire ownership.  By 
this is meant that there are distributive choices inherent in the private law rules 
regulating acquisition and transfer of ownership; such rules allocate power to 
particular sets of persons who act in certain ways.
1191
 A dual moral significance is 
attached to the person-thing connection, which can be understood both as a matter of 
the individual relationship concerned but also as a way of organising society. In the 
case of bona fide purchase, it is not only a matter of restoring a previously existing 
equality to the relationship between the parties, but of deciding which class of 
persons in society (original owners or acquirers) should be required to bear a given 
risk. It is necessary to consider the possibility of trade-offs, and the acceptability of 
sacrificing the interests of one person or group in favour of another. This implies that 
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 An argument along these lines is made by C Michelon, “The Virtuous Circularity between 
Positive Law and Particular Justice”, University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No 
2011/11 at 15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791807. 
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a different kind of reasoning, involving attentiveness to societal impacts and the 
broader public good, is appropriate. 
 
(c) Distributive justifications for bona fide purchase 
The question of what sorts of concerns may justify a given distribution of resources, 
and when such a distributive theory can call itself a theory of justice is vast, and is 
not addressed here.
1192
 There are a variety of different (and potentially incompatible) 
principles which might be suggested as a basis on which to allocate gains and losses. 
Jeremy Waldron differentiates justifications which focus on property rights as for 
some reason worthy of recognition in themselves (rights-based),
1193
 and those which 
treat property rights as only deserving of protection insofar as they serve some 
further end of general utility (utilitarian).
1194
 More broadly, one could talk of 




For present purposes, it is sufficient to identify two kinds of distributive 
criteria which are especially relevant to the debate about good faith acquisition. One 
variety relates to the qualities and actions of the persons involved- for example who 
has acted in a deserving or undeserving manner. Another focuses on the creation of a 
particular sort of society, e.g. which approach will lead to maximum circulation of 
goods? Both types of justification are often employed in the context of rules 
protecting bona fide purchasers. It is impossible to examine fully here the precise 
relationship between property law and these “external” values or justify 
comprehensively the adoption of one particular normative scheme,
 1196
 so, without 
excluding the possibility of other, potentially reasonable, distributive schemata, the 
remainder of the thesis concentrates on two aims: the facilitation of economic 
activity and the encouragement of honest and careful trading.  
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 For a flavour of the various debates see J Lamont and C Favor, “Distributive Justice”, in E N 
Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition) available at 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/justice-distributive/>. 
1193
 For example, an argument based around the idea of ownership as an extension of individual 
subjectivity. 
1194
 On which see Waldron, Private Property 12-16; ch 3. 
1195
 On deontological arguments see L Alexander and M Moore, “Deontological Ethics”, in E N Zalta 
(ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition) available at 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/ethics-deontological/>. 
1196
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of legislation and adjudication. 
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Does either of these adequately justify the adoption of protection for good 
faith purchasers? And are they compatible with one another? These specific concerns 
have been selected because they are, either implicitly or explicitly, already reflected 
in property doctrine, which in general penalises those who act in bad faith or 
intentionally or carelessly mislead others about ownership.
1197
 Although Scots law 
has never adopted the doctrine of market overt, expedition and simplification of 
transactions is commonly cited as a justification for such protections for bona fide 
purchasers as currently exist, for example by the authors of the Scottish Law 




How are the claimed economic benefits of good faith acquisition to be 
verified? It has been argued by, for example, those working in the Realist tradition 
that conventional “black letter” doctrinal analysis does not allow proper assessment 
of the real-world implications of legal policy.
1199
  In order to test the claim that 
protecting good faith purchasers promotes commerce, Part C examines alternative 
methodological approaches, focussing on the evaluation of market impacts and the 
extent to which economic analysis is useful in determining an appropriate 
distribution of risk. 
 
As regards the encouragement of honest and fair trading, at an abstract level 
this does not seem to be of much assistance in distinguishing between the claim of 
original owner and acquirer, both of whom may have acted in an entirely prudent or, 
conversely, negligent manner. The extent to which doctrine can take into account the 
behaviour of the parties and encourage fair and open transactions through inclusion 
of factors such as good faith and negligence is considered in Chapter 6. 
 
(d) Retributive justice and prevention of theft 
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 For example, s 21 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 bars original owners whose conduct has implied 
that another party had authority to sell from recovery, while ss 23-35 of the Act protect only those 
acquirers who are in good faith. 
1198
 Corporeal Moveables: Protection at para 11.  
 
1199
 See C below. 
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In most European legal systems the case of stolen goods is distinguished from that of 
entrusted ones.
1200
 In order to explain this tendency, it seems that (at least in part) 
one requires to refer to ideas of retribution and punishment of theft. There is some 
debate regarding the nature of retributive justice, and its relationship to corrective 
and distributive justice.
1201
 Retribution may on one view involve corrective 
justice,
1202




In order to explain the higher protection often afforded to an owner of stolen 
property, it is initially tempting to view this as in some way recognising the moral 
wrong which has been inflicted on him or her.  In light of the social disapprobation 
occasioned by theft, retributive justice may be thought to require that the thing 
should be restored to the owner. However, this does not seem a satisfactory 
justification for the doctrinal assimilation of theft to other cases of involuntary loss of 
possession,
1204




Given that retribution is usually associated with punishment for the individual 
committing a wrong, it is unclear that it justifies the imposition of liability upon a 
blameless third party. One explanation is that, although by definition a good faith 
purchaser must be innocent as regards the initial theft, there is distaste at the idea that 
a later party could obtain a benefit from the thief’s wrong. On this view the moral 
fault involved constitutes an inherent vice, which creates a sort of presumption of 
bad faith and prevents subsequent transferees from acquiring ownership.
1206
 It is 
difficult to see how this clarifies the distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
dispossession: is it not also dishonest to benefit from fraud or even loss?
1207
 Does the 
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 For a survey, see Lurger and Faber, Principles 925-931. 
1201
 For a historical overview, see Englard, Justice. For discussion of contemporary scholarship, see D 
Wood, “Retributive and Corrective Justice, Criminal and Private Law” (2005) 48 Scandinavian 
Studies in Law 541. 
1202
 Reparation may be seen as restoration of equality between the parties. 
1203
 Redistribution of goods between parties may be seen as promoting distributive aims in removing 
property from those who do not deserve it.  
1204
 As for example under in the case of “lost or otherwise missing” property under § 935 BGB. 
1205
 R Saleilles, De La Possession Des Meubles: Études De Droit Allemand Et De Droit Français 
(1907) 140-141. A similar argument is made by F Guisan, La Protection de l'acquéreur de bonne foi 
en matière mobilière (1970) 236. 
1206
 This type of argument is criticised by Saleilles, Possession 146.  
1207
 Saleilles, Possession 147. 
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wrong in theft differ from the wrong in any other unauthorised transfer, and if so, 
how? Indeed, should property law involve itself in moral assessment of theft? 
 
It is not certain whether property law should seek to further retributive ends at 
all. In Chapter 4 it was argued that, although property law may reflect the same basic 
concerns as the criminal law, it has a different internal logic and structure.
1208
 This 
chapter argues that property law serves public purposes, but this is not to say that 
these are the same as those served by the criminal law.
1209
 For example, an 
involuntary dispossession often involves a breach of social order, whereas a 
voluntary one does not.
1210
 However, criminal law sanctions are available precisely 
to keep the public peace,
1211
 whereas property law contributes to social order in 
alternative ways, for example by providing clear rules on acquisition. Property rules 
must also take account of the need to facilitate transactions, and ensure security and 
certainty of rights, concerns which are less relevant to the criminal law.  In the case 
of good faith acquisition of stolen property, these imperatives may well outweigh the 
need to seek redress for the wronged party. 
 
Rules distinguishing stolen property are also justified on the grounds that they 
make it more difficult for purveyors of stolen property to sell it.
1212
 It is not clear, 
however, that civil law rules are actually useful in preventing the sale of stolen 
property, as there may be many other factors involved in market functioning. (This 
point is discussed further below in the context of law and economics scholarship.) 
Moreover, even if the market for goods of dubious origin is reduced, thieves may 
disguise or otherwise make identification of the property as stolen difficult. Unless 
the thief him or herself is allowed to acquire the thing, he or she will remain 
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 See ch 4 C(1). 
1209
 A similar point is made by Guisan, Protection 236. 
1210
 F Vinding Kruse, The Right of Property, trans D Philip (1953) vol 2 275.  
1211
 Guisan, Protection 237. 
1212
 See Saleilles, Possession 147-8; Vinding Kruse, Property vol 2 283. 
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C. NON-FORMALIST PERSPECTIVES 
 
Whilst much of the thesis is concerned with doctrinal accounts of bona fide purchase, 
this perspective has some inherent limitations. This section evaluates the contribution 
of non-formalist arguments to the debate, and the extent to which alternative 
methodological approaches may be helpful in elucidating satisfactory justifications 
for protection of the good faith acquirer. 
 
(1) The Realist Challenge 
 
(a) Critique of conceptualism 
Within the Common Law tradition, some of the strongest attacks upon the 
application of the nemo plus principle have been inspired by the Legal Realist 
movement in the United States.
1214
 The Realist critique of classical property doctrine 
focusses on exposure of the substantive battle of interests often obscured by legal 
formalism. On such a view, the abstract logic of nemo plus does not correspond to 
the “real” world of business and commerce but is rather a manifestation of juridical 
idealism.
1215
 In order truly to understand legal doctrine, it is necessary to consider the 




A good example of the kind of abstraction complained of is the doctrinal 
approach to transfer induced by fraud.
1217
 In English and Scots law the protection of 
a bona fide purchaser varies depending on whether there has been a juridical act 
sufficient to confer ownership upon the transferor.
1218
 Usually a transfer induced by 
fraud will be sufficient for this purpose, and an innocent third party transacting with 
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 The history of the Realist movement, and the extent to which there can be said to be a unitary 
“Realist” perspective is outwith the scope of the thesis, but for a historical survey see W Twining, 
Karl Llewellyn and the Legal Realist Movement, 2
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 See ch 4 D(3)(d). 
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the fraudster may thus acquire ownership.
1219
 Notwithstanding this, there is some 
confusion in both English and Scots law regarding cases of error due to mistaken 
identity.
1220
 In relation to English law, the House of Lords has held that in cases of 
fraudulent misrepresentation a voidable title
1221
 will usually only pass to the rogue 




The oddities produced by these seemingly fine distinctions have led to 
numerous scholarly criticisms of classical common law property discourse, in 
particular the use of the abstract idea of “title”
1223
 to regulate disputes between 
original owners and good faith purchasers. Those inspired by the work of the 
influential Realist scholar Karl Llewellyn have been especially critical of the 
vagaries of the application of the concept in practical disputes.
1224
 As one 
commentator put it: 
 
The question whether a thousand angels could dance on the head of a pin 
would hardly seem more meaningless than the questions of intent [to transfer 




Llewellyn’s main argument was that the “static” nature of title is inappropriate in the 
context of contemporary sales transactions, which rarely feature a single action 
which may be said to pass “title”, but are rather an on-going and potentially lengthy 
process.
1226
 Regard should instead be had to the type of transaction and 
circumstances of the parties.
1227
 As property disputes were actually disputes between 
different groups of social interests, focus should be on exposure of the interests 
                                                          
1219
 As for example in Macleod (n 929). 
1220
 See further Carey Miller, “Plausible Rogues” and Corporeal Moveables para 8.11. 
1221
 I.e. one that is valid until challenged. For fuller discussion of the meaning of the terms “title” and 
“voidable”, see ch 4 D(3)(d).  
 
1222
 See Shogun (n 724). 
1223
 On the notion of “title”see ch 4 D(3)(c)(i). 
1224
 See K N Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales (1930) 561-574, esp. at 561-562. 
1225
 King, “New Conceptualism” at 39. 
1226
 K N Llewellyn, “Through Title to Contract” (1938) 15(2) New York University Law Quarterly 
Review 159 at 168. 
1227
 Llewellyn, “Through Title” at 170. 
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involved to critical scrutiny.
1228
 It is necessary to pay attention to the particular 
attributes (geographical, temporal) of the market concerned,
1229
 and also the status of 
the parties, drawing a distinction between merchant and non-merchant sellers, and 
also merchant and non-merchant buyers.
1230
 The routine separation of ownership and 
possession in the service of credit makes focus solely on the location of ownership an 




In relation to bona fide purchase, if two parties have both acquired in good 
faith from a rogue, why should the law create artificial distinctions between them? 
For example, Franklin compares the case of a transfer by B, who has acquired by 
fraud but can still pass title to C, and an unauthorised transfer by a bailee (hirer), who 
has no title to pass to C. He argues that: 
 
It should be sufficient that A voluntarily gave the movable to B, whether or 
not the disposition was blessed with “title,” as in no event does A envisage 
the risk to which B exposed him, a risk from which A is made to suffer only 




The standard Scots doctrinal answer to this objection would be that in the former 
case there has been (defective) consent to transfer of ownership, but in the latter there 
has not.
1233
 There is some validity, however, in the point that the layperson may find 
the distinction between the two cases of wrongdoing baffling and perhaps unfair. 
                                                          
1228
 M Franklin, “Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession Vaut Titre and Bona Fide 
Purchase” (1931-1932) 6 Tulane Law Review 589 at 591. 
1229
 “If then our law and its understanding are not to be set in empty cloud, we must struggle 
ourselves to see what sort of thing was there for the courts to see, and what sort of reaction a judge or 
lawyer of the time and place might have to it”: K N Llewellyn, “The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales” 
(1939) 52 Harvard Law Review 873 at 880. 
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 See Llewellyn, “First Struggle” at 879. 
1231
 “[T]he reference to the location of “the property” in chattels as a key to determine issues is a 
farmer's reference, suited to […] a world of farming not yet trenched upon by industry; a world where 
use and control and possession and risk and power of disposition sit comfortably in the same fist, and 
neither reapers nor sewing machines nor trucks and tractors have thrust in, along with their technical 
complexity, a financial and legal complexity almost as baffling”: K N Llewellyn, “Across Sale on 
Horseback” (1939) 52 Harvard Law Review 725 at 732. 
1232
 Franklin, “Security” at 595. 
1233
 See Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables para 8.11. 
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Indeed, it is not only those working in the Realist tradition who have criticised the 




(b) The UCC approach 
As one of the principal drafters of the UCC,
1235
 Llewellyn’s views have naturally 
influenced the way that the code is understood.
1236
 Indeed, the official comments to 
the code attempt to minimise the importance of title in determining rights and 
obligations, stating that: 
 
The legal consequences are stated as following directly from the contract and 
action taken under it without resorting to the idea of when property or title 
passed or was to pass as being the determining factor. The purpose is to avoid 
making practical issues between practical men turn upon the location of an 
intangible something, the passing of which no man can prove by evidence 





This approach is exemplified in the Code’s stipulation that: 
 
Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights, obligations and 
remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies 





                                                          
1234
 For example, the English Law Reform Committee Report of 1966 was inspired in part by 
criticism of the proliferation of “theoretical distinctions” in the case law relating to mistaken identity: 
ch 4 B.  
1235
 Llewellyn held the position of “Chief Reporter” from 1942 until his death in 1962. 
1236
 See for example G G Glaser and W C Kelsch, “Notes: Title Theory and the Uniform Commercial 
Code” (1954) 30 North Dakota Law Review 211; E R Latty, “Sales and Title and the Proposed Code” 
(1951) 16 Law & Contemporary Problems 3. 
1237
 Official comment to UCC Art 2-101. 
1238
 UCC Art 2-401. For discussion of the use of the term “title” in the UCC, see W L Tabac, “The 
Unbearable Lightness of Title under the Uniform Commercial Code” (1991) 50 Maryland Law 
Review 408 and King, “New Conceptualism”.  
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Despite this attempt to avoid reference to the passing of title, the UCC itself 
continues to adhere to a form of the nemo plus rule,
1239
 with an exception for those 
who buy from a commercial seller of goods of that kind. Under UCC § 2-403(2), the 
underlying principle is that “any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who 
deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a 
buyer in ordinary course of business.”
1240
 The emphasis here is evidently on 
protection of commerce and facilitation of transactions rather than any moral 




Some scholars have maintained that the very concept of title is not useful in 
regulating sales transactions, and rather than look at “arbitrary” movements of an 
abstract “title”, emphasis should be placed on the overall setting and relationship of 
the parties, and an analysis of which party would be best placed to guard against 
certain risks.
1242
 In the case of transfer by a non-owner, it is contested that regard 
should be had to “non-artificial” factors such as facilitation of commerce to 
determine who should be allowed to keep the disputed thing.
1243
 The continuing 
differentiation of void and voidable titles under the UCC (for example, a purchaser 
from a thief can only acquire the void title of the seller)
1244
 is criticised as unhelpful 




It is not only American legal theorists who have expressed a preference for a 
more functionalist approach to transfer of ownership. In part inspired by 
Scandinavian legal realism,
1246
 Swedish legal doctrine also analyses the problem of 
                                                          
1239
 UCC Art 2-403(1). It is also explicitly stated that a person with a voidable title has the power to 
transfer. See further Tabac, “Unbearable Lightness”, where it is argued that traditional ideas of title 
and ownership still provide the framework for the provisions of the UCC.  
 
1240
 For a general overview of § 2-403(2), see Thomas, Comparative Analysis 167-200. 
1241
 The “good faith” purchaser thus becomes the “commercial” purchaser. See G Gilmore, “The 
Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase” (1954) 63 Yale Law Journal 1057 at 1057.  
1242
 King, “New Conceptualism” at 36-37. 
1243
 King, “New Conceptualism at 42. 
1244
 Art 2-403(1). 
1245
 King, “New Conceptualism at 43-44. 
1246
 C Martinson, Transfer of Title Concerning Movables Part III- National Report: Sweden (2006) 
12-13. See also C Martinson, “How Swedish Lawyers Think about Ownership and ‘Transfer of 
Ownership’ – Are We Just Peculiar or Actually Ahead?”, in W Faber and B Lurger (eds), Rules for 




good faith acquisition in terms of the different interests involved, and how deserving 
they are of protection. Rather than the location of ownership, the question becomes 
(as in English law) who, in the immediate dispute, has the “better right” to the 
thing.
1247
 Conflicts are settled in the context of the relation between the individual 





Is the Realist approach helpful in understanding the bona fide purchase case? 
Attempts to justify protection for good faith acquirers using formal doctrinal logic 
alone
1249
 have difficulty explaining the economic and social aspects of the problem, 
in particular the development of special rules in particular market contexts such as 
“markets overt” or the law of factors. Concepts of ownership and possession in 
themselves can only perform limited justificatory work. It was argued in Chapter 4 
that the impacts of legal doctrine on specific groups in society (for example lenders, 
those holding on hire purchase contracts) should not be obscured when undertaking 
doctrinal analysis.  Nor should it be forgotten that property law rules are a product of 
the material conditions of a particular time and place. In Chapter 6, the arguments for 
applying different norms in different market contexts are discussed, as well as the 
importance of various “non-artificial” factors such as carelessness and fair allocation 
of risk. 
 
However, following the arguments made earlier in this chapter, stability and 
certainty of property rights are also important concerns. A weighing up of interests at 
the level of the particular case may risk rendering the outcome even more 
unpredictable than application of the established doctrinal concepts. Moreover, 
conceptual structures are not meaningless; it is the abstract, non-empirical concept of 
ownership which distinguishes a legal right to control a thing from brute force. 
Although internal logical coherence may seem an “artificial” value, it was argued 
earlier that it also plays an important role in giving doctrine justificatory force. Of 
course, some doctrinal distinctions (such as those in the law relating to mistaken 
                                                          
1247
 Martinson, Transfer at 85-86. On English law, see ch 4 D(3)(c)(i). 
1248
 Martinson, “Swedish Lawyers” 75-78. 
1249
 Such as that by Weinrib, discussed above B(2(a). 
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identity) are indeed esoteric and in need of modification, but, as the continuing 
adherence to the nemo plus principle in the UCC demonstrates, even ancient 
concepts may remain reasonable and practical. 
 
The Realist critique then, is valuable insofar as it encourages courts and 
legislatures to articulate clearly which parties the law is trying to protect and why, 
but attention to the “facts on the ground” will not by itself resolve doctrinal or real-
world conflicts such as that between owner and acquirer. This requires a more 
detailed articulation of goals and policies. The next section thus turns to one of the 
most frequently cited extra-juridical explanations for good faith acquisition, that 
relating to its economic impact, and asks whether the functionalist methods 
advocated by realist scholars are useful in assessing its justificatory force. 
 
(2) Economic Justifications for Good Faith Acquisition: Dynamic Versus Static 
Security  
 





Facilitation of transactions has been identified as one of the most important policy 
reasons for bona fide purchase, and is cited by scholars across numerous jurisdictions 
as a key factor in doctrinal development.
1251
 Comparative and historical research 
demonstrates that good faith rules were often established in a mercantile context, 
whether in mediaeval market centres such as Lübeck
1252
 or through custom in trade 
centres such as Paris.
1253
 Although Scots law does not exactly fit this pattern, 
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 “Le personnage que le droit va tendre à protéger n’est plus le propriétaire terrien, mais l’homme 
d’affaires” : Rouiller, Nemo plus 502.  See also e.g. R & J Dempster v Motherwell Bridge and 
Engineering Co 1964 SC 308 at 332 per Lord Guthrie. 
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arguments advanced for increased protection for purchasers often made reference to 




More recently, English judges have sometimes been criticised for a perceived 
inclination to take too narrow an approach to the Factors Acts and the Sale of Goods 
Acts, and to prefer the original owner over the innocent purchaser.
1255
 “The courts, in 
favouring the original owner at the expense of the innocent purchaser, have run 
counter to the needs of a commercial country.”
1256
 Given this continuing appeal to 
economic considerations, this section focusses on the basis of the economic 
argument, and the extent to which tools of economic analysis may be helpful in 
assessing it. 
 
Trade in moveable assets forms an important part of an economy based on 
consumption of commodities and services.
1257
 Division of labour entails that raw 
materials must reach the person best placed to turn the materials into products for 
consumption, and then the resulting commodities must be allowed to circulate freely 
from person to person without need for laborious investigations of title.
1258
 Once 
commodified, it is not the particular qualities of the particular thing which matter, but 
its ability to be exchanged for another thing or fungibility.
1259
 Fundamental to our 
understandings of what it means for an object to be “property” is the object’s 




In the case of transfer by a non-owner, there is a clear tension between 
stability of property rights and the need to secure commodity circulation. The view is 
often expressed that the development of rules protecting purchasers represents a 
                                                          
 
1254
 See ch 3 C(2)(b). 
1255
 See for example Goode, Commercial Law 459. 
1256
 Denning LJ (dissenting) in Central Newbury (n 757) at 381. See also his comments in Pearson (n 
757) at 286. 
1257
 Data on private consumption as a share of GDP in the UK and other economies can be found at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PETC.ZS. 
1258
 Rouiller, Nemo plus 501. 
1259
 For discussion of the concept of the commodity, and the distinction between use value and 
exchange value, see K Marx, Capital Vol 1, trans B Fowkes (1976) ch 1.  
1260
 For example, according to the influential account of G W F Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans S 
W Dyde (1996) para 71 it is only through the process of commercial exchange that contracting 
parties recognise one another as persons and owners.  
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historical movement motivated by the needs of capitalist exchange in which 
“[c]ommercial interests finally outweighed concepts of legal logic.”
1261
 To some 
extent such forces could be contended to have been at play in Scotland, the move 
away from the use of “borgh and hamehald” seems very likely to have been 
motivated by the need to promote the rapidity and ease of commerce. 
 
The problem is often articulated as a clash between static security and 
dynamic security, or security in acquisition and security in transaction. Static security 
may be characterised as concerned with the protection of rights that have already 
been acquired. It would generally prevent a right holder from being deprived of his 
or her rights without consent. It can be linked to ideas of absolute and unlimited 
rights, and the sphere of freedom accorded to the individual subject.
1262
 It may be 
contrasted with dynamic security, which would tend towards the protection of an 
acquirer’s reasonable belief in the entitlement of the transferor. To do otherwise is 
argued to risk a paralysing effect on transactions, which might result from a 
requirement for detailed investigations of title. The concept of dynamic security is 
dominated by a vision of economic life as based around movement and of producing 




Although superficially attractive, it is not clear that these general concerns 
inevitably justify the adoption of protection for bona fide purchasers. Implicit in the 
appeal to dynamic security is a practical claim that, if every purchaser was required 
to trace the origin of his or her title, that commerce would be impeded or perhaps 
even become impossible. From a functional point of view, however, there is nothing 
about this particular problem that necessitates conferring ownership on a purchaser 
from a non-owner. A presumption of ownership may be all that is required to ensure 
the “rapid circulation of commodities”.
1264
 There is moreover a risk that the idea of 
security will turn on itself: what one gains as a purchaser one risks losing as an 
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 It is impossible and undesirable to eliminate all risks from commercial 
life; this would require an unattainable stasis. 
 
(3) The Law and Economics Analysis 
 
(a) Calculating efficiency 
The Law and Economics movement builds on the Realist willingness to look behind 
doctrinal rules to understand and assess law using the tools of economic analysis.
1266
 
Insofar as normative recommendations are made,
1267
 the legal rule which produces 
the most efficient distribution of costs and benefits between the parties involved will 
be preferred. This may either involve making at least one person better off and none 
worse off (Pareto efficiency) or benefitting at least one person more than any third 
parties are harmed (Kaldor-Hicks criteria).
1268





For example, according to Calabresi, the best
1270
 reason not to replace a 
property rule (the holder of the entitlement to the thing must consent to transfer)
1271
 
with a liability rule (another party may destroy the entitlement upon payment of a 
collectively ascertained sum) is the economic inefficiency of a transfer by theft.
 1272
 
Deterrence of theft is taken to be a net social good because of this inefficiency. 
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1272
 An efficient transaction would transfer an entitlement to the buyer who will derive maximum 
utility from it and thus values it most highly. In the case of theft, there is no accurate valuation by the 
owner: Calabresi and Melamed, “Property Rules” 1125. For a detailed discussion, see R L Hasen and 
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What can economic analysis contribute to our understanding of the bona fide 
purchase problem? Various scholars have constructed different models, with 
emphasis upon diverse variables, but in essence all seek to identify the quantifiable 
costs and benefits attached to particular archetypal rules. This may be in relation to 
the individual parties, or in terms of overall market function. For example, some seek 
to achieve a reduction in transaction costs while some seek to determine who is the 
most efficient risk bearer
1273
 by examining, for example, risk appraisal and risk 
pooling (i.e. insurance) costs.
1274
 The extent to which it is possible to identify a 
“best” rule is disputed,
1275
 but many scholars proceed on the basis that, given 




(b) Deterrence of theft 
One point of focus has been the extent to which protection for purchasers will 
encourage a market in stolen goods.
1277
 Rules allowing recovery by the original 
owner are commonly thought to impose at least some extra cost on thieves, who may 
find potential purchasers more wary.
1278
 On the other hand, it would only be those 
who had a reasonable prospect of demonstrating good faith that a good faith rule 
would benefit (and who therefore might be encouraged to spend more.)
1279
 It seems 
difficult to say with precision how much the market would increase; there are other 
factors which may affect the price a buyer is willing to pay for stolen goods. If the 
seller of the goods is solvent and appears unlikely to disappear, a buyer may decide 
that the seller’s warranty is enough to outweigh any risk that the property might be 
stolen. Moreover, if the market for stolen goods decreases this may cause owners to 
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Somma (ed), The Politics of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (2009) 199 at 204. 
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 For example, C Rose, “The Transfer of Property Rights by Theft - An Economic Analysis” 
(2010) 30 European Journal of Law and Economics 247. 
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 See for example Weinberg, “Negotiability”. 
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 See for example Landes and Posner, “Economics” 9-10, 22-23; S Shavell, Foundations of 
Economic Analysis of Law (2004) 53. 
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 This point is made by Weinberg, “Negotiability” 576. Depending on the standard of good faith 
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take fewer precautions, making theft less costly.
1280
  The complexity of the problem 
makes reliable calculation difficult.  
 
(c) The “least cost avoider” 
A useful review of the economic literature has been undertaken by Arthur 
Salomons.
1281
 He argues that economic analysis suggests a clearer rule when it 
comes to entrusted property than in the case of stolen property.
1282
 When considering 
which party is able to avoid the risk of unauthorised transfer most cheaply (the “least 
cost avoider” approach),
1283
 it may be thought that in the case of entrusted property 
the owner is in a better position to avoid the risk of fraudulent transfer. This is 
because he or she is in a good position to assess the trustworthiness of the person to 
whom he or she is to entrust the property, whereas an acquirer may find obtaining 
information about ownership history costly or impossible.
1284
 One problem with this 
analysis is that it fails to take account of the fact that the owner may not be able to 
avoid entrusting his or her property in some circumstances, for example if urgent 
repairs are needed, and therefore cannot always take measures to reduce his or her 
risk. Investigating the trustworthiness of a potential entrustee might turn out to be as 
expensive as it would be for the buyer to investigate the reliability of the seller. 
 
Moreover, the idea that increased protection for purchasers necessarily 
reduces the sum that a buyer invests in title investigation has been criticised by 
Medina, who points out that good faith rules may prescribe high and costly standards 
of care.
1285
 As Baird and Jackson argue, legal rules themselves affect the amount of 
information that is available (for example through requiring registration or other 
public notification of transactions).
1286
 In relation to some types of moveable 
property, transfer and ownership of which is not recorded in any manner, it will be 
impossible for an acquirer to undertake any meaningful investigation into its 
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 D Baird and T Jackson, “Information, Uncertainty and the Transfer of Property” (1984) 13 
Journal of Legal Studies 299 at 301.  
209 
 
provenance and therefore no saving will be made by placing the burden on the 
original owner.  Overall, even in the case of entrusted property the “cheapest cost 
avoider” approach does not, on closer examination, provide a clear-cut solution. 
 
In terms of stolen property, it is more difficult to assess who may be the least 
cost avoider. Owners may be better able to reduce the risk of theft than 
purchasers.
1287
 On the other hand, Rose has suggested that good faith rules both 
encourage buyers to waste resources attempting to verify the ownership of goods, 
and impose higher costs on owners who must safeguard their property against 
theft.
1288
 However, this is based on a model rather than empirical data. Property law 
rules are clearly not the only factor in rates of property crime. In addition, 
encouraging owners to search for stolen property
1289
 may lead to increased litigation 
costs.
1290
 Some authors, however, doubt that this will have a significant impact upon 
trade.
1291
 There appear to be numerous contrasting views, with the literature on the 
topic producing no consensus position. 
 
(d) Valuing ownership 
Medina has criticised the least cost avoider approach, and argued that the optimal 
rule is one which will maximise the expected value of the ownership right.
1292
 The 
most appropriate rule may vary depending on whether the aim is to protect the 
reservation value of the right or the liquidation value. Reservation value is the value 
to the owner, whereas liquidation value reflects what a buyer would be willing to 
pay.
1293
 To some extent, this may correlate to the previously mentioned concepts of 
use value and exchange value. The reservation value is better protected by protection 
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In some circumstances, or in relation to some types of asset, increased 
liquidity may be preferable to an increased reservation value.
1295
 One explanation 
that is put forward for the difference in the protection offered when a seller’s title is 
void as opposed to when it is voidable is that, in the case of the voidable title, the 
owner may well have demonstrated at least some willingness to contract and may 
therefore be more interested in the thing’s liquidation value.
1296
  Although this 
argument does not in itself justify a social preference for liquidity, it is helpful in 
clarifying the values at stake and in articulating the root of the bona fide purchase 
dilemma. 
 
(e) The “best self-insurer” 
If property disputes are constructed as a question of the distribution of risk, it follows 
that the at least some ownership disputes may be resolved equally well by a system 
of insurance.  The risk of loss of the thing would be placed on the party who, in the 
circumstances, turned out to be the “best self-insurer”.
1297
 Unless 100% of all stolen 
or embezzled items are assumed to be eventually traced by the original owner, the 
probability of a buyer requiring to make a claim will logically be less than the 
probability that that the object will be stolen or embezzled from the original owner. 
This might imply that it will cost less for a buyer to obtain insurance and hence 
original owners should be allowed to recover in all circumstances, while buyers use 
insurance (or indeed contractual mechanisms such as warranties) to guard against the 
risk of loss. 
 
Such a picture is, nevertheless, complicated by several factors. As original 
owners have control over the object in question, and can take measures to prevent 
theft or embezzlement, they may be able to reduce their costs of insurance. Indeed, as 
it is difficult to calculate with the requisite actuarial precision the risk that an object 
may turn out to be stolen or embezzled, it is likely that many insurance companies 
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would not be willing to offer insurance to buyers at all.
1298
 Even with the promise of 
financial compensation, some acquirers might continue to be unhappy with the 
possibility of having to give up the property. Insurance would moreover add extra 
costs, and therefore would not be practicable for many categories of low-value 
moveable property. The growth of title insurance in the art market is discussed 
below, but it seems reasonable to conclude that for most types of moveable property, 





A full analysis of the general merits of the Law and Economics approach is beyond 
the scope of the thesis, as is detailed assessment of some of the economic models put 
forward.  However, the methodological approach adopted faces two serious 
criticisms, one theoretical and one empirical. 
 
The functionalist thesis implicit in the Law and Economics approach has been 
attacked, for example by Weinrib in The Idea of Private Law. Weinrib argues that 
private law is not the “juridical manifestation of a set of extrinsic purposes”.
1300
 To 
this may be added the view that the relationship between law and economy should be 
seen as one of “structural coupling” rather than law as a dependent variable.
1301
 





There is further the question as to whether efficiency, in itself, can justify a 
private property regime.
1303
 Weinrib has criticised this approach from the point of 
                                                          
1298
 Insurance companies moreover face the problem that, unless insurance is made compulsory, those 
buyers who choose to insure may be those with the riskiest titles.  
1299
 For further general criticism of the idea that insurance costs are an appropriate way of 
determining liability rules, see M Trebilcock, “The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of 
Efficient Civil Liability Rules” (1988) 4 Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 243 at 257-
258. 
1300
 Weinrib, Private Law 5. 
1301
 See G Teubner, “Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in 
New Divergences” (1998) 61 MLR 11 at 28.  
1302
 Teubner, “Legal Irritants” 31. Compare for example the position of Estonia: P Kama, “Evaluation 
of the Constitutionality of Good Faith Acquisition” (2012) 19 Juridica International 23 at 24. 
1303
 For example, Waldron, Private Property is devoted to the possibility of finding a rights-based 
justification for private property. 
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view of corrective justice.
1304
 It can also be attacked from the point of view of 
distributive justice.
1305
 Efficient rules may favour a particular distribution of costs 
between buyers and sellers, but ignore other relevant moral and political concerns 
e.g. the need to protect consumers.
1306
 The identity of those who gain and lose is 
important; some groups may be better able to bear losses. 
 
From an empirical perspective, it is doubtful whether the economic 
confidence of the European businessperson is seriously affected by the property law 
rule adopted. The little empirical research that exists suggests that the differing rules 
regarding the transfer of moveables are not seen as relevant in border-crossing 
commercial practice.
1307
 Although differences in legal rules may increase transaction 
costs, the importance of this to overall market functioning can be overestimated.
1308
 
Shifting the burden of proof may work to reduce transaction costs whilst allowing the 
owner to maintain his or her rights. At least as regards good faith acquisition, the 
drive for harmonisation at the European level, like that which led to the enactment of 
the Sale of Goods Act, is less obviously motivated by actual business demands for a 
unified law than pursuit of a juridical and political ideal. Despite referring to the need 
to protect commercial transactions, one of the drafters of Book VIII of the DCFR has 
noted the lack of empirical data and a lack of consensus about how to measure 
economic welfare and indeed whether economic welfare is the only relevant 
                                                          
1304
 Weinrib, Private Law 5. 
1305
 See for example C Edwin Baker, “The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law” (1975) 5 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 3. 
1306
 In some cases, it may be that efficiency and distribution-based analyses may produce the same 
results. For discussion of the relationship between the two, see R Craswell, “Passing on the Costs of 
Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships” (1991) 43 Stanford Law 
Review 361. Problems arise, however, where the group which it is intended to benefit is not 
homogenous, or has a different evaluation of a rule’s costs and benefits. 
1307
 C von Bar and U Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in 
Europe: A Comparative Study (2004) para 487. 
1308
 U Drobnig et al., Divergences of Property Law: An Obstacle to the internal Market? (2006) 26. 
The historical differences between Scots and English law do not seem to have been detrimental to the 
functioning of a free market in goods between the two jurisdictions: Cairns, “Droit éccosais” 144. It 
is interesting to compare the United States, in which the lack of diversity in the treatment of the good 
faith acquirer has been attributed to market integration: Levmore, “Variety” 60. Compare B 
Akkermans, “Property Law and the Internal Market”, in J H M van Erp et al. (eds) The Future of 
European Property Law (2012) 199, where it is suggested that property law rules may indeed affect 






 It is acknowledged that the issue is “not an everyday problem”
1310
 
of consumers and businesses.  
 
It is moreover difficult to quantify factors such as the cost of self-protection 
and the cost of title investigation by an acquirer. As rules on bona fide purchase 
interact with many other factors,
1311
 it is almost impossible to attribute behaviour 
(such an as increase in theft) to the effect of such rules alone.
 1312
 Although, all other 
things being equal, a rule allowing recovery by the original owner may reduce the 
value of stolen goods and thus the incentive for theft,
1313
 in the real world the price of 
goods is affected by so many variables that such an assumption is very difficult to 
empirically verify.
1314
 As will be argued later, neither protection of bona fide 
purchasers nor of original owners will entirely eliminate uncertainty, in this sense 
perhaps neither is optimal. 
 
Levmore has argued that it is precisely the complexity of assessing the 
behavioural effects of different legal rules which has led to widespread variety in the 
treatment of the bona fide purchaser.
1315
 The difficulty of constructing an adequate 
model and the lack of empirical data in many areas means that bias towards one’s 
own system and preferences may unconsciously emerge.
1316
 Schwartz and Scott have 
gone so far as to argue that it is fundamentally impossible to construct a system that 
                                                          
1309
 B Lurger, “Transfer of ownership of movables in Book VIII of DCFR 2009-with and without the 
transferor’s right to transfer ownership”, in J H M van Erp et al. (eds), The Future of European 
Property Law (2012) 47 at 60. 
1310
 Lurger, “Political Issues” 47. 
1311
 Including the wider regulatory and social environment, e.g. crime rates and law enforcement 
policies. See further Rose, “Transfer” 20 and Weinberg, “Negotiability” 574. 
 
1312
 For an initial attempt to take into account social variables such as the nature of the existing legal 
institutions, culture and quality of public enforcement of property rules, individualism, religion and 
political governance, see G Dari-Mattiacci et al., “The Good-Faith Purchaser: Markets, Culture and 
the Legal System” Working Paper, 2012. Available at 
http://portal.idc.ac.il/he/schools/law/progs/legalworkshops/documents/dari-mattiacci_gfp_026_-
_with_appendix.pdf. It is submitted that this work only highlights the extreme complexity of the 
issues.  
1313
 See for example Landes and Posner, “Economics” at 9-10.  
1314
 Recognised, for example, by Cooter and Ulen, Economics 154. 
1315
 Levmore, “Variety”.  
1316
 For example, Salomons identifies a general (if probably insignificant) tendency for American 
authors to favour the original ownership rule (“Economics” 208.) He also points to the complexity of 
the macro-level variables, see “Economics” 215. 
214 
 
provides optimal incentives to both owners and good faith purchasers to exercise 




Finally, many of the assumptions made in such models rely on actors 
exhibiting a rational preference for the lowest cost solution. However, these 
assumptions are not always borne out by psychological studies of how people 
actually reason about property rights.  For example, an existing right is valued more 
highly than the chance to acquire a right.
1318
 This may indicate that, even where it is 
more cost-effective for the owner to take precautions to avoid loss than for an 
acquirer to investigate title, there may be a social preference for placing the burden 
on the acquirer. Social antipathy towards theft and thieves may influence the owner’s 
willingness to spend on theft protection more than a rational cost-benefit analysis 
such as that suggested by Posner and Lander.
1319
 Although the chances of the owner 
being able to recover (and thus his or her incentive to search) will diminish under a 
rule protecting bona fide purchasers, there is often little that private individuals can 
do to trace their property. 
 
Overall, therefore, although economic calculus is particularly helpful in 
analysing notions of value, it faces cogent moral and political objections and does 
not at present offer a clear or verifiable solution.  
 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROPERTY DOCTRINE 
 
One implication of this understanding of good faith acquisition as involving publicly-
orientated deliberation and justification is a shift in attention towards the role of 
                                                          
1317
 A Schwartz and R E Scott, “Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith Purchase” (2011) 111 Columbia 
Law Review 1332 at 1339.  
1318
 On this phenomenon, sometimes described as the “endowment effect, see R Korobkin, “The 
Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis” (2003) 97 Northwestern University Law Review 1227. It may 
be the case that physical possession, rather than legal ownership, increases the value attached to a 
thing. See J Reb and T Connolly, “Possession, Feelings of Ownership, and the Endowment Effect” 
(2007) 2 Judgment and Decision Making 107.  
1319
 Landes and Posner, “Economics” at 14. The authors do acknowledge that an owner always has a 
strong incentive to prevent theft (presumably on cost-benefit grounds) whatever the rule on good 
faith acquisition. Other scholars assume that the right to recover will negatively affect the owner’s 
incentives to take precautions, for example Schwartz and Scott, “Rethinking” 1348-1349. 
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collective organs such as legislatures in delineating and enforcing property rights.
1320
 
The question as to when proprietary rights may be limited or extinguished in the 
public interest is one of obvious political and social concern. Caruso has argued that 
it is these profound public, rather than the private, implications of property law 
which have given rise to resistance to harmonisation at the European level which has 
not been encountered in relation to, for example, contract law.
1321
 While detailed 
consideration of the relationship between property and the state is outwith the scope 
of the thesis,
1322
 the governmental power to create or destroy particular interests 
poses a challenge to absolutist conceptions of individual subjective rights
1323
 and 
implies a potential contingency to the original owner’s right. It is necessary to 
reconcile the cardinal status of the nemo plus principle with the recognition that it 
may be departed from in the public good.
1324
 It might even be argued that what 
appears to be a derivative transfer of ownership from owner to acquirer is merely 




Exploration of the distributive aspects of property doctrine further leads to an 
enriched appreciation of property rules as facilitative of public as well as private 
ends. The distributive rationales identified will often serve all parties to the 
transaction: original owners will also benefit from facilitation of commerce whilst 
acquirers still hope not to be deprived of their property without consent.
1326
 When 
considering, for example, the extent to which an owner has a duty to ensure that 
others are not misled as to another’s authority to transfer, there is a move from a 
                                                          
1320
 Contrast Weinrib, Private Law ch 8 where it is argued that the private law relation is primarily 
structured around adjudication, rather than public political deliberation.  
1321
 See generally D Caruso, “Private Law and Public Stakes in European Integration: the Case of 
Property” (2004) 10 European Law Journal 751. One of the drafters of the DCFR has cited the public 
policy implications of property rules as one reason why they are not suitable for inclusion in an 
optional European instrument: Lurger, “Transfer” at 64. 
1322
 See further M R Cohen, “Property and Sovereignty” (1927-1928) 13 Cornell Law Quarterly 8; R 
Michaels and N Jansen, “Private Law beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, 
Privatization” 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 843. 
1323
 For an overview of the challenges to the idea of a unitary ownership based in the autonomy of the 
individual subject in contemporary property theory, see A J van der Walt, “Unity and Pluralism in 
Property Theory - A Review of Property Theories and Debates in Recent Literature: Part 1” (1995) 
TSAR 15; “Subject and Society in Property Theory - A Review of Property Theories and Debates in 
Recent Literature: Part II” (1995) TSAR 322. 
1324
 On the implications of different conceptions of subjective rights for justification of exceptions to 
the nemo plus rule, see Rouiller, Nemo plus 508-511. 
1325
 On this strand of thought in French jurisprudence, see Rouiller, Nemo plus 18-21. 
1326
 This is pointed out by Karner, Gutgläubiger Mobiliarerwerb 64-65. 
216 
 
view of ownership as providing a domain in which the owner can exercise individual 
freedom to an idea of certain duties towards others as intrinsic to ownership.
1327
 The 
owner’s right is never absolute, but is inherently limited by the need to respect the 
rights of others. Indeed, by establishing public norms of acceptable behaviour, rules 
for the transfer of moveables may be seen as substantiating mutual respect among all 
parties concerned in a transaction.
1328
 Requirements of publicity and good faith 
contribute not simply to the welfare of the individual parties but to the trust and 
confidence required for successful social and economic life. 
 
The arguments outlined in this chapter do not amount, however, to a claim 
that distributive justice should always be privileged over corrective justice, or that 
bona fide purchase represents a straightforwardly public limitation on private rights. 
A person’s interest in continuing to own his or her thing cannot simply be opposed to 
a general interest in protecting acquirers; rather a multiplicity of interests, both 
individual and collective, require to be taken into account. The need for coherence 
must also be taken seriously; in the case of Scots law this requires careful 
consideration of the current position and justification of any proposed changes in 
terms of existing norms and concepts. The challenge for property theory and doctrine 
is to find an acceptable means of acknowledging and balancing these various 
imperatives whilst ensuring that any solution fits with fundamental doctrinal 








                                                          
1327
 U Bälz, “Fundamental Changes in the Protection of Property- Some Comparative Reflections.” 
(1997) 13 Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 221 at 225-226. 
1328
 This point is made regarding private law more generally by C Michelon, “The Public Nature of 
Private Law?”, in G Clunie et al. (eds), The Public in Law (2011) 10.   
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CHAPTER 6 A NEED FOR REFORM? FOUNDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
A. A NEED FOR REFORM? 
 
This chapter considers whether Scots law should provide increased protection for the 
bona fide purchaser of corporeal moveables from an unauthorised party. It is 
concluded that, particularly in relation to costly moveables such as motor vehicles, 
possession does not provide an adequate system for publicising property rights. In 
terms of security and certainty of rights, good faith acquisition is not a panacea for 
the problems associated with highly mobile property such as vehicles. However, in 
light of the deficiencies of the current Scots law rules, a clear doctrine explicitly 
conferring ownership in more precisely defined circumstances would be preferable. 
 
(1) Weaknesses in the Current Law 
 
In the preceding chapters, several difficulties have been identified with the current 
position. Further analysis is needed regarding the function of possession, either in 
relation to an unauthorised transferor or on the part of the transferee. Although the 
current rules protect acquirers from a non-owner in a number of cases, it is not 
necessarily evident to a third party whether a seller falls under one of the protected 
categories. Rather than subtle distinctions, there is an argument for a broad general 
rule protecting all who buy in good faith from a party in possession.
1329
 Further 
clarity is also desirable regarding the necessity for possession on the part of the 
acquirer: there has been some controversy over whether physical delivery is required 
for protection under sections 24 and 25 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, while in the 
case of hire purchase vehicles no transfer of possession is required. This chapter 
suggests that the transferor’s physical possession is not a sufficient justification for 
                                                          
1329
 See for example the recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission in Corporeal Moveables: 
Protection (these proposals excepted stolen property) and the model rule proposed in the DCFR Book 
VIII.-3:101. See also E M Swartz, “The Bona Fide Purchaser Revisited: A Comparative Inquiry” 
(1962) 17 Boston University Law Review 403 at 411.  
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protecting a transferee, but that good faith protection may sensibly be limited to 
those who have actually taken physical control of the thing.  
 
Questions moreover exist about the relevance of good faith in property law, 
and the role that a clear and uniform standard of good faith might play in facilitating 
markets, particularly in the case of second hand vehicles. Special protection is 
currently available to purchasers of hire purchase vehicles transferred without 
authorisation, but it is argued that with the possible exception of “cultural property”, 
there should be a uniform rule offering equal protection to all categories of seller of 
any type of corporeal moveable.  
 
Finally there is the matter of the relationship between Scots law and English 
law, and indeed Scots law and the laws of other European legal systems. Although 
not a “weakness” as such, comparative research both contributes to understanding of 
the current Scots position and indicates possibilities for future development. Some 
scholars have argued that there is a “fundamental difference in methodology” 
between the civil law and the common law in relation to transfer of moveables by a 
non-owner.
1330
 In English law, the extent to which the original owner may have 
contributed to potential transferees being misled about another’s right or authority to 
transfer is usually considered on a case-by-case basis under the rules on estoppel, a 
version of which is codified in section 21 of the Sale of Goods Act.
1331
 In accordance 
with the idea of relativity of title, section 21 does not refer to who will acquire 
ownership but rather who will have the better title. Although the nemo plus rule is 
broadly accepted as the default position, there is a patchwork of exceptions in 
particular circumstances.
1332
 In civil law jurisdictions such as France and Germany, 
by contrast, an owner who voluntarily transfers possession to another is understood 
to assume the risk of fraudulent transfer. This is accomplished by means of a broad 
general rule, which (at least in the case of German law) explicitly confers ownership 
upon the bona fide transferee.
1333
 This approach may be more consistent with the 
                                                          
1330
 See for example, L Ellis, “Louisiana Property Law Revision: Transfer of Movables by a Non-
Owner” (1980) 55 Tulane Law Review 145 at 166. 
1331
 See ch 4 D(3)(c). 
1332
 See generally ch 4 D.  
1333
 In terms of a clear conferral of ownership upon the transferee, § 932 BGB is the best example. 
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unitary Scots understanding of ownership, and the emphasis in a civil law property 
system on certainty as to who is the owner at any particular point (rather than which 









 to “re-align Louisiana law with modern civil law and 
the Uniform Commercial Code”
1337
 through adoption of a rule conferring ownership 
on a transferee “in good faith for fair value” from an authorised possessor.
1338
 It is 
submitted that Scotland should consider adopting a similar general rule. Further 
questions in this respect are raised by the publication of the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR),
1339
 which also contains broad protection for good faith 
acquirers.
1340
 Although at present there is no prospect of the introduction of 
mandatory rules governing transfer of moveables in Europe, there would be benefits 
for Scotland (and perhaps also England) in reform of the current piecemeal approach. 
 
(2) Harmonisation and the European Dimension 
 
(a) The internal market 
Future Scots doctrinal development will not take place in isolation. As markets 
become increasingly integrated within the European Union, it seems likely that this 
will add to pressure to, for practical reasons, adopt a unified approach to transfer of 
moveables.
1341
  Where one jurisdiction grants more extensive protection to an 
acquirer from an unauthorised seller than its neighbour, there is a risk that stolen or 
embezzled goods may be “laundered” by means of sale under the most favourable 
                                                          
1334
 For discussion of the nature and history of the idea of the mixed jurisdiction, see K G C Reid, 
“The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems” (2003) 78 Tulane Law Review 5. For a discussion of some of the 
difficulties that may be associated with the term, see V Palmer, “Mixed Legal Systems and the Myth 
of Pure Laws” (2007) 67 Loyola Law Review 1205. 
 
1335
 1980, as part of a revision of the Property sections of the Louisiana Civil Code: see 1979 La. 
Acts, No. 180, S 1 (effective Jan 1 1980). 
1336
 It was almost immediately suspended (See La. S. Con. Res. No. 172, 6th Reg. Sess. (1980)) and 
repealed by 1981 La. Acts, No. 125, § 1. See further M B Stroud, “The Sale of a Movable Belonging 
to Another: A Code in Search of a Solution” (1988) 4 Tulane Civil Law Forum 41. 
1337
 Exposé des Motifs (1980), quoted in Ellis, “Transfer” 159. 
1338
 Civil code Art 520, quoted in Stroud, “Sale” 56. 
1339
 The provisions relevant to transfer of moveables are collected in Lurger and Faber, Principles. 
1340
 Lurger and Faber, Principles 887. 
1341





 Although the thesis is not concerned with problems of private international 
law, the dismantling of border controls within the EU and in particular the Schengen 
area adds to concern about illicit cross-border traffic in stolen goods.
1343
 A uniform 
rule would help to counter these difficulties. 
 
From the point of view of European Union law, harmonisation of property 
rights is sometimes argued to be necessary for the facilitation of commerce and the 
development of the internal market. While there is, as yet, little jurisprudence on the 
issue, it has even been suggested that divergences in property law may breach Art 34 
TFEU.
1344
 In the case of transfer by a non-owner, it is not clear that differing 
protection for bona fide purchasers can be seen as presenting an obstacle to cross-
border trade. The case law of the ECJ regarding free movement of goods is 
complex;
1345
 however, it is submitted that property law rules in this area do not 
amount to measures hindering market access. 
 
In some instances, the ECJ has appeared to regard any measure negatively 
impacting on consumer demand as potentially obstructing market access.
1346
 
Although the rules determining the security afforded to purchasers may have some 
economic implications,
1347
 it is unlikely that these effects would, in themselves, 
                                                          
1342
 For example, the problems caused by import and export of stolen vehicles into and from the UK 
are identified in Design Council UK, A Report on Designing Out Vehicle-Related Crime (2011), 
available at http://www.designcouncil.org.uk/our-work/challenges/security/design-out-
crime/vehicles/ at 29-31. 
1343
 The Schengen Acquis (OJ L 239, 22.09.2000) principally concerns movement of persons, but also 
contains a commitment to reduce “[t]he number and intensity of checks on goods carried by travellers 
when crossing internal borders … to the lowest level possible” (Convention Implementing the 
Schengen Agreement, Art 124). On the attempts to regulate the EU market in stolen and illegally 
exported cultural property, see Council Regulation (EEC) n° 3911/92 on the export of cultural goods 
and Council Directive 93/7/EEC on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the 
territory of a Member State; K A Short, “Preventing the Theft and Illegal Export of Art in a Europe 
Without Borders” (1993) 26 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 633; Reports from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee on the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) n° 3911/92 and Council Directive 93/7/EEC: COM 
(2000) 325; COM (2005) 675; COM (2009) 408 and COM (2013) 310. 
1344
 For example B Akkermans and E Ramaekers, “Free Movement of Goods and Property Law” 
(2013) 19 European Law Journal 237. 
1345
 For a fuller discussion, see E Ramaekers, European Union Property Law: From Fragments to a 
System (2013) 53-74 and Akkermans and Ramaekers, “Free Movement” at 243-248. 
1346
 Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-519 at paras 56-57 and case C-142/05 
Åklagaren v Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos [2009] ECR I-4273 at paras 26-28. 
1347
 See ch 5 C. 
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operate to make market entrance more difficult for cross-border sellers.
1348
 This can 





 or some other type of measure which 
might impact market access.
1351
 To illustrate, a hypothetical company, Alpha Ltd, 
sells used cars, some of which it knows may turn out to have been stolen. Although it 
may be more appealing to Alpha Ltd to sell such cars in Italy, where ownership can 
be transferred to a purchaser in good faith,
1352
 there is insufficient evidence
1353
 of a 
significant decrease in consumer demand in jurisdictions where the nemo plus rule is 




 there is no restriction on 
the use of cars, which are still an attractive commodity in the affected markets. 
 
Even supposing that rules governing the case of transfer by a non-owner were 
deemed an obstacle to trade,
1356
 they are indistinctly applicable requirements (i.e. 
measures applying to both imported and domestic goods) which could be justified as 
“mandatory requirements”
1357
 aimed at the protection of consumers or, where the 
nemo plus rule was applied, prevention of theft.
1358
 A mandatory requirement must 
comply with the proportionality principle,
1359
 and not be achievable by means of any 
                                                          
1348
 Unlike in the case of recognition of security rights, in which instance the treatment of his or her 
security does affect the terms on which the cross-border seller can enter the market, and moreover 
may disadvantage such parties compared to purely domestic sellers. 
1349
 It is unclear whether uncertainty as to ownership counts as a “characteristic” of a particular 
product. If it does, products with uncertain ownership are (presumably) equally likely to be domestic 
products, and may still freely enter the market.  
1350
 If rules for transfer of ownership are considered to be “selling arrangements”, they will not breach 
Art 34 as they “apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and … affect in the 
same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member 
States” (Joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-06097 at para 16). 
1351
 It is difficult to classify property rights in terms of the distinction made in Keck (ibid.) between 
rules relating to product characteristics and rules relating to selling arrangements. In Commission v 
Italy (n 1340) the ECJ also referred to “[a]ny other measure which hinders access of products 
originating in other Member States to the market of a Member State” (at para 33). 
1352
 See Art 1153 Codice Civile.  
1353
 The impact of good faith rules on markets for stolen goods was discussed in ch 5 C(b).  
1354
 (n 1346). 
1355
 (n 1346). 
1356
 For example because they could be shown to reduce the volume of trade in a given product in a 
particular member state.  
1357
 See Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral [1979] ECR 649 (Cassis de Dijon). 
1358
 The judgment in Cassis (ibid. at para 8) defines mandatory requirements as relating in particular 
to “…the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer”.  
1359
 Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I-607 at para 34. 
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measure having less impact on intra-community trade.
1360
 Where national laws 
pursue a legitimate aim and attempt to balance security for purchasers with 
protection for the original owner, it is unlikely that any solution adopted would be 
argued to be disproportionate. Moreover, there is a lack of evidence that any barriers 
to trade are sufficiently serious to warrant intervention. Like differing recognition of 
security rights, it seems that the effect on trade would be thought too “uncertain and 




(b) Human rights 
A further potential influence on the development of Scots doctrine is the body of 
supranational rules safeguarding human rights.
1362
 Could rules protecting good faith 
acquirers be subject to challenge under Article 1 Protocol 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)? The protocol establishes an entitlement to 
peaceful enjoyment of property,
1363
 adding that “No [natural or legal person] shall be 
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 




Does a dispute between a bona fide purchaser and an acquirer fall within the 
scope of this provision? Where the matter is a civil dispute between persons (or a 
person and the state acting as a party in civil litigation), the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) has held in a number of decisions such as that in S.Ö., A.K., 
Ar.K. and Y.S.P.E.H.V. v Turkey that rules for the transfer of ownership, in 
themselves, do not engage the second sentence of Art 1 Protocol 1: 
 
                                                          
1360
 Case C-319/05 Commission v Germany (Garlic) [2007] ECR I-9811 at para 87. 
1361
 See Case C-69/88 H. Krantz GmbH & Co v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen en de Staat der 
Nederlanden [1990] ECR I-583 at para 11, discussed in Akkermans and Ramaekers, “Free 
Movement” 253-255; Ramaekers, Property Law 67-74. 
1362
 For an initial view of the effect of human rights legislation on Scots property doctrine, see A J M 
Steven, “Property Law and Human Rights” 2005 Juridical Review 293.  
1363
 The term used in the legislation is “possessions” rather than property, but it is accepted that both 
expressions may be used almost interchangeably and are, in any event, given a wide meaning. See 
Marckx v Belgium (1979-80) 2 EHRR 330 at para 63; R Reed and J Murdoch, Human Rights Law in 
Scotland, 3
rd
 edn (2011) at 994-995. For criticism of the incoherence of the provision and a linguistic 
analysis of the different texts of the ECHR, see G L Gretton, “The Protection of Property Rights”, in 
A Boyle et al. (eds), Human Rights and Scots Law (2002) 275, esp. at 276-277 and 293-285. 
1364
 On the confusing relation between “peaceful enjoyment” and “deprivation”, see Gretton, 
“Protection” at 278. 
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The passing of property, resulting from legal limitations inherent in private 





However, this is subject to the caveat that the law must not “create such inequality 
that one person could be arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of property in favour of 
another.”
1366
 It is clear from judgments such as that in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United 
Kingdom
1367
 that where the state, acting as legislator,
1368
 causes a party to be unfairly 
deprived of property through application of particular legislative provisions, this may 
also amount to a breach of Art 1 Protocol 1. 
 
As to whether either the original owner or a bona fide purchaser has an 
interest which qualifies for protection under the section, the Convention does not 
refer to deprivation of ownership, but deprivation of possessions. “Possessions” has 
an autonomous meaning from any concept in domestic law,
1369
 although this does not 
imply that domestic law will be irrelevant. The term covers both “existing 
possessions” or assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue 
that he or she has at least a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining effective enjoyment 




An original owner has (at least initially) a property right in the object which 
would seem to qualify as a “possession” under Art 1 Protocol 1. Where, under 
domestic law, a bona fide purchaser does not acquire ownership, does he or she have 
any interest that may entitle him or her to protection? Physical control of an object 
                                                          
1365
 S.Ö., A.K., Ar.K. and Y.S.P.E.H.V. v Turkey (dec.) no. 31138/96 14 September 1999 at para 1, 
cited along with Kuchař and Štis v. Czech Republic (dec.) no. 37527/97 21 October 1998 in 
Zhukovskiye v Russia (23166/04) January 13, 2011.  
1366
 Bramelid and Malmström v Sweden (8588/79 and 8589/79) October 12
th
 1982 at 82. The point is 
argued by A Riza Çoban, Protection of Property Rights within the European Convention on Human 
Rights (2004) 185-186. 
1367
 (2008) 46 EHRR 45. 
1368
 Pye turned on the provisions of the Limitation Act 1980 and the Land Registration Act 1925. In 
relation to common law doctrines, judges must also apply and develop the law in a way which is 
consistent with the ECHR under the s 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
1369
 See Gasus Dosier und Fördertechnik GmbH v Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 403 at para 53; Reed 
and Murdoch, Human Rights paras 8.08-8.13. 
1370
 Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v Germany (42527/98) July 12th 2001 at para 83. 
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that one does not own is unlikely to qualify as a “possession”.
1371
 What the purchaser 
has been deprived of is not merely detention of the thing (it seems unlikely that the 
owner’s right to recover from a detentor without right is contrary to Art 1 Protocol 
1), but the expected acquisition of the right of ownership. On this basis, does the 
purchaser have something amounting to a “legitimate expectation” that he or she will 
be able to acquire a proprietary right? A “legitimate expectation must be “of a nature 
more concrete than a mere hope and be based on a legal provision or a legal act such 
as a judicial decision”.
1372
 Where a bona fide purchaser’s claim has no basis in 
domestic law, it is therefore unlikely that it would amount to a deprivation of 
possession for the purposes of Art 1 Protocol 1. 
 
Assuming, then, that it is only an original owner who will be protected in the 
enjoyment of his or her possessions, could a hypothetical rule depriving him or her of 
ownership when an unauthorised transfer is made to a good faith party amount to the 
type of deprivation which will breach Art 1 Protocol 1? Where such a provision is 
sufficiently clear and precise, the deprivation will certainly be “subject 
to …conditions provided for by law”. As to whether good faith protection could be 
argued to be in the public interest, there is a wide margin of appreciation for the 
contracting states to make their own assessment as to what the general interest might 
require.
1373
  This is a part of the freedom of states to regulate the use and transfer of 
property in different ways in accordance with different social policies.
1374
 In Pye, the 
Court underlined that the margin of appreciation in respect of settlement of such 
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 In Durini v Italy (dec.) no 19217/91 12
th
 January 1994, the Commission held that the right to live 
in a property that one did not own was not a “possession”. See also Öneryildiz v Turkey (2005) 41 
EHRR 20 at para 126, in which occupation of land in the hope of eventually acquiring a property 
right to it was not sufficient to constitute a “possession”. In Beyeler v Italy (2001) 33 EHRR 52 at 
para 106, however, the ECtHR declined to decide whether a physical possessor who had acquired 
through a sale null under Italian law had suffered a deprivation of possessions, it being enough that 
his peaceful enjoyment had been disturbed. 
1372
 Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v Czech Republic (39794/98) July 10
th
 2002 at para 73. See Reed 
and Murdoch, Human Rights paras 8.11-8.12. 
1373
 Broniowski v Poland (2005) 40 EHRR 21 at para 149; Reed and Murdoch, Human Rights paras 
8.26; 8.35-8.37. 
1374
 See Pye (n 1367) at para 74. See also James v UK (1986) 8 EHRR 123 at paras 40-41 and 
discussion in Riza Çoban, Protection 200-204. 
1375
 Pye (n 1367) at para 82. See also James, ibid. 
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In Gladysheva v Russia, the ECtHR found that, where a privatisation of state 
property had been affected by fraud, it was disproportionate not to protect the bona 
fide purchaser of the property from deprivation without compensation and 
eviction.
1376
 In that case, however, the state was a beneficiary of the deprivation, and 
could have prevented the initial fraud; it is not clear that the same result would be 
reached in a dispute between private parties. 
 
Moreover, where an owner is not in physical possession but retains 
ownership under a retention of title clause the Court has held in Gasus that a state 
may legitimately distinguish between this quasi-security interest and other forms of 
ownership.
1377
 Given the comment that “whoever sells goods subject to retention of 
title is not interested so much in maintaining the link of ownership with the goods 
themselves as in receiving the purchase price”, some limitation of the owner’s right 
to vindication
1378
 in these circumstances appears to be accepted by the Court as 
justifiable. On this basis, the protection afforded to a buyer in possession under 
section 25 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 also complies with Art 1 Protocol 1. 
Following that reasoning, it could also be argued that a more general distinction 
between the protection afforded to an owner in physical possession and an owner 
who has voluntarily parted with it would be ECHR compliant. 
 
However, a fair balance must still be struck between the different interests 
involved, and a deprivation without compensation is likely to be particularly 
problematic: 
 
There must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be realised.... Compensation terms under the 
relevant legislation are material to the assessment of whether the contested 
measure respects the requisite fair balance, and notably, whether it does not 
impose a disproportionate burden…
1379
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 Gladysheva v Russia [2011] ECHR 2021 paras 79-83. 
1377
 Gasus (n 1369) at para 68. 
1378
 As opposed of course to a monetary claim against the buyer.  
1379





Where ownership is awarded to a good faith purchaser, it is usually the case that the 
original owner will have some form of monetary claim
1380
 against the thief or 
fraudulent entrustee. Although this claim may well be worthless,
1381
 Gretton has 
argued that it is nevertheless sufficient for ECHR purposes.
1382
 On the other hand, 
the Court in Gladysheva appeared to suggest that, where there was little prospect of a 
fraudulent third party actually compensating the applicant for her loss, a right to sue 
was insufficient compensation.
1383
 In that particular case the applicant lost her home, 
with little prospect of being allocated alternative housing.
1384
 It is submitted that, at 
least in some circumstances, loss of ownership of a moveable without any realistic 
prospect of compensation could also place a disproportionate burden on the original 
owner. In many instances this burden will be justified by the aim pursued, but it is 
the actual impact on owners that should be taken into account. 
 
The fact that the owner does not receive any notification (unlike in the case of 
prescriptive possession of land)
1385
 before loss of his or her thing is another factor 
that may suggest unfairness. The more clarity that can be provided to the owner 
about the circumstances in which his or her right may be at risk, the more likely it is 
that a provision will be compatible with Art 1 Protocol 1. As uncertainty regarding 
property rights may also place an excessive burden on the original owner,
1386
 
exceptions to the nemo plus rule should be clearly defined. 
 
A final point to address is whether a rule protecting purchasers could be not a 
deprivation but a control on use, in which case the jurisprudence regarding 
compensation would not apply.
1387
 Although acquisition of a right through adverse 
possession and deprivation of the former owner was held by the Grand Chamber in 
                                                          
1380
 Such a claim could be either delictual (in the case of a thief) or contractual (in the case of a 
fraudulent hirer).  
1381
 The thief may be untraceable, or the hirer bankrupt.  
1382
 “Protection” at 286. 
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1385
 See s 45 of the Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012. 
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 Almeida Garrett, Mascarenhas Falcão and Others v Portugal (2002) 34 EHRR 23 para 54. See D 
J Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2
nd
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Pye to be a control on use,
1388
 the court’s reasoning is not altogether clear.
1389
 Prima 
facie rules regarding transfer of moveables, although having obvious implications for 
entitlements to use property, regulate the existence of property rights rather than use 
and therefore do not fall under the second paragraph of the protocol. The decision in 
Pye, however, implies that the Court might by analogy treat deprivation through 
good faith acquisition as a control on use, meaning that good faith acquisition would 
be easier to justify. 
 
Overall, it seems probable that as long as some attempt is made to balance the 
interests of the acquirer and the original owner this will be enough for compliance 
with the ECHR. Although a heavy burden may be placed upon an original owner 
deprived without consent, the question as to who should bear the risk of unauthorised 
transfer is one on which reasonable legislators may differ. Unless the state chooses to 
guarantee all transactions,
1390
 someone must lose out. Certainly unfairness may be 
created in individual cases, but this may be necessary in light of what is understood 




(c) A new ius commune? 
The impetus towards greater economic and political integration has also led jurists to 
search for shared principles on which a new European legal framework might be 
constructed. Numerous references have already been made to the Book VIII of the 
DCFR, the aims of which have been described by one of the drafters as being 
“rational discussion of the various effects, advantages and disadvantages of different 
property law rules in the field of loss and acquisition of ownership of movables.”
1392
 
At the time of writing the proposals in the DCFR are principally of scholarly interest. 
Due to the mandatory nature of property law rules, the provisions on transfer of 
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 Pye (n 1367) at para 66. 
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 For discussion, see G L Gretton, “Private Law and Human Rights” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law 
Review 109 at 111-112; E Cooke, “A postscript to Pye” 59 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 149. 
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moveables have been determined not to be suitable for inclusion in the planned 




What is the significance of these developments for the present discussion? Is 
it possible to envisage some shared European rule on unauthorised transfer of 
moveables, perhaps based upon the research reflected in the DCFR? And what can 
Scots jurisprudence learn from comparative law on this topic when even other 
European legal systems take such seemingly divergent approaches? 
 
It is not possible to address in detail here the debates surrounding the 
desirability of harmonisation initiatives such as the DCFR,
1394
 but the fact that no 
obvious majority principle emerges from the extensive comparative research carried 
out implies that drafting a mutually satisfactory European rule would not be easy. 
Salomons notes that that the area of good faith purchase is one of the few where the 
drafters of the DCFR have adopted an solution only followed in a minority of 
jurisdictions, perhaps because the lack of a consensus position left more freedom to 




Are there any common doctrinal roots which could be built upon in future 
reform efforts? The historical research detailed in Chapters 2 and 3 does not disclose, 
at least in respect of Scots law, an obvious shared foundation for the protection of 
good faith purchasers. Although many mediaeval market centres adopted some form 
of protection for purchasers, this seems to have occurred on a localised and 
piecemeal basis. The influence of Roman law means that nemo plus is recognised as 
a basic tenet of the modern law of most European jurisdictions,
1396
 but there is a wide 
variety in the scope of and rationales of exceptions. 
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 See A F Salomons, “Comparative Law and the quest for optimal rules on the transfer of 
moveables for Europe.” (2013) 2 European Property Law Journal 54 at 70. 
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However, the fact that numerous reasonable resolutions are possible does not 
imply that critical comparative analysis is unproductive. Rather than reflecting the 
revival of a historical ius commune, Dalhuisen suggests that the modern search for 
broader concepts and transnational principles represents a return to the natural law 
methods of Grotius and Pufendorf.
1397
 It is his opinion that the globalisation of 
finance and commerce requires this denationalisation.
1398
 While some scepticism 
about the argument that the needs of capital justify protection for good faith 
purchasers was expressed in Chapter 5, Scots law can certainly benefit in various 
ways from the research contained in the DCFR. Articulation of the principles on 
which the current law is based, and a deeper appreciation of the factors which unite 
and divide different legal systems is undoubtedly valuable, whether or not this 
eventually results in a uniform rule at European or international level. 
 
B. POSSESSION AS A BASIS FOR ACQUISITION 
 
The most important jurisdictional divide in the area of good faith acquisition is not 
necessarily a common law/ civil law divide, but a divergence in the function 
attributed to possession
1399
 and the extent to which it can give rise to the acquisition 
of rights good against the original owner. 
 
The role of possession in acquisition can be distinguished from its evidentiary 
function;
1400
 many European legal systems recognise a rebuttable presumption of 
ownership based on possession.
1401
 Several theories have been developed to explain 
how the voluntary transfer of possession may further justify an acquisition of right by 
                                                          
1397
 J H Dalhuisen, “European Private Law: Moving From a Closed to an Open System of Proprietary 
Rights” (2001) 5 Edinburgh Law Review 273 at 277. 
1398
 Dalhuisen, “Private Law” at 295-296. 
1399
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 See Saleille, Possession 81-82. 
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a bona fide transferee,
1402
 placing the burden of loss upon the original owner. Taking 
into account the importance of certainty, as well as the need to promote distributive 
ends such as furtherance of commerce and encouragement of fair and honest trading, 
what role should possession play
 
in the protection of acquirers from a non-owner? 
 
(1) Possession on the Part of the Transferor 
 
(a) Potential to mislead 
In German jurisprudence, where the owner has allowed the property to leave his or 
her possession, he or she is often understood to have contributed to his or her own 
loss; this is referred to as the “Veranlassungsprinzip”.
1403
 The principle has its basis 
in the view that, in transferring possession, the owner has voluntarily acted to create 
the appearance of ownership in the possessor. For example, the Motive for the BGB 
state that the owner carries more blame than the acquirer for the latter’s mistake as to 
ownership.
1404
 In awarding the property to the acquirer there is an element of 





This idea is also reflected in the dictum from Lickbarrow v Mason
1406
 that where one 
of two innocent persons must suffer for the wrong of another, the loss should fall on 
him who placed it within the power of the wrongdoer to perpetrate the fraud. 
Estoppel (and its homologue in section 21 of the Sale of Goods Act) operates to 
prevent a party who has contributed to a wrong benefitting from his or her misdeed; 
there may be some cases in which the owner’s conduct has played an obvious role in 
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 In the modern law, however, it is settled that parting with 




Given current doctrinal and social trends, it is unrealistic to maintain that an 
owner who has merely parted with possession should be penalised for contributing to 
a subsequent wrongful transfer. Property law plays an important part in instilling the 
trust and confidence required for economic life and commerce often involves 
circumstances in which it is desirable for possession to be transferred without a 
power to transfer ownership. The use of moveables as collateral, combined with the 
growth of forms of secured credit in which the owner parts with possession (such as 
hire purchase) only reinforces the practical necessity for this. These social changes 
which have led to the routine separation of possession and ownership show no signs 
of reversal; against this background it is difficult to see why the law should always 
permit a transferee to assume that the possessor is owner.
1409
 Whether it is the debtor 
or the creditor who is in possession, physical control in itself cannot be taken as a 
sufficient indicator of ownership.
1410
 Indeed, this would cause the idea of possession 
as a legal rather than an empirical concept to break down, as legal possession does 




Focussing on the transferor’s possession also neglects the limited physical 
contact between buyers and sellers in many sales transactions. The value of web 
sales in the UK retail sector alone was estimated at £23.4 billion in 2012.
1412
 Where 
the transaction is conducted at a distance, the buyer cannot be said to have been 
misled by the transferor’s possession. Rather, reliance is placed upon other indicators 
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such as the seller’s reputation. Online marketplaces such as eBay have developed 
their own particular norms and practices for assessing seller reliability and dispute 
resolution. The ability of the transferor to make delivery to the transferee, i.e. to put 
the transferee in possession, may still be of some importance and is considered later. 
 
As regards the owner’s fault in causing the acquirer’s mistake, an acquirer 
may equally be “blameworthy” in the sense that, although in good faith, he or she 
could also have carried out more detailed enquiries into the title and authority of the 
unauthorised seller.
1413
 In fact, both the entruster and the acquirer have relied on the 
trustworthy appearance of the fraudulent entrustee.
1414
 It is therefore preferable to 
accept, as does current Scots law, that transfer of possession does not equal a 




(b) Fair allocation of risk 
Turning again to the German debates, the idea that the owner is best placed to avoid 
the danger of unauthorised transfer (“Prinzip der Gefahrenbeherrschung”) provides a 
further reason as to why he or she should bear the risk of loss.
1416
  By placing in the 
hands of a third party, the owner has “adventured” (risked) his or her thing.
1417
 For 
example, the Motive for the BGB assume that in choosing to part with possession the 





 reasons that the owner is better able to 
manage the risk of loss than the acquirer as he or she can assess the trustworthiness 
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 Of course, in relation to many low-value moveables meaningful investigation of title will be 
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Law Review 329 at 360. 
1416
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 See for example Atiyah, Sale 385; Rouiller, Nemo plus 977; Saleilles, Possession 152. 
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of those that he or she gives his or her thing to, while the acquirer can only assess the 
true legal situation with difficulty. 
 
Although ostensibly based in fairness, there is also some congruence with 
arguments based on simple practicality or, as discussed earlier, economic efficiency. 
In the absence of a system of registration, reliance on possession becomes a proxy 
means of affording security to acquirers.
1420
 If buyers cannot place confidence in the 
seller’s possession, they may be forced to undertake costly and time consuming 
verifications of ownership, which would be detrimental to the rapidity of commerce, 
or, where this is not possible, protect themselves by abandoning the sale. 
 
A final point that is relevant is the relationship between possession and 
remedies. It is possible to argue that, by voluntarily relinquishing his or her 
possession, an owner should give up at least the right to obtain specific recovery of 
the thing, as opposed to a claim for damages. This would be on the basis that there is 
a separate interest that the formerly immediate possessor has in specific recovery, as 
opposed to the mediate possessor.
1421
 Historically, this was the position where the 
“hand wahre hand” principle was applied in mediaeval German law,
1422
 and it is also 
reflected in the structure of the modern English law governing interference with 
moveables, which do not guarantee restitution of the thing.
1423
 For a system based on 
Roman law, which recognises a sharp distinction between possession and ownership, 
it is, however, incongruous for a temporary relinquishment of possession to amount 
to a permanent forfeiture of the right to regain the thing itself. 
 
An obvious criticism of the idea that it is fairer to place the risk on the owner 
is that this approach may not always precisely reflect the equities of the concrete 
case: the owner may have investigated carefully the trustworthiness of the entrustee, 
while the acquirer may have been reckless as to the transferor’s authority to 
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 For reasons of certainty and predictability, however, it may well be 
preferable to adopt a general rule allocating the risk to the one party or the other. The 
inefficiency of requiring courts to assess the blameworthiness of the particular parties 
under a negligence-based rule is seen as an advantage of comprehensive protection 




However, it is more problematic to assert that this principle can account for a 
distinction, such as that recognised in German law, between lost or stolen and 
entrusted property;
1426
 an owner may be equally “at fault” in the case of a loss or 
theft which has occurred due to his or her negligence. An owner is further able to 
take precautions against loss and theft, while sometimes there may be no option but 
to entrust the property to another temporarily.
1427
 In modern urban commercial life, it 
is not reasonable to assume that one can have confidence in every person to whom it 
may be necessary to entrust possession of one’s things. Although an entrustment may 
superficially appear to be a voluntarily engaged transaction, it is not always 
voluntary in the sense that realistic alternative options existed.
1428
 It is not necessarily 
the case that the owner obtains any benefit from parting with possession.
1429
 Nor 





Allowing the original owner to recover lost and stolen property moreover 
generates a conflict between the need to allow acquirers to rely on appearances and 
the idea that the owner is responsible only for risks associated with entrusted 
property. From the point of view of the acquirer, his or her principal concern is that 
there should be an unambiguous rule as to whether he or she can rely on the 
transferor’s possession. It is impossible for him or her to distinguish between 
property which may have been embezzled and that which has been stolen; while an 
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 Zweigert, “Rechtsvergleichend-kritisches” at 12-13. See also comments in Farquharson (n 899) 
at 335. 
1425
 Ellis, “Transfer” at 160. 
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entrustment-based doctrine may provide increased certainty for original owners, the 
security of acquirers is correspondingly diminished. 
 
Overall, it is difficult to say that these arguments regarding possession on the 
part of the transferor justify a uniform preference for the bona fide acquirer. In order 
to provide certainty for acquirers, one could advocate a rule validating any 
acquisition from a party in possession, but to treat physical possession alone as 
giving authority to transfer would risk the collapse of the distinction between 
possession and ownership.  Even if it is desirable to protect acquirers, the 
significance afforded to the transferor’s possession should therefore be limited. 
 
(2) Possession on the Part of the Transferee 
 
The acquisition of physical possession already has a probative function in Scots 
law.
1431
  This may to some extent serve to protect the celerity of transactions by 
reducing the need for lengthy investigations of the transferor’s authority. What are 
the justifications for also affording it an acquisitive function? And should these 




In other jurisdictions, physical possession is often required before a bona fide 
purchaser is protected. For example in French law possession réelle is necessary, 
meaning that the goods should not remain under the control of the seller.
1433
 This can 
be connected to the idea of acquisitive prescription, and the requirements of 
prescriptive possession. In the Code Civil, Art 2276 (formerly Art 2279) is 
categorised as a rule of acquisitive prescription.
1434
 Although the doctrinal consensus 
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th
 February 1990: Bulletin 1990 IV N° 
45 p30.  
1434




is now that Art 2276 does not represent a mode of acquisitive prescription,
1435
  the 
requirement in Art 2261 that prescriptive possession should be “without interruption, 
peaceable, public and non-equivocal” influences by analogy the interpretation of Art 
2276.
1436
 In German law, not only physical possession but Eigenbesitz
1437
 is a 
prerequisite.
1438
 The DCFR also restricts good faith protection to those who have 
acquired physical control of the object.
1439
 These provisions are usually justified with 
reference to two broad aims. 
 
(a) Publicity of transfer 
Insofar as possession gives rise to a presumption of ownership, physical control 
provides a material and public
1440
 indication of right.
1441
 To some extent, this is also 
true in relation to acquisitive prescription; protection of long-held possession allows 
all parties to rely on the appearance of ownership thus created.
1442
  Where there is no 
physical possession on the part of the transferee, possession can no longer be said to 
have this probative or “signalling” function relative to the world at large. In relation 
to the original owner, there will be no external manifestation of the change in the 
legal position.
1443
 As it is empirically investigable, attaching legal consequences to 
physical control may seem an attractive means of connecting the noumenal world 
(ownership, legal rights) to phenomena.
1444
 
                                                          
1435
 For a brief overview of the views on this topic, see M Dubertret, Négociabilité et Possession: 
Essai sur l’inopposabilité des vices de la propriété mobilière (2010) 241-243. 
1436
 See for example Cour de Cassation civ. 1re, 30
th
 October 2008: Bulletin 2008 I, n° 242. For 
criticism, see Zenati, “Revendication” 408. As Zenati asserts, the instantaneous acquisition 
understood to result from Art 2276 does not logically require either publicity or continuous 
possession. 
1437
 Possession as one’s own, see § 872 BGB.  
1438
 See § 933 BGB requiring that the thing be “übergeben” (handed over). 
1439
 Lurger and Faber, Principles VIII.-3:101 Comment 12 and 13. For criticism, see L P W van Vliet, 
“Acquisition and Loss of Ownership of Goods - Book VIII of the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference” (2011) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 292 at 316-321. 
1440
 The extent to which possession of moveables in, for example, a private dwelling house can be 
said to be “public” is debateable. 
1441
 This may make it an appropriate factor in allocating the burden of proof, see Lurger and Faber, 
Principles 433. In relation to French law, Dross argues that affording a probative function to 
possession is more rationally justifiable than giving it a role in acquisition: “Singulier destin” 45. 
1442
 Of course, acquisitive prescription usually requires a continuous period of possession whereas 
good faith protection is generally instantaneous. For a comparative overview of rules on acquisitive 
prescription of moveables, see Lurger and Faber, Principles 973-981. 
1443
 See for example Motive III 345. For criticism of this view, see Van Vliet, “Acquisition” at 318. 
1444
 For the distinction between noumenal and phenomenal (empirical) possession, see Kant, 




It is not desirable, however, to reduce noumena entirely to phenomena, 
abandoning the distinction between ownership and possession.
1445
 As things 
currently stand, physical control is often only a weak indicator of ownership.
1446
 In 
terms of promotion of commerce and ease of transaction, it is not particularly 
important whether an acquirer enters into possession but rather simply that he or she 
has relied on some appearance of ownership.
1447
 From this perspective, good faith is 
more important than possession in justifying protection of the acquirer. 
 
A further problem with understanding good faith acquisition as a type of 
instantaneous acquisitive prescription is that no lapse of time is necessary to 
complete the right of the acquirer. This means that some of the traditional 
justifications for acquisitive prescription (rewarding potentially productive use and 
penalizing original owners who make no effort to recover possession)
1448
 do not 
apply. Unlike acquisitive prescription, favouring any party in instant physical control 
does not promote social and legal stability; a party who has only just acquired 
possession will prevail over an original owner with a long-term connection to the 
thing. It is true that the aim of producing certainty as to rights is relevant to the case 
of good faith acquisition. It seems doubtful, however, that requiring possession on 
the part of the transferee would resolve the difficulties surrounding publicity in 
transfers of moveables. Although acquirers would be afforded increased security, as 
owners who may sometimes wish to entrust others with possession of the thing they 
would face a greater risk of loss. The choice lies not between “more” and “less” 
uncertainty but between the kinds of uncertainty various people must bear.
1449
 
Regardless of other economic or social reasons for favouring the acquirer, a short 
                                                          
1445
 Indeed, as Kant argues, legal rights in property exist precisely for the benefit of those owners who 
are not in physical possession; physical possession is already protected by our right to physical 
integrity. See Kant, Metaphysics paras 246-248. 
1446
 For further strong criticism of the idea that possession provides a reliable indication of right see 
von Lübtow, “Hand Wahre Hand” 208 and Lurger and Faber, Principles 432. 
1447
 This point is made by Van Vliet (“Acquisition” 319) and Dross (“Singulier destin” 45). 
1448
 See generally D Johnston, Prescription and Limitation, 2
nd
 edn (2012) ch 1, for discussion of the 
role of fault/ negligence on the part of the original owner see paras 1.36-1.37. 
1449
 F I Michelman, “Ethics, Economics and the Law of Property” (2004) 39 Tulsa Law Review 663 at 
682. A similar point is made by Baird and Jackson, “Information” at 300. 
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period of possession is not a particularly persuasive justification for placing the 
burden of uncertainty on the original owner. 
 
On the other hand, the simplicity of a possession-based approach means that, 
although not increasing overall certainty, it may be a clear and comprehensible way 
to settle disputes. Decisions on a case-by-case basis will only add to insecurity; there 
are hence strong arguments for adopting a broad general rule, despite the fact that 
this may produce injustice in a small number of individual cases. Indeed, a semi-
absolute protection of either all owners or all acquirers appears in many ways 
preferable to a system with many distinctions between different categories of owner 
and acquirer, which may increase insecurity for all parties. Guisan, for example, 
praises the straightforwardness of the Italian solution of protecting all acquirers in 
good faith, regardless of whether the property is entrusted or stolen.
1450
 However, 
despite providing a useful rule of thumb, possession in itself does not explain why it 




In the case of certain types of moveable property, some form of registration 
or recording of property rights may be the most effective way to ensure publicity and 
security of rights. It is unlikely that there are many categories of moveable property 
for which it would be cost-effective to introduce a register of title, but there are 
already a number of different, privately-run, systems for recording information about 
thefts.
1452
 Factors that may indicate the suitability of a registration system include the 
desirability of separating use and ownership of and/or recognising multiple property 
rights in the same object, identifiability, infrequent transfers of property of that type 
and high value.
1453
 The particular cases of motor vehicles and cultural property are 
discussed below, but there may be other examples (e.g. electronic equipment) which 
would benefit from introduction of a more formal means of recording information 
about events such as creation of a security or theft. 
                                                          
1450
 Guisan, Protection 256-257. 
1451
 Guisan for example justifies this choice by reference to protection of commerce: Protection 256. 
1452
 Albeit with the support of police and other government agencies. A notable example is the 
Immobilise database, www.immobilise.com. For further information about this system and the others 
available see n 1478. 
1453




Unfortunately, however, many moveables are of low value (or depreciate in 
value quickly) and often functionally indistinguishable from others of the same type.  
They can also be quickly moved from place to place. It therefore seems unlikely that 
a registration system would be practicable for many sorts of moveable goods. Indeed, 
entirely fungible goods have traditionally not been subject to vindication, which 




(b) Preventing fraudulent and bad faith transactions 
It is at least sometimes the case that where a buyer fails to take possession, this is 
indicative of a sham transaction in which the aim is not actually to transfer 
ownership but to create a non-possessory security right. Although such transactions 
are excluded from the scope of the Sale of Goods Act
1455
 (and therefore the 
protections for good faith purchasers available under the Act), there exists a fear that 
protecting acquirers who do not take possession will favour one set of creditors at the 
expense of other creditors and innocent third parties.
1456
  There may be a need for 
reform of the law relating to security over moveables, but penalising all acquirers 
who are not in possession is not the only or necessarily the best way of preventing 
such transactions.
1457
 Rules differentiating transfers in security from other sales could 
be enforced aggressively by courts dealing with good faith acquisition. Where there 
has been a demonstrably genuine transfer, the risk of sham sales thus appears only a 




The commentary to the DCFR further suggests that a failure to take 
possession may facilitate embezzlement and is in itself an indication that something 
                                                          
1454
 Baird and Jackson point out that even traditionally fungible goods such as grain may, with the aid 
of technology such as radioactive tracers, be distinguishable, but that the costs of this would far 
outweigh the benefits. “Information” 306 fn 17. 
1455
 See s 62(4) and also Art IX.-1:202(3) and (4) of the DCFR, noted by Van Vliet, “Acquisition” 
319. 
1456
 This risk is illustrated by the facts in the Gerson case, discussed in ch 4 D(3)(e)(iii). In the 
German context, the historic fear of sham transactions is discussed by P Heck, Grundriß des 
Sachenrechts (1930, repr 1960) 250 and Van Vliet, Transfer 54-55. 
 
1457
 See Van Vliet, “Acquisition” 318-319. 
1458
 Heck, Grundriß 250. 
240 
 
about the transaction is suspicious.
1459
 Although not explicitly stated, it seems that 
this view is probably linked to the idea discussed above that a transfer of possession 
will warn the original owner about the fraudulent transfer. Allowing good faith 
acquisition without possession is seen as enabling fraudulent entrustees to hide their 
unscrupulous actions from the original owner, and rewarding buyers who should 
have had doubts about the transaction. Leaving aside the question of the acquirer’s 
good faith, this argument neglects to consider whether requiring possession is 
actually effective in protecting original owners from fraud. While the owner may 
discover the embezzlement at an earlier stage, he or she will only be notified at the 
point when the thing is lost; recovery remains impossible.
1460
 Perhaps it is more 
likely that a successful claim for compensation can be brought against the fraudster, 
but this is by no means clear. 
 
This type of argument also raises questions about the relationship between the 
criterion of possession and that of good faith and the extent to which they can be 
separated. It is tempting to link the quality and character of the possession to the 
presence or absence of bad faith; a possessor who does not believe him or herself to 
be owner may not form the requisite
1461
 animus domini. In the development of the 
requirement that possession be “unequivocal”, French jurisprudence has been 
criticised for blurring the distinction between the will to acquire and the belief that 
one is in fact the owner.
1462
 One of the drafters of the DCFR has argued that if the 
transferee does not take possession, this in itself should be presumed to demonstrate 
a lack of good faith as failure to obtain physical control should automatically arouse 
the suspicion of the transferee.
1463
 Should possession be treated then as a necessary 
but insufficient condition for the establishment of good faith? 
 
It is submitted that a sharp demarcation of possession from good faith is 
desirable: where a transaction is conducted in dubious circumstances, the public 
                                                          
1459
 Lurger and Faber, Principles 892. 
 
1460
 See Van Vliet, “Acquisition” 321. 
1461
 Requisite in French law under Art 2276, but also in Scots law in relation to the intention to 
acquire ownership; see Carey Miller, “Good faith” 110-111; 120-121 and discussion in ch 4 
D(3)(b)(ii). 
1462
 See Zenati, “Revendication”. 
1463
 Lurger, “Transfer” at 61-62. 
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policy reasons for holding that there is a lack of animus domini are better considered 
in the context of good faith. The justifications for protecting good faith are discussed 
later, but the reasons for favouring physical possessors are distinct from and not 
reducible to these considerations.  The previously mentioned problems with 
attributing a “signalling” function to possession mean that is not a reliable measure 
of good faith; it has been argued that property doctrine should allow separation of 
possession and ownership and buyers must take this into account when considering 
what investigations of the seller are appropriate. Other factors, such as the norms and 
practices of in the market in question, will often be of equal or greater weight in 
identifying suspicious transactions. Although, therefore, possession may sometimes 
provide a useful default indicator of ownership, especially in the case of low value 
and rapidly traded goods, it should not be seen as a sufficient or even necessary 




(c) Importance of the physical connection to the thing 
Perhaps those who have physical control over a thing have a special connection 
which is worthy of recognition. Whatever the importance of good faith, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that only those with a physical link to the thing should be 
entitled to retention of the thing at the expense of the original owner. The interest of 
a party who has never possessed is liable to be the sort of interest best described as 
an interest in the exchange value of the thing, rather than its use value: an interest 
which can be adequately acknowledged with monetary compensation. Where an 
acquirer does not have unmediated possession, he or she should therefore have no 
greater claim to the object than the original owner.
1465
 Where there is a competition 
between parties none of whom are in possession (as for example in Michael 
Gerson),
1466 
there is no reason to override the usual rules of property law; no party 
has a special need for a proprietary (as opposed to a personal) claim. Although the 
                                                          
1464
 Guisan, Protection 218-220. 
1465
 See for example J Oeschler, “§§ 929–936 BGB”, in F J Säcker and R Rixecker (eds), Münchener 
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 6th edn (2013) vol 6 §933 para 1.  
 
1466
 (n 966). 
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acquirer may be in good faith, this is not sufficient to distinguish him or her from 




Further, before leaving the thing in possession of the seller it does not appear 
overly onerous to say that acquirers should consider the possibility of retransfer
1468
 
or a vindicatory claim.
1469
 The Motive for the BGB express the view that the trust an 
acquirer places in the transferor can be equated with an acceptance of risk;
1470
 
whatever the merits of this argument it is not obviously inequitable to link the 
availability of specific recovery to previous possession. This is not to suggest that 
physical possession alone justifies protecting an acquirer from vindication, but rather 
that it can play a role in determining which of several equally deserving parties 
should be awarded the thing itself, as opposed to a financial claim. An analogy may 
be made with the special protection afforded to the “proprietor in possession” under s 




Overall then, it has been argued that the acquirer’s possession does not 
provide an adequately accurate system for assessing good faith or signalling 
ownership.  Protection of all (good faith) parties in possession has the advantage of 
clarity and simplicity, but further justification is required for the choice to prefer 
acquirers over original owners. As an indicator of a particular type of connection 
with the thing, however, it is reasonable that possession should be a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for protection. 
 
C.THE ACTIONS OF THE OWNER 
 
(1) Diligence in Protecting Assets 
 
                                                          
 
1467
 The reluctance of the courts to prefer a second (non-posessing) buyer over a first is demonstrated 
by the result in Fadallah (n 960). 
1468
 Of course, on this argument the retransfer would have to be accompanied by a transfer of 
possession in order to be valid. 
1469
 Heck, Grundriß 250. 
1470
 Motive 345. 
 
1471
 Although see now s 80 of the Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, which does not give 
special protection to a transferee in possession. 
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Another means of justifying good faith acquisition is as counterpart to a limitation on 
the original owner’s right to recover in particular circumstances.
1472
 There are several 
reasons why such an approach might be advocated. There is the idea that the owner 
is the better risk bearer;
1473
 some scholars have further argued that in circumstances 
where the original owner could have done more to prevent the loss, he or she may 
bear more moral culpability. Penalising negligent behaviour would give owners 
increased incentives to take care of their property. For example, Schwartz and Scott 
have suggested basing the owner’s ability to recover entirely on the absence of 
negligence (rather than a property rights-based calculus.)
1474
 This would have the 
advantage of placing the owner in control of the risk of deprivation of ownership; a 
clearly defined negligence standard might also be a more appropriate measure of 
culpability than whether there had been a voluntary transfer of possession. 
 
However, concerns about predictability equally apply to the case of verifying 
negligence and it is not clear that the “proxies” Schwartz and Scott propose for 
evaluating negligence,
1475
 which include utilisation of customary theft prevention 
systems and measures such as anti-theft tagging, will provide sufficient certainty for 
owners. Who is to decide whether the owner has invested in a sufficiently robust 
security system, and, given that individual circumstances may vary widely, will it be 
foreseeable to the owner precisely what is in his or her case required? As Schwartz 
and Scott suggest that the law need not evaluate the buyer’s behaviour,
1476
 this will 
also reduce certainty for the buyer who has no means of ascertaining whether or not 
the owner will be permitted to recover, and no way to influence the eventual 
outcome. 
 
A negligence based rule may also be criticised for its unduly harsh treatment 
of a careless owner, which, as is evident from judicial comments in cases such as 
                                                          
1472
 If the original owner is to be deprived of the right to recover, it is logical to provide in this 
circumstance for ownership to be formally transferred to the most appropriate party. This avoids the 




 See ch 5 C(3)(e). 
1474
 Schwartz and Scott, “Rethinking”. 
1475
 Schwartz and Scott, “Rethinking” 1361-1362. 
1476
 Schwartz and Scott, “Rethinking” 1364. 
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Moorgate Mercantile Co v Twitchings,
1477
 may be viewed as an interference with the 
owner’s perceived liberty to act in a careless manner. If owners neglect to use, say, 
an adequate burglar alarm, does this really warrant depriving them of the right to 
recover their property? As even slight negligence may be exploited by a thief or a 
fraudster, is it really possible to say that it was this negligence (rather than the 
actions of the fraudster or thief) which was responsible for the loss of the thing?
1478
 
Moreover, where neither party is negligent, a fault-based analysis does not help to 
justify protection of the owner over the good faith acquirer, who may have acted in 




Should the manner in which the owner lost possession of the goods affect 
assessment of his or her culpability? It has already been suggested that voluntary 
transfer of possession by the owner is not a sufficient reason to treat him or her as 
more blameworthy than the acquirer.  In contrast to the traditional distinction in 
German law between lost or stolen and entrusted property,
1480
  the DCFR proposes a 
rule which would protect all acquirers in good faith where acquisition is in the 
ordinary course of business.
1481
  It has been argued by one of the drafters that there 
are no convincing reasons for treating stolen property in a different manner from 
things which have been entrusted.
1482
 The owner should be expected to take 
precautions both against loss and theft and the possibility of fraud by entrustees. 
 
In general then, the actions of the original owner do not provide a robust 
justification for allowing good faith acquisition. A negligence-based standard would 
be complex to apply to individual cases, and if applied too strictly could place an 
                                                          
1477
 (n 905) at 919; 925. 
1478
 For example, in Hamblin (n 908) at 275 per Pearson LJ, it was accepted that it was the actions of 
a fraudulent car dealer, rather than the actions of the buyer in signing documents without reading 
them, which were responsible for the plaintiff finance company’s loss.  
1479
 Schwartz and Scott, “Rethinking” 1365 argue that the owner would then have no incentive to 
search for his or her property, meaning that the party which valued the object most highly might not 
have a chance to obtain it and hence creating inefficiency. This point is, however, relatively briefly 
argued and it is difficult to conclude from it that good faith acquisition will necessarily lead to an 
inefficient allocation.  
 
1480
 § 935 BGB excludes good faith acquisition under § 932 where the property is lost, stolen or 
otherwise missing. 
1481
 Art VIII.-3:101(2). 
1482
 Lurger, “Political Issues” at 49-50. 
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unfair burden on victims of fraud. Nor does the fact that an entrustment of possession 
has taken place reliably indicate negligence. 
 
(2) Diligent Search 
 
Where recovery by the original owner is permitted, should this be conditional upon 
reasonable and prompt attempts to search for the property? In terms of 
prescription/limitation of the owner’s claim, some judicial authority in the US has 
suggested that failure to take steps to publicise the loss of the property and to actively 
search for it indicates a culpable lack of diligence on the part of the owner which 
should not be allowed to prejudice a good faith purchaser.
1483
 With the increasing 
availability of electronic databases recording details of ownership and instances of 
loss or theft,
1484
 it is frequently possible for owners to take actions which might deter 
thieves and warn potential purchasers. A rule penalising those who failed to report a 
theft or loss to police (or register it in an appropriate electronic database)
1485
 would 
presumably encourage information sharing and thereby increase the protection 
available to original owners. Purchasers would also be better able to conduct 
meaningful investigations into provenance of goods. 
 
However, such an obligation could be seen as an unwarranted imposition on 
the owner’s freedom to conduct his or her affairs as he or she wishes. As it has been 
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 See for example the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 2
nd
 Circuit in 
DeWeerth v Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987). The judgment in DeWeerth also reflects, 
however, the operation of New York’s “demand and refusal” rule under which limitation of the 
owner’s claim does not occur until the return of the property has been requested.  The “diligent 
search” rule reflects concerns about unreasonable delay in making a demand extending the limitation 
period indefinitely. A different result was subsequently reached by the New York Court of Appeals in 
Solomon R Guggenheim Foundation v Lubell  77 N.Y.2d 311 (N.Y. 1991) (discussed below), this 
was however held not to affect the result in DeWeerth  (DeWeerth v Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir. 
1994).  
1484
 For example, the Immobilise database (www.immobilise.com ) can be used by members of the 
public and businesses to register valued possessions or company assets and report theft or loss. Police 
can then access the database to check if a recovered item has been reported stolen. See also 
https://www.reportmyloss.com/ (a website for report lost property in the UK) and 
http://www.checkmend.com/uk/ (website providing information about used electrical equipment 
including whether it has been recorded as lost or stolen, is a counterfeit, has been cloned,  has had 
any insurance or warranty claims made against it and the number of previous owners). 
1485
 Penalties for those who do not register stolen art in an electronic registry set up for the purpose 
have been proposed by some scholars, see for example A Hawkins et al, “A Tale of Two Innocents: 
Creating an Equitable Balance Between the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of 
Stolen Art” (1995) 64 Fordham Law Review 49 at 88-95. 
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argued that the issue of whether a crime has been committed is not, in Scots law, 
relevant to transfer of ownership,
1486
 it would not be logical to tie recovery to 
informing the police. Given the existing separation between civil and criminal 
remedies, surely failure to bring a civil action timeously should be the only relevant 
bar to recovery. The existence of the registries of lost or stolen moveables mentioned 
above does not mean that such registries are sufficiently developed to play such an 
important role in determining property rights; further, in the absence of publicly run 
registries it is problematic effectively to force owners to use private and potentially 
unaccountable private databases. 
 
Moreover, to limit the owner’s power to recover would not entirely resolve 
the problem; it is submitted that an explicit conferral of ownership on the bona fide 
purchaser is necessary in order to bring greater clarity to the law. When the issue is 
approached as one of transfer of ownership, the diligence of the owner’s enquiries 
does not seem a satisfactory basis on which to determine the validity of a transfer to 
a bona fide purchaser: this is not predictable by an acquirer and indeed, where it is 
only the after the acquisition has taken place that a theft is discovered, should the 
original owner’s subsequent actions retrospectively determine the validity of the 
transfer? 
 
A prominent judgment of New York Court of Appeals has also highlighted the 
practical difficulties that would attend a rule of this type: 
 
All owners of stolen property should not be expected to behave in the same 
way and should not be held to a common standard. The value of the property 
stolen, the manner in which it was stolen, and the type of institution from 
which it was stolen will all necessarily affect the manner in which a true 
owner will search for missing property… [I]t would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to craft a reasonable diligence requirement that could take into 
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 See ch 4 C(1). 
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Although it would be possible for a court to assess on the facts of every case whether 
an owner had acted reasonably in the circumstances, this would add an extra level of 
cost and uncertainty to legal proceedings. Unless clear rules were set out in advance, 
it might be impossible for an owner to ascertain exactly what actions would be found 
to be appropriate. The case of stolen or embezzled art is discussed later, but, in 
relation to other moveables, even a minimum requirement that stolen property be 
reported to the police might be problematic. How long would the owner have to 
make the report? Where the owner has not discovered the theft, it obviously will not 
be reported, but what if the failure to discover is due to negligence by the owner? A 
duty to monitor one’s property is more onerous than a duty to search if it is 
discovered to be stolen. 
 
Moreover, where the property has already reached the hands of the good faith 
purchaser at the time the (non-negligent) owner discovers the theft (a potentially 
common occurrence), such a “diligent search” rule would be of no benefit in warning 
the purchaser. Placing an obligation on the owner to inform particular parties could 
also inadvertently lead to an expectation that acquirers should make particular checks 
prior to purchasing. Finally, the operation of such a rule in relation to embezzled 
property would be problematic, as where the owner is not in possession of the thing 
it is usually only after the unauthorised transfer that the loss will come to light and 
recovery will be attempted. 
 
D. THE ROLE OF GOOD FAITH 
 
(1) Nature and General Concept 
 
In order to investigate its justificatory role, it is first necessary to explain what is 
meant by the term “good faith”. At the most intuitive level, good faith indicates a 
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 Guggenheim (n 1483) at 320. For criticism of the decision, see Hawkins “Tale”. 
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genuine belief in the authority of the seller on the part of the acquirer. Actual 
knowledge of the transferor’s lack of title will logically exclude good faith.
1488
  
However, as well as the mental state of the acquirer legal doctrine will often have 
regard to the external circumstances of the transaction. Differing understandings of 
the term “good faith” may therefore involve either or both of an objective and a 
subjective (ethical and psychological) component.
1489
 Jurisdictions vary in the extent 
to which anything other than actual knowledge
1490
 can be taken into account.
1491
 
Presumably in order to ensure prudent and careful behaviour on the part of potential 
transferees, some objective criteria are usually incorporated.
1492
 For example, the 
DCFR refers to what the transferee knew or could reasonably be expected to 
know.
1493
 There is some ambiguity in the Scots jurisprudence, but, on the basis of the 
discussion in Chapter 4,
1494
 it is submitted that Scots law takes into account both 
actual and constructive knowledge. 
 
What is the relationship, if any, between good faith and negligence?  The Sale 
of Goods Act 1979
1495
 refers to actual honesty on the part of the acquirer, regardless 
of any negligence that may have occurred. This is presumably to ensure that the 
standard imposed on buyers is not too onerous; it is difficult to define precisely what 
would amount to negligence in the case of an ordinary consumer transaction. Is some 
specific knowledge of the other’s right required, or simply carelessness in 
investigating the transferor’s authority? As virtually any moveable object could, in 
theory, be held on hire or loan it might be difficult or impossible for an acquirer to 
argue that a purchase was entirely free from doubt. In German law, where the 
acquirer is not aware due to “gross negligence”
1496
 that the thing does not belong to 
the transferor, no acquisition is possible.  An “obligation to inform” may arise based 
on the subject of the transaction, the identity of the transferor and the circumstances 
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 For example, the jurisdictions surveyed in Faber and Lurger, Principles at 910- 917. 
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 See S Litvinoff, “Good Faith” (1997) 71 Tulane Law Review 1645 at 1649. 
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 E.g. presumed knowledge or negligence. 
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 For a survey of European jurisdictions, see Faber and Lurger, Principles at 910-917. 
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 Ch 4 D(3)(b). 
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 Section 61(3). 
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in Münchener Kommentar §932. 
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in which the transaction was concluded.
1497
 There is, however, no general duty of 
enquiry.
1498
 While most systems will seek to exclude particularly egregious cases of 
carelessness on the part of an acquirer, it is not clear to what extent “negligence” 
performs a role that other criteria such as reasonableness do not. 
 
Insofar as some reference to external circumstance is always necessary in 
assessing subjective belief, good faith is not a neutral concept. As the historical 
survey in the previous chapters demonstrates, expectations regarding the behaviour 
of purchasers are shaped by societal and market norms. Although in respect of 
moveables there are usually no registers of title, the investigations required of a 
reasonable purchaser will change according to the prevailing market practice. This 
will also determine whether something about a particular transaction (such as its time 
or location) is seen as suspicious. It is conjectured that the greater the perceived need 
for anonymity and rapidity of transactions, the greater will be the law’s emphasis 
upon the outward circumstances of the transaction rather than the subjective 
knowledge of the parties.  From such a strictly economic (rather than fairness- based) 
perspective, there is little interest in investigating the innermost workings of the mind 
of the acquirer. This approach does not necessarily disadvantage buyers, who will 
also be able to rely on the apparent propriety of the transaction. As was identified 
when considering the UCC,
1499
 the eventual result is that in some jurisdictions 
purchasers are simply required to buy in the “ordinary course of business” following 
the norms of the market, the acquirer thus becoming the “commercial” rather than 




A further crucial aspect of the establishment of good faith is the rules 
regarding evidence. The question of where the burden of proving good faith should 
lie has been the subject of some debate following the suggestion in the DCFR that 
the party seeking to assert good faith should have to establish the facts supporting his 
                                                          
1497
 O Jauernig, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: Kommentar (2011) § 932 para 17. 
1498
 BGH 1st March 2013, V ZR 92/12 para 13. 
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 See ch 5 C(1)(b). 
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 The drafters point out that it is difficult for the original owner to 
prove anything about the transaction by which the transferee acquired the thing.
1502
 
Moreover, the transferee is the one who benefits from an assertion of good faith, so it 
is reasonable that he or she should be the one to provide evidence to support the 
claim.
1503
  On the other hand, if good faith is not presumed this could lead to 
increased litigation, with the attendant uncertainty for original owners over their 
prospects of recovery.
1504
 The ideal solution is probably some compromise between 
the two extremes,
1505
 but whatever the position adopted, the problem can only be 
satisfactorily resolved in the light of a broader conception of the good faith doctrine 
and its justification and purpose. The ultimate issue is what we can know, or 
presume, about property rights and the extent to which the law should seek to operate 
on the basis of appearances. 
 
(2) Justificatory Role 
 
What are the reasons for giving special protection to those who act in good faith? 
The role of good faith as a moral standard, in particular in the Canon law, has been 
mentioned,
1506
 but modern norms of good faith do not necessarily demand that the 
buyer act in a praiseworthy manner.
1507
 Moreover, even assuming the buyer to have 
acted with the utmost honesty and rigour, the property may well have left the original 
owner’s possession entirely without fault or carelessness. It is difficult to regard a 
buyer’s good faith as automatically rendering him or her more morally deserving. 
What follows focuses, therefore, on the potential for norms of good faith to provide 
social and economic benefits by harmonising public expectations about others’ 
behaviour. 
                                                          
1501
 See DCFR Art VIII-F3:101(1)(d); Faber and Lurger, Principles at 896-897; A F Salomons, “The 
Purpose and Coherence of the Rules on Good Faith Acquisition and Acquisitive Prescription in the 
Draft Common Frame of Reference: A Tale of Two Gatekeepers” (2013) 21  European Review of 
Private Law 843 at 854-855; Lurger, “Transfer” at 62-63. 
1502
 Lurger and Faber, Principles 896. 
1503
 Lurger, “Transfer” at 62.  
1504
 Salomons, “Purpose” at 861-862. 
1505
 See Lurger, “Transfer” at 62-63, citing Salomons’ suggestion that the burden of proof on the 
acquirer should be removed after a short period of time such as 3 years. 
1506
 See ch 2 C(4)(c)(2). 
1507
 For example, under s 61(3) of the Sale of Goods Act it is enough for a buyer to act “honestly”, 




As emerges from the comments above, good faith rules serve to promote the 
trust and confidence necessary for the operation of markets. To emphasise the actions 
of the acquirer, rather than the degree of culpability of the original owner, affords 
increased predictability to buyers and enables them to mitigate their own risk of loss. 
By ensuring that contracting parties can act on their (reasonable) beliefs about the 
other party, it is possible to solve some of the epistemological problems inherent in 
transfer of moveables which become particularly pressing in large and anonymous 
markets. In this respect, good faith rules must strike an appropriate balance between 
protecting an acquirer’s trust in the apparent legal position whilst promoting third 
parties’ (such as the original owner’s) confidence that the acquirer will obey the 
norms of the market and act with respect for others’ potential rights. It is difficult to 
achieve this using prescriptive formulae; careful evaluation of the particular facts of 
the case is required. 
 
Further, norms of good faith can play an important role in regulating the flow 
of information regarding property rights and establishing a robust duty on the part of 
the acquirer to investigate ownership. In this respect, good faith may be a more 
sensitive device than a simple possession requirement.
1508
 Adjusting the strictness of 
the standard of good faith adopted has been cited by one of the drafters of the DCFR 
as one of the most powerful methods for managing potential outcomes.
1509
 Although 
it has been argued that the moral praiseworthiness of the acquirer should not 
automatically outweigh the claim of the original owner, a demanding standard of 
good faith can be an effective tool for ensuring that the behaviour of the buyer is 
careful and respectful of others’ rights. Where means for investigating ownership 
(such as registries of stolen property) exist, duties of good faith can encourage their 
utilisation. 
 
This does not mean, however, that good faith is an unproblematic concept. 
Good faith has been characterised here as an “open” norm, the implications of which 
will vary according to the circumstances of the case. However, its flexibility also 
                                                          
1508
 See Salomons, “New rules” at 152. 
1509
 Lurger, “Transfer” at 60. 
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invites the criticism that it lacks the requisite normative substance to perform a 
justificatory role.  Due to the need for publicity, legal systems are often concerned 
less with subjective good faith and more with the transferor’s possession or other 
external signs of right. In the absence of any more substantial public indication as to 
ownership, it is difficult to justify one person’s belief alone binding all third parties. 
Although allowing reliance on reasonable belief may be beneficial for markets, it 
does not seem in itself a sufficient criterion for deciding between an original owner 
and an acquirer both of whom may be acting on such honest convictions.
1510
 Indeed, 
as commented earlier, it is the legal rules themselves which establish what market 
participants may reasonably expect and not vice versa; reference to the benefits of 
requiring some level of good faith does not avoid the necessarily difficult choice 
regarding the standards of care expected of each party. 
 
Moreover, the mutability of what good faith is understood to demand of an 
acquirer makes it difficult to identify with any precision its core significance. It has 
been pointed out that notions of good faith will differ across time and place. Even 
within current Scots law, it is difficult to determine in the abstract whether a 
particular circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of an acquirer. There is a 
tension between the objective and subjective elements involved; unless assessed 
entirely objectively, some reference to the actual subjective state of mind of the 
transferee will be required. Although certainly some standards of fair dealing are 
necessary in any market, the essential unpredictability of good faith is such that 
outside the realm of the individual case it does not provide a coherent foundation for 
transfer of property rights. Hesselink has contended that its functions should be 
understood as concretisation, supplementation and correction of the law rather than 




(3) Role as an Exclusionary Device 
                                                          
1510
 Karner, for example, comments that the principle of Vertrauenschutz, or protection of confidence/ 
legitimate expectations, would apply both to the expectations of the original owner and those of the 
acquirer: Gutgläubiger Mobiliarerwerb 59. 
1511
 M Hesselink, “The Concept of Good Faith”, in A S Hartkamp et al. (eds), Towards a European 
Civil Code, 4th ed (2011) 619 at 627-628; 640-642. Hesselink does not discuss in detail the status of 




Despite the evident utility of provisions referring to good faith, this characterisation 
of good faith as a limited and supplementary doctrine appears a more accurate 
depiction of its importance in practice, at least in the property context. If good faith 
cannot, in itself, justify acquisition by the transferee, it is certainly the case that it can 
be productively combined with other factors to act as a “control device”. Rather than 
grant absolute protection to either the owner or the acquirer, the use of such open-
ended norms
1512
 permits a context-specific allocation of rights and duties between the 
parties.
1513
 In many systems bad faith is a vitiating factor, but good faith in itself, 
whether subjectively or objectively assessed, cannot be described as the principal 
justification for protecting the buyer. For example, in French law good faith is not 
explicitly mentioned at all in Art 2276,
1514
 and has sometimes been argued not to be 
required at all in order to benefit from the article’s protection.
1515
 The DCFR also 





Likewise, in England and Scotland, Section 23 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
simply confirms that a transfer by a party with a voidable title will be valid unless 
bad faith is present. Sections 24 and 25 of the Act approach good faith as one factor 
amongst others (possession on the part of the transferor followed by delivery, both of 
which were discussed above) which will serve to validate a prima facie ineffective 
transfer. Although the acquirer’s genuine belief in the propriety of the transaction is 
required, it is not the policy of the Act to provide a general protection for all good 
faith transferees. It is other factors such as possession which are presumed to have 
induced some form of reliance; good faith is used to exclude those acquirers who 
were not, in fact, acting under an honest misapprehension. 
 
                                                          
1512
 One term that has been adopted for such incompletely-specified norms is “standards”. For 
discussion, see A Lehavi, “The Dynamic Law of Property: Theorizing the Role of Legal Standards” 
(2010) 42 Rutgers Law Journal 81 at 86. 
1513
 See for example the flexible approach adopted by the drafters of the DCFR: Faber and Lurger, 
Principles 895. On the necessary “incompleteness” of property rights, see Lehavi, “Dynamic Law” 
105. 
1514
 It is, however, required under Art 1141. 
1515
 See for example R Poincaré, Du Droit de Suite dans la Propriété Mobilière (1883) 122. 
1516
 Art VIII.-2:101 read with art VIII.-3:101. 
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The understanding of good faith contended for here, then, views its function 
as primarily provision of flexibility rather than normative force. Although the view 
of good faith advanced does not provide a neat solution to the bona fide purchase 
problem, it clarifies the conceptual role of good faith in property law doctrine. 
Notwithstanding the need for stability, it is undesirable for property law rules to 
prescribe every outcome ex ante with complete fixity. The criterion of good faith is 
therefore an attractive way to allow the particular facts of each case to be taken into 
account. 
 
E. QUASI-SECURITIES AND GOOD FAITH PROTECTION 
 
(1) Policy Issues: Facilitation of Security versus Publicity 
 
The law regarding good faith acquisition may often have a considerable impact on 
the security interests of creditors. The law of security is in general outwith the scope 
of the thesis,
1517
 but, particularly in the case of devices such as retention of title 
which function as securities, conflicts arise between the application of the nemo plus 
rule and protection of good faith third parties. Such situations require what is in 
essence allocation of the insolvency risk among various voluntary and involuntary 
creditors. If legal policy is to promote the availability of security,
1518
 there must be 
some certainty for the secured party that his or her interest will prevail. One of the 
reasons for the failure of the Louisiana civil code reform seems to have been the 
fears of those who wished to hold non-possessory, non-registered quasi-securities 





However, it is also important to ensure that purchasers are protected from the 
effect of undisclosed and potentially undiscoverable securities. The only recognised 
                                                          
 
1517
 For an overview of the Scottish debates, see Scottish Law Commission, Moveable Transactions. 
For English law, see H Beale et al., The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (2012) chs 13-14.  
1518
 Broadly speaking, this is the approach favoured by the Scottish Law Commission: “Moveable 
Transactions” ch 12. 
1519
 These fears appear to have been unfounded. See Stroud, “Sale” 60-61. 
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forms of security over corporeal moveables
1520
 have traditionally been publicised by 
means of the creditor’s possession, but devices such as retention of ownership 
clauses and “sale and leaseback” use ownership as a means of protecting the 
creditor’s interest while leaving possession of the thing with the debtor.  A new form 
of non-possessory security publicised by registration has been suggested by the 
Scottish Law Commission in their Discussion Paper on Moveable Transactions.
1521
 
According to the Commission, any sale to a buyer in the ordinary course of business 
should be enough to protect a buyer from the effect of such a security;
1522
 buyers 
would in addition be protected where the existence of the security was not evident 
from the proposed register.
1523
 The extent to which this proposal would affect the 




(2) Good Faith Acquisition of Ownership for Security Purposes 
 
Where a creditor attempts to acquire ownership for the purposes of security, should 
he or she be afforded the same protection as other acquirers in good faith? It was 
argued earlier that, although possession is only an imperfect means of obtaining 
publicity, it is reasonable for an acquirer who does not take possession to forfeit good 
faith protection.  So, for example, where property held subject to a retention of title 
clause is purchased by a creditor and immediately leased back to the debtor, the 
creditor would not be able to argue that ownership had been acquired in good faith. 
Where it is clear that the sale and leaseback transaction is intended to function as a 
security, this approach does not seem problematic. There is in effect a competition 
between two quasi-securities; as argued earlier, there is no convincing reason as to 
why preference should be given to the second creditor.
 1525
 Neither promotion of 
security nor respect for the publicity principle suggests that the second transaction is 
more deserving of protection. Where the original owner is not another creditor, for 
example if borrowed property is sold and leased back to the seller, it appears unjust 
                                                          
 
1520
 I.e. pledge and lien. 
1521
 See Scottish Law Commission, “Moveable Transactions” ch 16. 
1522
 Scottish Law Commission, “Moveable Transactions” para 16.41. 
1523
 Scottish Law Commission, “Moveable Transactions” paras 16.42-16.43. 
1524
 See Scottish Law Commission, “Moveable Transactions” ch 21. The initial position of the 
Commission is against recharacterisation. 
 
1525
 See ch 4 D(3)(e)(iii). 
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to prevent the original owner from recovering goods which have remained 
throughout in the control of the borrower. If the creditor does take delivery of the 
thing, however, it is difficult to distinguish his or her position from that of any other 
acquirer. 
 
(3) Conflict between Creditor and Good Faith Purchaser. 
 
The recognition of a particular security right, the scope of the right and the position it 
gives the holder of that right vis-à-vis other secured and unsecured creditors reflects 
a balance that must be struck by law makers between the parties involved: debtor, 
suppliers, credit institutions, unsecured creditors, the treasury etc.
1526
 Given the wide 
use of functional securities such as retention of title, and the current lack of 
alternative non-possessory securities, to allow debtors to evade their creditors by 
transferring creditors’ goods in their possession to a good faith third party might have 
detrimental impacts on the provision of credit. It is for this reason that property held 
on the basis of a conditional sale agreement falling under the Consumer Credit Act 
1974 is excluded from the scope of s 25 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.
1527
 Hire 
purchase transactions are moreover excluded as they are not an “agreement to buy” 




While any future reforms in this area will no doubt consider the need for notification 
and buyer protection in greater detail,
1529
 the current Scots position is not at all 
satisfactory. Some uncertainty is inevitable surrounding ownership of moveables; 
acquirers must therefore accept a certain amount of risk. However, the distinction 
between those transactions which are regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974 
and those which are not is complex and not easily investigable by potential 
purchasers. The law in this area has been a source of concern at least since the report 
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 This point is made by Drobnig, Divergences 23-24. 
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Hire Purchase Act 1964, see ch 4 D(4(a). 
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 See Helby (n 740); Close Asset Finance (n 1005). 
1529




of the Crowther Committee.
1530
 The Diamond Review recommended that all good 
faith purchasers of property entrusted for the purposes of security should be 
protected; under proposals in a (later abandoned) Consultative Report on Company 
Security Interests by the Law Commission for England and Wales buyers in the 
ordinary course of business would also have been protected against undisclosed 




Whether or not recharacterisation of quasi-securities is eventually adopted, it 
is submitted that greater publicity should be necessary before such arrangements can 
be enforced against good faith third parties. The balance of risk at the moment is 
strongly in favour of those extending credit, yet, as is evident from the facts in 
Michael Gerson, the proliferation of undisclosed security interests is also prejudicial 
to later creditors. 
 
F. PROTECTION BASED ON THE NATURE AND CONTEXT OF THE 
TRANSACTION 
 
(1) Characteristics of the Transaction 
 
In contrast to the focus so far on the actions of the persons involved in the relevant 
transaction, reference to external circumstances is consonant with an approach 
concerned with the broader social effects of market regulation.
1532
 It was seen in 
Chapter 4 that in relation to sections 21-25 of the Sale of Goods Act there is 
currently no (explicit) restriction that the seller should regularly engage in sale in the 
class of thing sold, or that the sale was in the ordinary course of business. Other 




 and the Netherlands
1535
 recognise a 
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 See Consumer Credit para 4.2.8. 
1531
 Diamond, Review 77; Company Security Interests: A Consultative Report, Law Commission 
Consultation Paper no 176 (2004) at 3.253-3.263, discussed by L Gullifer, “Exceptions to the Nemo 
Dat Rule in Relation to Goods and The Law Commission’s Proposals”, in J de Lacy (ed), The Reform 
of UK Personal Property Security Law (2010) 188. The English proposals included recharacterisation 
of existing quasi-securities. 
1532
 This is noted by Salomons, “Economics” 206. 
1533
 § 935(2) BGB allows good faith acquisition of lost or stolen things that are alienated by way of 
public auction or in an public auction conducted online pursuant to § 979 (1a) BGB. 
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“market overt” style rule protecting all acquirers in particular markets, even in the 
case of stolen goods. 
 
From the point of view of the buyer, these formulations are valuable in 
clarifying the level of security that can be expected in the relevant context. If 
furtherance of trade is genuinely the most important justification for favouring the 
bona fide purchaser, it follows these protections should be structured so as to benefit 
those who transact in accordance with the norms of commercial life. As has been 
seen, this has implications for the standard of good faith adopted, but inferences 
might also be drawn about the situations in which it is most important that acquirers 
should be protected. Several different potential bases can be suggested for 
identifying the relevant transactions. 
 
(a) Geographical location 
Under the market overt rule in English law the transactions protected were defined 
spatially, by reference to them having taken place within a particular local market. 
This approach faced numerous cogent criticisms,
1536
 a particular problem being 
delineation of the markets affected. In modern urban centres, it is less easy to 
geographically isolate the focal points of trade; indeed, a substantial number of sales 
are concluded in homes using the internet or telephone. The anonymity of urban life 
means that even sale at a public market stall no longer provides much added 
publicity. To attempt to draw up a list of all locations requiring protection would be 
time consuming and complex,
1537
 and would require buyers to be aware of and able 
to easily utilise this information. It could also make it attractive for thieves and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1534
 See Art 2277 (formerly 2280) Code Civil, which provides that where a lost or stolen thing is 
bought at a fair, market or public sale an owner must reimburse the possessor the price that he or she 
has paid in order to recover it. 
1535
 Art 3:86 (3a) Burgerlijk Wetboek provides that, where a stolen object is acquired by a natural 
person acting in a private (non-trade or business) capacity from a transferor who sells such objects 
regularly to the public using business premises destined for that purpose and who is acting in the 
ordinary course of business, the original owner will not be able to recover the item. The only 
exception is where the transferor is an auctioneer. 
1536
 Mentioned in ch 4 E(2)(b). 
1537
 For some of the complexities attendant on the definition of market overt, see the overview 
provided by Davenport and Ross, “Market Overt”. 
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fraudsters to target particular locations,
1538
 although traders at the markets identified 
would presumably be expected to take extra precautions against these risks. Overall, 





(b) “Ordinary course of business” transactions and consumer protection 
An alternative way of recognising the importance of certain commercial and business 
settings is the adoption of a broad protection for those who buy in the “ordinary 
course of business”. A crucial question is of course how the “ordinary course of 
business” would be defined.  The core idea seems to be compliance with the establish 
norms and practices of the market in question. Like good faith rules, depending on 
how restrictively such a criterion was interpreted a high amount of flexibility could 
be incorporated. 
 
Prima facie, this approach relies on the existence of regulated and well-
functioning markets. However, it does not necessarily depend on the idea that 
legitimate businesses are likely to be regulated or supervised by the state so as to 
prevent fraud and theft.
1540
 The drafters of the DCFR argue that stolen goods are 
simply unlikely to be sold in the ordinary course of business; acquirers can trust a 
legitimate business in the vast majority of cases.
1541
 An “ordinary course of business” 
rule aims therefore to protect this lawful trade while excluding irregular and informal 
markets. 
 
These assumptions can, however, be questioned. There is evidence that, at 
least in the UK, stolen goods are frequently sold to legitimate businesses.
1542
 
Moreover, according to a (relatively) recent Home Office Report, a substantial 
percentage (around 20%) of goods such as bicycles, laptops and other electronic 
                                                          
1538
 Prevention of theft was, of course, cited as one of the principal reasons for the abolition of the 
market overt rule, see ch 4 E(2)(b).  
1539
 A similar conclusion is reached by the drafters of the DCFR: Lurger and Faber, Principles 899. 
1540
 Lurger and Faber, Principles 899-900. 
1541
 Lurger and Faber, Principles 900. 
1542
 In one study, 78% of the thieves sampled disposed of stolen property to legitimate business 
owners: J L Schneider, “Stolen-Goods Markets: Methods of Disposal” (2005) 45 British Journal of 
Criminology 129 at 137. 
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equipment are purchased second hand or informally.
1543
 An “ordinary course of 





A more persuasive justification is that those acting in the ordinary course of 
business should, for purely objective reasons, be allowed to rely on the apparent 
propriety of their actions. If the aim of protecting purchasers is genuinely to favour 
commerce, then it is entirely logical to delineate the scope of protection by reference 
to legitimate commercial transactions. Unlike good faith, which does not necessarily 
provide a clear reason for preferring acquirer over original owner, protection of 
purchasers in the ordinary course of business openly favours those who consume.
1545
 
While its actual effectiveness in increasing economic activity can be questioned, an 
“ordinary course of business” rule would send a clear message about the category of 
people that the law wishes to protect. 
 
A limited version of this argument would focus on consumers: where an 
individual consumer is transacting with a seller operating in the ordinary course of 
business, it is assumed that there will often be an imbalance in economic power and 
ability to access information regarding the ownership of goods.
1546
 One possible 
approach would be to give full protection to any parties purchasing as a 
consumer.
1547
 As many purchasers of lower-value moveables may be unaware of the 
rules regulating property rights in stolen or embezzled goods, this might well be in 
line with consumer expectations.
1548
 It could be argued that there is currently a 
greater need to protect consumers against the risk of buying stolen property, which is 
not covered by the protections in the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
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 A Finney and D Wilson, “Handling stolen goods: findings from the 2002/03 British Crime 
Survey and the 2003 Offending, Crime and Justice Survey” Home Office Online Report 38/05 at 13-
14. 
1544
 Smith, Property Problems 187. 
1545
 Ordinary course of business-based rules are thus not, as Atiyah, Sale 379-380 suggests, simply 
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1546
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1547
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1548
 For a recent example of the confusion surrounding the law in this area, see M Brignall, “I paid 





An obvious initial difficulty would the definition of “consumer” and 
“consumer goods”.
1549
 One possibility would be link good faith acquisition to the 
other protections available under the proposed Consumer Bill of Rights.
1550
  This 
might well, however, lead to uncertainty and increased litigation over borderline 
cases. There are further problems with the notion that a consumer is necessarily more 
worthy of protection than a business seller. The drafters of the DCFR have criticised 
a simple consumer/ business distinction as crude.
1551
 Both categories of buyer may 
have acted entirely properly and in accordance with appropriate commercial norms. 
While commercial acquirers may often be better equipped to deal with risks, smaller 
businesses in particular might also benefit from increased protection. To bar business 
purchasers from good faith protection might even encourage risky or unlawful 
behaviour on the part of businesses, which would have no incentive to adopt a “best 
practice” approach. 
 
(c) Sales in which the state is involved. 
Public sales or auctions
1552
 are cited specifically in the French and German 
provisions mentioned above as providing increased protection to purchasers.
1553
 Is 
there a need for a clearer rule protecting purchasers in situations such as judicial 
sales and public auctions in Scotland?
1554
 Although the English market overt rule 
was justifiably criticised as anachronistic, in these contexts it is not unreasonable for 
the public to expect a state guarantee of ownership. Particularly where the state has 
overseen the confiscation of moveables, for example through the use of diligence or 
the impounding of stolen property the original owner of which cannot be identified, 
an acquirer might expect to rely on the correct procedures having been followed. 
Such persons transact on the faith of the authority of state officials and perhaps 
judicial sale, by protecting the interests of creditors, provides public benefit. In 
                                                          
1549
 As Davies points out, some types of property such as motor vehicles may be used for both 
personal and business purposes and are difficult to classify as “consumer goods”: “Ostensible 
Ownership” 215.  
 
1550
 See HL Bill 29 2014-15 and also the EU Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EU). 
1551
 Lurger and Faber, Principles 900. 
1552
 Used here the sense of an auction in which the property to be auctioned is either owned by the 
state, or sold under the authority of the state. 
1553
 See Art 2277 Code Civil and § 935(2) BGB. 
1554
 There is already some statutory protection for purchasers of lost and abandoned or stolen property 
disposed of by the police: Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 ss 71; 72; 86E. 
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Gladysheva v Russia, the fact that the state was involved and could have taken action 
to prevent the fraud was one of the factors that persuaded the ECtHR that a good 




The drafters of the DCFR point out, however, that, depending on the 
procedure adopted, it is by no means the case that a state-backed confiscation should 
be taken to indicate adequate investigation of the origin of the goods.
1556
 Nor do the 
circumstances of such sales necessarily give the owner a better chance of detecting 
and recovering the goods.
1557
 Why, therefore, should purchasers be more entitled to 
trust in an acquisition made in such contexts? 
 
In the end, perhaps no general rule covering all circumstances is possible. In 
relation to judicial sales in Scotland, statutory clarification of the situation would be 
desirable. In deciding whether any form of compensation should be available to the 
original owner, human rights considerations
1558
 suggest that proportionality will only 
allow deprivation of property without compensation where there is a very clear 
public interest and following a well-defined legal process. The position in cases 
where there is state involvement, however, provides limited assistance in relation to 
the more general problem of unauthorised transfer. 
 
(2) Type of Property Involved 
 
(a) Motor vehicles 
(i) Standard of good faith 
Further to the discussion of the Hire Purchase Act 1964 in Chapter 4, it seems 
worthwhile to consider whether there are any factors particular to the motor vehicle 
market which might suggest the need for special provision. Such property is 
obviously mobile and often high value, there is a thriving second hand market (so it 
is therefore attractive to steal) and vehicles are moreover routinely subject to quasi-
                                                          
1555
 See A(2)(b) above. 
1556
 Lurger and Faber, Principles 899. 
1557
 Lurger and Faber, Principles 900. 
1558
 See A(2)(b) above. 
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security devices separating possession and ownership such as hire purchase. This 
may have implications for the behaviour demanded of a good faith acquirer: the more 
valuable the property concerned, the greater investigations might reasonably be 
expected.
1559
 A stricter standard of good faith would benefit finance company owners 
and perhaps reduce the risk to purchasers of acquiring a stolen vehicle. 
 
It has been mentioned that, although there must be subjective honesty on the 
part of a purchaser, Scots law does not currently place any obligation on the 
purchaser to conduct any particular checks or enquiries. Vehicle registration 
documents are not evidence of ownership and do not have any private law function 
as “documents of title”.
1560
 It is possible that sale without the registration documents 
may be enough to raise suspicion and suggest that further investigation should be 
undertaken.
1561
 However, a hire purchase agreement may not be listed on the vehicle 
registration document. Even knowledge of a prior hire purchase agreement does not 




In German law, it seems that the good faith requirements operate in a stricter 
manner in regard to sales of motor vehicles. When acquiring a second-hand vehicle, 
it is expected that the Kraftfahrzeugbrief (vehicle registration document) will be 
presented, and (unlike the current UK registration document),
1563
 this allows the 
buyer to verify the identity of the person authorised to transfer the vehicle.
1564
 
Possession alone does not create the requisite legal appearance necessary for good 
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 See Davies, “Sales Law” 26 citing Discussion Papers by the Law Reform Commissions of 
Queensland and Victoria. 
1560
 See ch 4 D(4(a). 
1561
 See n 1058. 
1562
 Barker (n 1055). 
1563
 There has been harmonisation of vehicle registration documents within the EU: see Directive 
1999/37/EC. The UK fulfils its obligations under the directive by the inclusion of a statement that the 
registration document does not identify the owner of the vehicle. See Annex 1 part V C.4. The 
German registration certificate, although it does not function as a document of title (and hence, like 
the UK document, states that the holder of the registration certificate is not identified as the owner) 
nevertheless identifies the person who is entitled to dispose of the vehicle. The UK document only 
records the “keeper” of the vehicle, who is the person responsible for the vehicle’s licensing and day 
to day use on the road and who is answerable to the police and other enforcement authorities in 
respect of e.g. motoring and parking offences. 
1564






  If the vehicle registration document is not presented, there will 
be gross negligence such as would fall within the scope of § 932(2) BGB and operate 
to exclude acquisition. A private sale, or a sale from a dealer where there are any 
circumstances which arouse suspicion, will place a duty on the buyer to investigate 
the title further. French law is to a similar effect: possession of a vehicle without 
delivery of the registration document (or at least checking that it is in the seller’s 




On the basis of current UK registration documents, there is no simple way for 
a buyer in the UK to investigate ownership of a vehicle. Checks can be conducted 
with HPI Ltd, a private company which contains data on most thefts and hire 
purchase agreements. This information may, however, be incomplete or outdated. 
The cost of a search is at present £19.99 for a single vehicle.
1567
  To require a check 
to be conducted with HPI Ltd as a condition of good faith does not seem overly 
onerous financially, but forcing all purchasers to pay for a privately run service is 
problematic. There is no indication that there currently any plans to do this. It seems, 
therefore, that there is limited potential for onerous good faith obligations to play a 
greater role in identifying stolen and embezzled vehicles. 
 
(ii) Registration systems and availability of information 
Some have argued that the use of documents of title to further negotiability of certain 
types of moveable property indicates the increasing importance that will be attached 
to recording systems in transfer of title.
1568
 The Hire Purchase Act 1964 was felt to 
be necessary in order to alleviate hardship to the purchaser. Introduction of a form of 
registration system linked to a unique identifier such as the Vehicle Identification 
Number has been argued to provide the best solution to the remaining problems in 
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 BGH 13th May 1996 II ZR 222/95, approved BGH 1
st
 March 2013, V ZR 92/12. See also BGH 
13
th
 Sep 2006 VIII ZR 184/05. 
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 Cour de Cassation 30
th
 October 2008, Bulletin 2008, I, n° 242. A photocopy of the registration 
documents along with other proof of ownership may also be sufficient: Cour de Cassation 8
th
 
November 2007, no 06-20095. The French registration certificate contains a statement as to whether 
the holder (titulaire) of the registration certificate is the owner. 
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 See https://www.hpicheck.com/hpi_check.html. 
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 Kozolchyk, “Transfer” 1511-1512. 
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verifying ownership of vehicles.
1569
 In respect of undisclosed quasi-securities such as 
hire purchase agreements, some registration systems record only the existence of 
these securities whereas others purport to record ownership; it is not at the moment 
proposed that a system recording the ownership of vehicles be introduced in 
Scotland.
1570
 The Scottish Law Commission has published a Discussion Paper 
covering security over corporeal moveable property such as motor vehicles which 
suggests the introduction of a new non-possessory security over corporeal moveables 
based on a registration system.
1571
 This might prove an important development: it 
would be reasonable to require dealers or buyers from private individuals to search a 
public register in order to be protected against any undisclosed securities. 
 
As regards other developments in vehicle registration and licensing, the 
motor vehicle finance industry has been reluctant to introduce a more comprehensive 
recording system.
1572
 Liquidity is important in the car market; anything which might 
discourage buyers is thus a matter of concern. Reducing the cost to the buyer (thus 
encouraging ever more sales) is more important than increasing the amount of 
information that might be available. It seems unlikely that the protection afforded to 
purchasers by the Hire Purchase Act 1964 will be amended in the near future. In the 
absence of a change of practice in vehicle registration or the imposition of a duty to 
check with HPI Ltd (along with a duty to register in order to obtain protection), it 
will remain difficult for buyers of motor vehicles to conduct any meaningful 
investigation into the ownership of the vehicle. This, in turn, leaves owners (whether 
private individuals or finance companies) facing a slightly higher risk that their right 
will be lost to a purchaser in good faith. 
 
(iii) Do purchasers need greater protection? 
One problem with the current law is that consumers are protected if buying a hire 
purchase vehicle in good faith, but, although it may be equally difficult for a buyer to 
discover whether a vehicle has been stolen or embezzled, in that case the acquirer 
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 See Davies, “Wrongful Dispositions” 485-486. 
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 Scottish Law Commission, “Moveable Transactions” para 20.7. 
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 See Scottish Law Commission, “Moveable Transactions” chs 16 and 20. 
1572
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faces quite a severe financial loss.
1573
  There is an ongoing problem with “cloned” 
stolen vehicles: it may be impossible for a buyer, even one who runs proper checks, 
to discover that a vehicle has been stolen and the number plates etc. replaced.
1574
 The 
DVLA system is currently paper-based and not designed to detect vehicle crime.
1575
 
The lack of systems integration across the DVLA, insurance companies, servicing 
organisations and Vehicle and Operator Services Agency (VOSA) prevents cloned 




Within the scope of the current research it is difficult to say with certainty 
what would be the most desirable policy position. It is, at first glance, tempting to 
argue that purchasers should be protected against all risks, not simply those relating 
to undisclosed hire purchase contracts. Particularly if a vehicle is presented with 
forged registration forms, penalising the acquirer will not encourage him or her to 
make any further enquiries or otherwise operate to reduce the trade in stolen and 
embezzled vehicles. Given the emphasis on liquidity in the car market, it is perhaps 
surprising that increased protection has not been demanded. This may be due to a 
lack of public awareness or low numbers of stolen vehicles being traced, but it 
supports the view that the availability of extensive good faith protection may well be 
unimportant in terms of facilitation of commerce. A further complexity is added by 
the fact that it may often be insurers who, through their right of subrogation, seek to 
recover the stolen vehicle. 
1577
Although undoubtedly insurers are not interested in 
recovery of the physical vehicle, but rather only its economic value, to deny insurers 
the possibility of some form of recovery would presumably lead to an increase in the 
cost to the public of car insurance. Further research on the attitudes of purchasers, 
insurers and other interested parties is necessary to ascertain the most appropriate 
rule. 
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 Unless, of course, one the exceptions in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 applies.  
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 For a narrative describing how this type of theft operates, see Design Council UK, Vehicle-
Related Crime at 13. 
1575
 Design Council UK, Vehicle-Related Crime 26. 
1576
 Design Council UK, Vehicle-Related Crime 27.  
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A further gap in the current law is the lack of protection for trade and finance 
purchasers of vehicles subject to an undisclosed prior hire purchase agreement.
1578
 
According to the idea, discussed in relation to “ordinary course of business” 
arguments, that those who engage in legitimate economic activity should be 
safeguarded against certain risks, a dealer acting in accordance with commercial 
custom should be equally worthy of protection. On the other hand, those who profit 
most from the maintenance of market liquidity should perhaps be required to bear a 
greater share of the risk. Lord Denning in Pearson v Rose & Young Ltd suggested 
that a dealer in motor cars, who made substantial (and quick) profits from their 
resale, should be prepared to “occasionally get[] his fingers burnt.”
 1579
 No simple 
reconciliation of these arguments is possible, but any future reforms should, at 
minimum, adopt an approach to the business purchaser which is consistent across all 
types of moveable property, with the possible exception of objects of cultural or 
artistic importance. 
 
(b) “Cultural property” 
Although the topic can only be explored briefly here, there are several reasons for 
affording greater protection to owners of objects of recognised cultural value, such as 
art and antiquities. It is commonly accepted that a prolonged art market boom has led 
to increased demand for many types of cultural property.
1580
 This has in turn raised 
concerns about the trade in stolen and illegally excavated or exported objects and 
tensions at the international level, where there is a political divide between so-called 
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http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/crime/2013/201311-cba-heritage-cult-prop-strat-assmnt.pdf. 
The value of stolen art and antiquities in the UK alone is estimated to be over £300 million annually: 
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The main problem with establishing a special rule for cultural objects is 
determining to which property the rule applies.
1582
 Full discussion of possible 
definitions is outwith the scope of the present thesis, but an initial overview drawing 
on relevant international and EU law (discussed below) can be found in the work of 
the Scottish Law Commission
1583
 and the DCFR.
1584
 For reasons of certainty, it 
would be desirable to designate items of great national or cultural significance in 
advance. This might be possible, but is logistically difficult and, on an international 
level, might be expensive or impossible for some source nations. 
 
(i) Non-economic value 
In contrast to other moveables, increased scrutiny of provenance may be appropriate 
and desirable in the art market; the social and cultural significance of this type of 
property makes it particularly clear that economic goals are not the only concerns 
relevant to legal policy. It is difficult to capture the “value” of heritage preservation 
in solely monetary terms.
1585
 In terms of some artefacts deemed to be of cultural 
significance, there may be an argument that good faith acquisition should be 
excluded entirely or even that the property should be deemed extra commercium.
1586
 
                                                          
1582
 The difficulties of reaching an adequate definition of “cultural property” are discussed in the 
Scottish Law Commission’s report on Prescription at paras 3.16-3.20; the Commission in the end 
reached the view that cultural property should be subject to the same period for positive prescription 
as other moveables. 
1583
 Discussion Paper on Prescription and Title to Moveable Property (Scot Law Com DP No 144, 
2010) Part 4. 
1584
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1585
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(2010) 37 Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce 145 at 173-177. 
1586
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International Journal of Cultural Property 13; J M Podesta, “Saving Culture, but Passing the Buck: 
How the 1970 UNESCO Convention Undermines its Goals by Unduly Targeting Market Nations” 
(2008) 16 Cardozo Journal of Internationl & Comparative Law 457. Merryman does, however, 




It is perhaps for these reasons that the DCFR excludes cultural goods from the scope 




As regards the broader idea of sentimental attachment to art, and the 
possibility that this might imply an unusually strong bond between object and 
original owner,
1588
  despite the initial attractions of giving preference to those who 
can demonstrate sentimental attachment such an approach would seem likely to 
produce too much uncertainty. 
 
(ii) “Provenance” and availability of information 
Making information about property rights in cultural objects available through a 
register or database reduces the need to protect acquirers against prior theft or 
embezzlement. Development of databases could play a crucial role in combatting 
trade in illicit art.
1589
 Works of art and other cultural objects might be thought to be 
more suitable for inclusion in such a system than other moveables: they are more 
readily identifiable than other forms of property, and often have unique individual 
characteristics. This is, however, not always the case.
1590
 The extent to which 
information about provenance is sought by or available to buyers may in addition be 
limited.
1591
Although it might be expected that dealers in valuable and unique objects 





                                                          
1587
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In the absence of a more integrated approach to information sharing, it may 
still be appropriate to impose increased information costs upon dealers due to the 
social harm created by illegal trade. This is in contrast to other categories of 
moveables in which a liquid market and quick and easy purchase is a greater priority. 
It is important both for appreciation of the objects and to ensure their legitimate 
acquisition that a full history of the origin and previous owners of works of art and 
antiquities is provided.
1593
  For example, it was commented in one US case that: 
 
The [purchaser’s] claim that the failure to look into [the seller’s] authority to 
sell the painting was consistent with the practice of the trade does not excuse 
such conduct. This claim merely confirms the observation of the trial court 
that “in an industry whose transactions cry out for verification of ... title ... it 
is deemed poor practice to probe”. Indeed, commercial indifference to 
ownership or the right to sell facilitates traffic in stolen works of art. 
Commercial indifference diminishes the integrity and increases the 




(iii) Standards of good faith 
Should a different standard of good faith apply to acquisitions of cultural property?  
Although the general concept of good faith discussed earlier remains relevant, there 
is a possible role for the development and use of museum acquisitions guidelines in 
ascertaining good faith,
1595
 as well as industry codes of practice.
1596
 It may moreover 
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be appropriate for more onerous obligations to be placed upon certain categories of 





Unlike in respect of other moveables, purchasers of cultural property will in 
many cases have a means of guarding against the risk of loss. The development of 
title insurance for valuable art works also provides further scope for well-resourced 




A serious problem with reliance on investigation by the purchaser is that fear 
of driving thieves “underground” appears to sometimes deter owners of stolen 
artworks from reporting thefts.
1599
   Moreover, although private means of title 
investigation may be available (such as the Art Loss Register), should the state 
compel purchasers to utilise these private databases (which may, as in the case of 
Hire Purchase Information, often be incomplete or even inaccurate)? 
 
Overall, the great social and historical importance of some cultural objects 
means that it is important to provide incentives for the buyer to conduct a full 
investigation.  Should good faith acquisition be excluded in the case of (appropriately 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Archaeological Heritage: The Inadequate Response” (2005) 34 Annual Review of Anthropology 343, 
citing the case of the Lydian treasure. (On this case, see A Chechi, et al., “Case Lydian Hoard – 
Turkey and Metropolitan Museum of Art,” Platform ArThemis (http://unige.ch/art-adr), Art-Law 
Centre, University of Geneva.) 
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Illicit Trade 193-194. 
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 See K Minyard, “Adding Tools to the Arsenal: Options for Restitution from the Intermediary 
Seller and Recovery for Good-Faith Possessors of Nazi-Looted Art” (2007) 43 Texas International 





 See for example Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation  (n 1483) at315-316, in which the 
Guggenheim museum claimed that it was a “tactical decision” not to inform other museums and 
galleries or the police or other law enforcement authorities that a work by Chagall had been stolen 
from them in case the thieves were driven underground.  This point is noted by S F Grover, “The 
Need for Civil-Law Nations to Adopt Discovery Rules in Art Replevin Actions: A Comparative 
Study” (1992) 70 Texas Law Review 1431 at 1436-1437. For a further example, see Landes and 
Posner, “Economics” at 35. 
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defined) cultural property, a good compromise might be a rule entitling those who 
carry out due diligence to compensation. 
 
(iv) International dimensions 
Regulation of ownership of “cultural heritage” also involves a significant 
international dimension. Although problems of private international law are not 
discussed in any detail, it seems that there is a pressing need for harmony between 
jurisdictions to prevent “laundering” of valuable artworks. An excellent example is 
the Winkworth v Christies
1600
 case, in which Japanese artwork was stolen in England, 
taken to Italy where it was legitimately acquired in accordance with Italian law, then 
brought back to England.
1601
 It was eventually held that a valid acquisition under 
Italian law was sufficient for the acquirer’s ownership to be recognised in England. 
The abuse of good faith acquisition rules certainly takes place.
1602
 Contrary to this 
though, it can also be said that increased protection for original owners does not 
seem to have made much difference to the functioning of the art market in, for 




There have been a number of international conventions seeking to control the 
illicit trade in cultural property.
1604
 Interesting questions are raised about the 
respective roles of public and private law, the restoration of stolen art may represent 
an act of both public and private justice.
1605
 In Islamic Republic of Iran v Barakat 
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Law Review 1055. 
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 See F Francioni, “Public and Private in the International Protection of Global Cultural Goods” 
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Search for Art Stolen by the Nazis and the Legal Rules Governing Restitution of Stolen Art” (1999) 9 





 an unsuccessful attempt was made to argue that Iran’s claim to illegally 
exported antiquities was in reality an attempt to enforce Iran’s penal or public law. 
Although the point will not be explored further here, public as well as private 
international law can also play a role in bridging the gap between differing national 
laws. Although the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 
1607
 has often been criticised,
 1608
 it can also be said to have laid the foundations for 





The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural 
Objects proposes a rule favouring original owners of stolen objects,
1610
 with a right 
to compensation for those who have conducted due diligence.
1611
 Its provisions 
would apply to private persons as well as public institutions. The Convention has 
currently only been ratified by thirty three states, with important art-trading nations 
such as the United States, Japan, France, Germany and the UK not having done 
so.
1612
 Among the reasons cited for the refusal by France and Germany to ratify the 
treaty is incompatibility with the protection of good faith in their respective civil 
codes.
1613
 Although in terms of adoption by states, the Convention cannot (yet) be 
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considered successful, it has been argued that it has had an impact on practices in the 




In the European context, the Return of Cultural Objects Regulations 1994 
which implement Council Directive 93/7/EEC are also relevant. These regulations 
provide for court-ordered removal from the possessor and the return of certain 
categories of cultural objects which have been unlawfully removed from another 
member state. Ownership after return is governed by the law of the requesting 
member state.
1615
 If the possessor exercised due care and attention in acquiring the 
object, there is a right to compensation. In jurisdictions which recognise good faith 
acquisition, such as the Netherlands, an exception is required to the normal rule to 




It is submitted that these international developments add to the arguments 
already outlined for regulating acquisition of “cultural property” separately from 




This chapter began by considering the international context for future developments 
in the law relating to unauthorised transfer of moveables. It was argued that the 
ECHR and EU jurisprudence does not help to identify any single obvious solution to 
the problem of good faith acquisition; there are coherent justifications for protecting 
both original owners and bona fide purchasers. However, it is certainly the case that 
clear provisions determining ownership which further properly-defined objectives 
are required in order to ensure compatibility with human rights and free movement of 
goods principles. This adds to the arguments outlined in Chapter 4 for reform of the 
current law governing unauthorised transfer. 
. 
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What are the foundations on which such reform might be constructed? It is 
submitted that the role of possession in justifying conferral of ownership should be 
limited. Physical possession is not a sufficiently reliable indicator as to whether the 
transferor is the owner. A distinction between cases in which the original owner has 
voluntarily relinquished possession and those in which the property has been lost or 
stolen is not justified by concerns of fairness. In terms of the possession of the 
transferee, this does not provide sufficient reason in itself to confer ownership on 
him or her at the expense of the original owner. Possession in this context should not 
be used as an indicator of good faith. However, it was argued that a transferee who 
does not take possession should not qualify for good faith protection. This is because 
until a buyer takes physical custody, his or her interest in the thing is arguably 
primarily an economic one which can be met with financial compensation.  
 
With regard to the actions of the owner, it is again difficult to envisage this as 
a sensible basis on which to allocate ownership. It is not useful to ask whether the 
original owner has acted to protect his or her assets. Assessing culpability is difficult 
and it is not clear how the law could set a standard which would not impose a heavy 
burden on owners. Nor is the good faith of an acquirer a reliable means of deciding 
whether the interests of acquirer or original owner should be safeguarded. In Scots 
law, good faith is best understood as an exclusionary device.   
 
Which factors, then, might justify increased protection for an acquirer? 
Geographical location of the transaction is no longer a helpful basis for determining 
when to depart from the default nemo plus rule. A rule protecting those who transact 
in the ordinary course of business would, however, link clearly to the perceived need 
for the law to facilitate markets. There are some arguments for a consumer 
protection-based rule but this would also have disadvantages; many potentially 
deserving business acquirers would be left without security. Further protection might 
be justified on a case-by-case basis in relation to state-backed sales.  
 
With regard to whether different rules may be appropriate for different types 
of property, it was argued that increased protection for original owners may be 
276 
 
necessary in respect of cultural goods. Due to the special social and political 
significance of these objects, a good faith rule is more difficult to justify than in 
respect of other moveables.  Itwould make sense, however, to reward buyers who 
carry out due diligence; for example, in the event of the object being reclaimed by an 
original owner recovery of compensation from the seller could be conditional on 
proper enquiries as to ownership having been made. Motor vehicles often feature in 
litigation relating to good faith acquisition, but due to the difficulties of establishing 
ownership the role that a more onerous standard of good faith  could play is 
practically limited. Particularly where it is desired to use a vehicle as security, a 
system for registering such securities would be desirable. Further research is 
necessary to establish whether there is a compelling need for increased protection for 
purchasers of motor vehicles and the impact that this might have on other interested 
parties such as insurers. Whatever approach is adopted, the current legal distinction 
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